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Abstract 
This dissertation proposes that in democratic government understanding citizens is a key 
to effective public management and understanding taxpayers is a key to successful tax 
administration. Tax compliance has long been a prevalent issue in many countries including 
Thailand, where a personal income tax gap is at least 200 billion Baht ($6.7 billion) or 10% of 
the total revenue. The two major purposes of this study are 1) to explore citizens’ perceptions of 
the Thai personal income tax system and the matter of tax compliance and 2) to identify 
important determinants of tax compliance behavior in Thailand. This study used two research 
methods: a face-to-face survey of 1,148 citizens in Bangkok and interviews with 15 Thai tax 
experts. The survey findings suggest that significant determinants of tax compliance behavior in 
Thailand are: enforcement perceptions, fairness of the tax system perceptions, tax knowledge, 
and demographic characteristics, which confirm that both the traditional utility maximization and 
the alternative behavioral approaches are necessary for understanding tax compliance issues. Tax 
experts’ opinions support the survey results. This study recommends a comprehensive package 
of strategies for increasing tax compliance in Thailand, which includes making tax system more 
fair via lowering tax rates, broadening tax base, eliminating unnecessary allowances and 
deductions, linking welfare benefits to tax filing, improving the penalty enforcement, educating 
citizens about tax duties and the sense of citizenship, and improving government administration 
and revenue spending in the long run. This study contributes to both academics and practitioners 
by serving as the first comprehensive tax compliance database in Thailand.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 Public management has shifted away from a closed-system approach, characterized by 
managerial focus within their own organizations (Taylor, 1912; Weber, 1922; Maslow, 1954; 
McGregor, 1960), and has moved toward an open-system approach, adaptive systems, and 
contingency theories, characterized by strategic interactions with external environments. This 
suggests that public organizations operate within complex and dynamic environments and adjust 
or adapt themselves in order to survive (Kath and Kahn, 1966; Thompson, 1967; Cohen, March, 
and Olsen, 1972; Gaus, 1947; Selznick, 1949; Schon, 1978). One way that public organizations 
adapt themselves to external environments is by engaging citizens into decision making 
processes e.g. public participation, representative bureaucracy, and collaborative governance. 
The benefits of engaging citizens derive from understanding the demand of the constituents 
better, and thus, reduce conflicts and constraints faced by public organizations. As a result, 
objectives of public organizations, of not only effectiveness and efficiency, but also fairness and 
social equity will be easier to achieve.1  
Engaging citizens in the decision making processes of government also affects how tax 
collection agencies approach the issue of tax revenue collection. This research proposes to the 
field of Public Administration that understanding citizens’ behavior is a key to effective public 
management. Rather than focusing only on tax administration within an organization, taxpayer 
                                                          
1
 In 1968, young and brilliant public administration scholars under 35 years old under the lead of H. George 
Frederickson, W. Henry Lambright, and Frank Marini was gathered in the first Minnowbrook Conference to discuss 
about the problems in the field of public administration and proposed to the field “the new public administration”.  
New public administration is more interested in real problems and in the public. It, thus, adds social equity as 
another core value of public administration and focuses more on citizen participation (Frederickson, 1971, 1980; 
Frederickson & Smith, 2003) Other concepts include the promotion of changes e.g. decentralization, devolution, 
evaluation, contracts, and client involvement.  
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behavior should become a center of attention.  Although paying taxes is a compulsory duty of 
most citizens, citizen compliance is essential in determining the effectiveness of tax collection 
agencies, i.e., how much tax revenues will be collected in practice?  
 
Statement of the Problem 
Tax compliance has long been a prevalent issue in many countries. In 2006, the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) estimated that the United States has about $300 billion tax gap, which is 
the amount of income taxes not collected due to noncompliance (Alm & McKee, 2006). Tax 
compliance situation outside the United States are even worse (Slemrod, 1992). The statistics 
(Ministry of Finance of Thailand, 2011a) showed that in 2009 there were only about 9 million 
people who file tax in Thailand out of 18 million people who were obliged to pay taxes of those 
30 million people who were in labor force. Out of that 9 million people, only 2 million people 
were really paying personal income taxes (i.e., others are exempted or get tax returns). It is 
predicted that there are approximately 8 million people in Thailand who do not file taxes. 
However, there is no official tax gap calculation for Thailand. In my opinion, it is reasonable to 
expect that if there are about 2 million people that are obliged to pay taxes, out of those 8 million 
people, Thailand will have approximately 200 billion Baht2 ($6.7 billion) tax gap in personal 
income taxes. That gap would be 10 percent of total revenues for Thailand.  
The author lives in Thailand and also works as an economist at the Fiscal Policy Office, 
Ministry of Finance of Thailand. From the author’s experience, tax compliance issues have not 
                                                          
2
 Based on 2010 statistics (Ministry of Finance of Thailand, 2011b), personal income taxes’ revenue was 208 billion 
Baht from 2 million people currently paying taxes.  The tax gap is estimated as generating equal revenue from 
having 2 million people more that will legally have to pay taxes.  
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been given enough attention especially for personal income taxes. Thailand is among the three 
least tax compliant countries with a tax evasion score of 53.34 percent of GDP while the United 
States (8.6%), Switzerland (9.13%), and Austria (10.43%) are the most tax compliant countries 
(Tsakumis, Curatola, & Porcano, 2007). So far, there has been no systematic study for ways to 
increase tax compliance in Thailand even though the tax evasion situation is more severe than in 
the United States. 
Most tax compliance studies are about the tax systems in the United States and other 
developed countries. There are relatively few studies analyzing tax compliance in developing 
countries, mainly because of data availability problems (Alm, 1999). Studies of tax compliance 
are also very limited in Thailand with only a few studies on tax evasion and tax administration 
problems (Channarong, 2009; Gallkiew, 1985; Machamnean, 1999). The one that is most related 
to this study is Gallkiew’s study back in the year 1985. Gallkiew explored problems in direct tax 
administration in Thailand, which he found four causes why people did not file income tax from 
personal service: 1) low standard of education of taxpayers, 2) negative attitude of taxpayers 
toward the government and the Revenue department, 3) ambiguity of the Revenue Code, and 4) 
inefficiency in tax administration of the Revenue Department. The other two studies focus on the 
legal perspectives that involve the revision of the Revenue Code. Machamnean (1999) looked at 
the insufficiency of the Revenue Code in handling with tax avoidance so that he suggested the 
introduction of statutory general anti-avoidance measures instead of using interpretation from the 
Supreme Court’s decisions. Chanarong (2009) focused on the abuse of tax units to minimize tax 
burden by filing personal income taxes as an ordinary partnership or a non-juristic body of 
persons instead of as individuals. He proposed anti-abusive measures that include the revision of 
the Revenue Code to address the loopholes of deduction allowance among different tax units.  
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However, none of these studies comprehensively explored the citizens’ perceptions on 
tax administration and the determinants of tax compliance from the citizens’ point of view.  A 
more comprehensive and up-to-date research on the perceptions of citizens towards tax 
administration and tax compliance is still very much needed.  Learning about factors that affect 
tax compliance behavior will help Thai tax administration agencies increase citizen compliance, 
and hence, raise organizational effectiveness by increasing revenues. Comparing these results to 
the United States and other developed countries as well as applying the results to other similar 
developing countries would contribute to the understanding of public management as citizen 
compliance for both academics and practitioners.  
Since tax compliance literature in the United States have found several factors that could 
affect income tax compliance behavior, namely tax audits, penalties, positive incentives, tax 
amnesties, and attitudes and perceptions toward tax systems together with control variables such 
as tax rates, actual income levels, and other demographic characteristics, it would be very 
interesting to see whether these factors will yield similar effects in Thailand. Because of different 
economic, social, and political contexts and higher tax evasion than in the United States, it is 
unlikely that the perceptions and determinants of tax compliance will be the same in Thailand.  
The primary purpose of this study is to explore citizens’ perceptions of the Thai tax 
system and the matter of tax compliance. And, the secondary purpose is a causal analysis of what 
causes, explains, or influences tax compliance.  The primary research question is then:  how 
citizens perceive the Thai personal income tax system? And, the secondary research question is: 
what are the important determinants of taxpayer compliance in Thailand?  
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The Significance of Tax Compliance Issues 
Tax compliance is important in many respects. First, tax revenues are the largest and 
most significant sources of revenues for every country. If the governments can promote more 
compliance from taxpayers, tax revenues will increase without having to raise tax rates or 
expand the tax base, which could avoid political tensions. This is especially important during 
economic downturns.  
Second, tax compliance reflects a country’s true tax system. As discussed by Slemrod 
(1992), a country’s tax system could not only be determined by tax rate and the tax base but also 
tax administration and enforcement. Progressive tax rate structure could even become regressive 
if the taxes are not collected from high-income groups. If that is the case, tax policy will be 
distorted or will not serve its purpose to achieve efficiency and equity.  
Third, related to the second point, tax compliance concerns equity and fairness issues in 
public administration. If taxes are not collected from some groups within society, tax systems, 
bureaucrats, and the government are not perceived as fair and ethical by its citizens, and then 
lose their legitimacy. In today’s anticorruption era, fairness and transparency are among the most 
critical issues included in tax administration as governments need to be responsive to their 
citizens.  
Lastly but most importantly, tax compliance helps address the problem of organizational 
design in public management theory. Tax authorities, despite having imperfect information about 
the tax compliance behavior of citizens., have to design taxation, audit, and punishment schemes 
to meet their revenue objectives (Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein, 1998, p. 819). This is the classic 
principal-agent problem. Modern public management theories suggest that public organizations 
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operate in an open system and must be responsive to their environment. Incorporating tax 
compliance behavior of citizens will help tax collection agencies develop better strategies and 
increase tax collection efficiency. Thus, tax compliance could be considered an important issue 
for a public management that strives for both efficiency and equity.  
 
Theoretical Approach 
The three most popular phrases encountered by tax administrators and public finance 
scholars regarding the issue of tax compliance are tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax 
compliance. Tax avoidance refers to a situation in which people legally find loopholes in tax 
laws for the purpose of not paying taxes or paying lower taxes. Tax evasion refers to those who 
illegally avoid paying taxes they owe. Tax compliance describes persons who pay taxes they 
owe, the opposite of tax noncompliance and tax evasion. Tax avoidance is, however, not 
considered tax noncompliance as they still comply with tax laws.  
James D. Sorg (1983) classified the term compliance into four categories: intentional 
compliance (intend to comply and successfully comply), intentional non-compliance (intend not 
to comply and successfully non-comply), unintentional compliance (intend not to comply but 
unsuccessfully non-comply), and unintentional non-compliance (intend to comply but 
unsuccessfully comply). Sorg originally used these categories to explain the behaviors of 
frontline implementer - a lower participant in the organization. His broadest definition of 
frontline implementer includes private citizens in the case of many regulatory and tax policies 
that are the people who ultimately affect the implementation of the policy (Sorg, 1983, p. 391). 
Sorg’s four compliance categories, therefore I believe, could be employed to address tax 
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compliance behaviors of citizens, which could be intentional or unintentional and successfully or 
unsuccessfully comply in paying taxes.  
Tax compliance has been systematically studied after the publication of Allingham and 
Sandmo’s “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis” (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). 
Allingham and Sandmo studied income tax compliance behavior by relating it to studies of the 
economics of criminal activities by Becker (1968), including rational decision making under 
uncertainty, and expected utility theory.  There are two major streams in tax compliance 
literature: traditional utility maximization approach and alternative approach. Mikesell and 
Birskyte (2007) called these two approaches the compliance lottery view and the responsible 
taxpayer view respectively. In the compliance lottery view, taxpayers have two choices: to 
declare actual income or declare less than actual income (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972, p. 324). 
Taxpayers make a rational calculation by weighing the gains from successful non-compliance 
(tax obligation that is not paid and kept for personal use) against the expected loss of being 
caught (values of the penalty times the probability of detection) (Mikesell & Birskyte, 2007, p. 
1046). Declared income is then expected to increase as penalty rate and probability of detection 
rise. This approach, however, assumes that people pay taxes primarily because of the fear of 
detection and punishment, in other words tax compliance depends solely on enforcement (Alm, 
1999, p. 743). Tax compliance studies under this compliance lottery view aims at reducing tax 
avoidance and tax evasion and increasing tax compliance through enforcement measures that 
reduce intentional non-compliance. 
As one might expect, there are other factors that could affect taxpayers’ decision to 
underreport. According to Mikesell and Birskyte (2007), the other major view on tax compliance 
is the responsible taxpayer view. People will pay taxes when: 1) they are motivated to do so, 2) 
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they understand clearly what their taxpaying obligations are, and 3) payment of those obligations 
is made convenient (Mikesell & Birskyte, 2007, p. 1048). This model promotes compliance via a 
softer approach which encourages the compliance of unintentional non-compliance taxpayers 
rather than intentional non-compliance. Convenience, assistance, and education are necessary to 
correct unintentional non-compliance.  
The compliance lottery and the responsible taxpayer are the two major views in tax 
compliance literature. Understanding both perspectives is crucial for the government to develop 
measures and techniques to reduce both intentional and unintentional non-compliance and 
promote intentional and unintentional compliance. 
 
Research Methodology  
This study will explore citizens’ perceptions of the Thai personal income tax system 
which includes perceptions of enforcement, fairness of the tax system, government 
administration, tax knowledge, and demographic characteristics.  
Secondarily, this study will assess what could influence tax compliance behavior by 
testing five primary hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Perceptions of greater enforcement increase tax compliance behavior 
in Thailand. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Perceptions of fairer tax system increase tax compliance behavior in 
Thailand. 
    9 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Perceptions of better government administration increase tax 
compliance behavior in Thailand.  
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Greater tax knowledge increases tax compliance behavior in 
Thailand. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Those with higher income (H5.1), those who are older (H5.2), those 
who are married (H5.3), those who are female (H5.4), those who are not self-employed (H5.5), 
and those with higher levels of education (H5.6) tend to have higher tax compliance. 
 
This study uses a mix-method research approach which includes both quantitative and 
qualitative analyses. The primary source of data this study will be based on a survey in order to 
develop a database of personal income tax compliance behavior in Thailand. The research will 
focus on studying perception and compliance behavior of personal income taxpayers in 
Bangkok. Bangkok is the capital city of Thailand with a population of over 10 million people or 
about 2.5 million households (four people per family on average), which represents the largest 
proportion of taxpayers in Thailand. Approximately 1,000 people will be asked for their opinions 
on a five-point Likert scale under various circumstances designed to test hypotheses 1 to 5. The 
quantitative analysis would be done via exploratory factor analysis and structural equation 
modeling. 
In addition to the quantitative analysis from the survey, qualitative analysis will be 
conducted via in-depth interviews with tax exerts. The interviews of tax experts, which include 
tax administrators, tax policy experts, and professors, will be conducted to gain better insights of 
tax compliance issues and investigate further explanations of tax compliance behavior in 
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Thailand. The interview results will be used to supplement the survey results for a more 
comprehensive understanding of tax compliance issues. 
 
Expected Contributions 
This study will contribute to both academics and practitioners. The findings will 
theoretically benefit to the fields of public administration and public finance in explaining the 
problems of citizen compliance and developing strategies to improve tax compliance situation by 
understanding citizens. The results of this study will also provide the first firmly-established 
database on income tax compliance for researchers in Thailand to build upon. For practitioners, 
the study will provide useful information and analysis for tax authorities in Thailand and other 
similar developing countries to aid in designing strategies to increase taxpayer compliance and, 
therefore, achieve higher organizational effectiveness.  
This study proposes public management as the citizen compliance approach to 
understand and serve the citizens better by asking directly what they think and what would make 
them willing to comply more. Public administration in the era of governance3 seeks cooperation 
and participation from citizens. Taxpayers, as the largest group of citizens, surely deserve the 
attention of public administration research. This study will give a clearer picture of the effects of 
                                                          
3
 The word “governance” is now very popular in public administration literature and even used interchangeably with 
“public administration” or “public management” (Frederickson & Smith, 2003; Garvey, 1997; Kettl, 2000; Peters & 
Pierre, 1998; Salamon & Lund, 1989). The relationship between government and society has indeed changed 
especially after global reform efforts known as the “New Public Management” in New Zealand and other 
Westminster model or parliamentary countries since 1980s and the “Reinventing Government” in the United States 
reform in President Bill Clinton.  Since then, governments have become less hierarchical, more decentralized, and 
increasingly delegates works to private sector (Kettl, 2000). Governments need to find ways to manage contracted-
out services or third-party government, coordinate among organizations both vertically and horizontally and among 
different types of organizations including private and non-profit sectors, and response to ever changing citizens’ 
demands in the globalization era. 
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enforcement perception, fairness of the tax system perception, government administration 
perception, tax knowledge, and demographic characteristics on tax compliance behavior in 
Thailand. This study integrates both the traditional utility maximization approach (compliance 
lottery view) and alternative approach (responsible taxpayer view) to determine primary factors 
that affect taxpayer compliance in Thailand from a comprehensive view.   
To conclude, public management as citizen compliance offers tax authorities ways in 
incorporating taxpayer compliance behavior to increase organizational tax-collection 
effectiveness and yield higher revenues for the country. Learning about perceptions and factors 
that affect taxpayer compliance will help tax authorities in Thailand and other similar developing 
countries to develop strategies that help enhance citizen compliance and, hence, increase public 
organizational effectiveness of tax authorities. Ultimately, this study will add another valuable 
perspective to the field of public administration by focusing on citizens as a central public 
management key.  
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Summary of Subsequent Chapters 
 This chapter has introduced the issues of tax compliance, major theoretical approaches, 
research methodology, and the expected contributions of this study to the field of public 
administration. In subsequent chapters, a more comprehensive discussion of tax compliance 
literature, detailed hypotheses and research methodology, data analysis and findings, and 
conclusion and recommendations will be presented. A brief summary of each subsequent chapter 
is provided below. 
 Chapter two presents a review of literature on tax compliance. This chapter includes an 
overview of Thai tax system, tax compliance studies in Thailand and the comparative 
perspectives, evolution of tax compliance literature, tax compliance research methodologies, and 
determinants of tax compliance. This chapter focuses on identifying the gap of the existing 
literature and the establishment of a conceptual framework for this study.  
 Chapter three describes the research questions, the hypotheses, and the research 
methodology used in this study. The survey and interview processes are presented. The research 
analysis techniques are also provided here. 
 Chapter four presents the survey results for the first research question on citizens’ 
perception of Thai personal income tax system and tax compliance. The descriptive statistic 
findings are presented in six categories including tax rates perceptions, tax non-compliance 
reasons, perceptions of tax compliance related issues, audit and penalty knowledge and 
perceptions, tax compliance strategies, and tax compliance behaviors. 
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Chapter five presents the survey results for the second research question on the 
determinants of tax compliance behavior in Thailand. Factor analysis and latent transition 
analysis are used to test the five major hypothesis of this study. The results of the five hypotheses 
on what influence tax compliance in Thailand are discussed. 
Chapter six presents opinions of tax experts from the interview results. The experts’ 
opinions on reasons for tax non-compliance and tax evasion situation in Thailand, weaknesses 
and strengths of current tax administration systems, factors that affect tax compliance behavior, 
and strategies that could help increase tax compliance are explored.  
The final chapter summarizes the key findings and presents implications and 
recommendations from this study. The chapter concludes with academic and practical 
contributions and directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
 The Review of Tax Compliance Literature 
The studies on tax compliance and tax evasion both attempt to improve the efficiency of 
tax administration. In my opinion, however, these two terms convey different meanings. The 
term tax compliance, in particular, has a positive connotation, i.e. citizens generally comply with 
tax laws. Tax compliance studies infer the attempt to raise citizens’ willingness to comply with 
tax laws. The term tax evasion, on the other hand, has a negative connotation, i.e. citizens are 
likely to evade taxes. Tax evasion studies imply an attempt to stop citizens from evading taxes. 
This study uses the term tax compliance with a specific purpose to convey a positive connotation 
associated with it. Although paying taxes is considered a duty of every citizen, government in a 
democratic society should listen more to citizens’ voices in order to know their concerns. 
Understanding the citizens better may help raise their willingness to pay taxes and mitigate tax 
avoidance and tax evasion, which should definitely work better than forcing them to comply with 
tax laws.  
The purpose of this chapter is to explore what have been done and what are still missing 
in tax compliance literature. First of all, an overview of Thai tax system is presented in order to 
provide some background essential to the context of this study. Next, tax compliance studies in 
Thailand are presented along with the comparative perspectives on tax compliance. Then, the 
evolution of tax compliance literature is discussed. After that, the research methodology in tax 
compliance is explored. Next, the determinants of tax compliance are presented. The chapter 
concludes with key points discussed in the chapter.   
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I. The Overview of Thai Tax System  
 Revenue Structure 
Net taxes amounts to 1,510,387.7 million Baht in fiscal year 2011, equivalent to 73 
percent of the estimated receipts. Tax revenues usually account for 16 - 17 percent of GDP.  The 
major differences between Thai or other developing countries’ tax system and the United States 
or other developed countries is that Thai system relies very much on indirect taxes. Indirect 
taxes, which include general sales tax (e.g. value added tax, specific business tax, and stamp 
duties), specific sales tax (e.g. petroleum and petroleum products, excise tax on imports, 
consumption tax, mining royalties, petroleum royalties, and natural resources royalties), export 
and import duties, and licensing fees account for 60 percent of gross tax revenue.  Direct taxes, 
which include personal income tax, corporate income tax, and petroleum income tax, account for 
41 percent of gross tax revenue. The largest amounts of tax revenues are from value added tax 
(29% of gross taxes) and corporate income tax (24% of gross taxes).  Personal income tax, in 
particular, accounts for only 12 percent of gross tax revenue (Bureau of the Budget, 2011). See 
Table 2.1 for tax revenue composition.  
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Taxes Revenues 
(Million Baht) 
% from 
Gross Taxes 
Direct Taxes  737,200 41% 
 Personal Income Tax 217,000 12% 
 Corporate Income Tax 430,200 24% 
 Petroleum Income Tax 90,000 5% 
Indirect Taxes 1,081,687 59% 
 General Sales Tax 568,150 31% 
  Value Added Tax 531,800 29% 
  Specific Business Tax 23,000 1% 
  Stamp Duties 8,350 0% 
 Specific Sales Tax 424,867 23% 
  Petroleum and Petroleum Products 151,700 8% 
  Excise Tax on Imports 36,590 2% 
  Consumption Tax 198,771 11% 
  Mining Royalties 802 0% 
  Petroleum Royalties 36,997 2% 
  Natural Resources Royalties 6 0% 
 Export – Import Duties 86,100 5% 
 License Fees 2,571 0% 
Deductions -308,500 -17% 
 Revenue Department’s Rebates -212,800 -12% 
Allocation of VAT to the Provincial Administrative 
Organizations 
-11,900 -1% 
 Export Compensation -13,300 -1% 
 Allocation to Local Administrative Organizations -70,500 -4% 
Gross Taxes (Direct Taxes + Indirect Taxes) 1,818,887 100% 
Net Taxes (Direct Taxes + Indirect Taxes – Deductions) 1,510,387 83% 
 
Table 2.1: Tax Revenue Composition 
Source: Thailand’s Budget In Brief Fiscal Year 2011 (2011), Bureau of the Budget, Thailand. 
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The reason why developing countries rely more on indirect taxes could be because it is 
easier to administer and have less (direct) effect on the wealthier groups (i.e. the groups that are 
more politically powerful). The problem with too much reliance on indirect tax is that it fails to 
address the problem of equity or income distribution unlike direct taxes. Income taxes with the 
use of progressive tax rates could tax the rich with higher tax rates than the poor to address the 
equity problem. If the direct tax system does not working properly to address the equity problem, 
the rich will keep getting richer and the poor will keep getting poorer. 
 There are three ways to increase any tax revenues 1) increase tax rates, 2) expand tax 
bases, and 3) improve the efficiency of tax collection or tax administration.  For this study, our 
focus is on the third way in improving the efficiency of personal income taxes’ collection by 
understanding more about tax compliance behavior of Thai citizens.  The major problem with 
increasing the tax rates or expanding the tax bases is that they are not politically desirable. It is 
simply not wise for politicians to announce tax increases and risk losing their votes in the next 
elections. Furthermore, more exemptions, deductions, and allowances have been introduced to 
support each government’s policy goals. Improving the efficiency of personal income tax 
collection seems to be the most desirable way to raise personal income taxes’ revenues.  
 Responsible Agencies  
In Thailand, there are four related agencies responsible for tax policy and administration 
under the Ministry of Finance. The Fiscal Policy Office is responsible for recommending fiscal 
policy to the Minister of Finance. The Tax Policy Bureau under the Fiscal Policy office is 
responsible for proposing tax policies and coordinating with tax collection agencies on the 
implementation of those policies. The Revenue Department is responsible for the administration 
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of income and sale taxes, which generates the largest portion of revenue for the country at 71.8 
percent of gross tax revenue in fiscal year 2011. The Excise Department is responsible for the 
administration of excise taxes that include sin taxes and tax on luxury goods, which generates 
21.3 percent of the revenue.  And, the Customs Department is responsible for the administration 
of custom duties, which generates 4.7 percent of the revenue (Bureau of the Budget, 2011). 
Among the three tax collection agencies, the Revenue Department could be considered the most 
powerful.  
In addition to the Ministry of Finance’s agencies, there are the Bureau of the Budget and 
the National and the National Economics and Social Development Board (NESDB). The Bureau 
of the Budget is a central agency under office of the Prime Minister that is responsible for 
coordinating with all governmental agencies and preparing annual government budgets to submit 
to the parliament. The NESDB, also under office of the Prime Minister, is responsible for 
formulating a 5-year National and Economic Development Plan and recommending and advising 
the government on economic and social issues. These agencies typically work together on 
planning and forecasting revenues and expenditures.  
 Personal Income Taxes System  
According to A Guide to Thai Taxation (Fiscal Policy Office, 2005, p. 2), the personal 
income tax is “a direct tax levied on income earned from sources within or outside Thailand 
during the taxable year.” Income incurring abroad from residents is subjected to tax only when 
those income are brought back into the country. Residents of Thailand include those who reside 
in Thailand for more than 180 days in any tax year (i.e. the same as calendar year). A non-
resident, on the other hand, is subjected to tax only when income is generated within Thailand. 
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Personal income taxpayers include individuals, nonjuristic partnership or body of persons, a 
taxpayer who dies during the tax year, and undivided estates. According to the Revenue Code, 
taxpayers must file a return of the income obtained the preceding tax year on or before the last 
day of March every year.  
There are 8 categories of assessable income: 1) income from personal service rendered to 
employers, 2) income by virtue of office or service rendered, 3) income from copyright, 
franchise or any other right, annuity, etc., 4) income in the nature of interest, dividends, gains 
from transfer of shares, etc., 5) income from letting out properties on hire, breach of a hire 
purchase contract or of a contract of installment sales, 6) income from liberal professions, 7) 
income from a contract of work with materials provided, 8) income from business, commerce, 
industry, transport, or other activities not listed above (Fiscal Policy Office, 2005). There are also 
some types of income that are exempted from personal income taxes e.g., actual medical 
expenses paid by employers, interest from tax refunds, interest from government lotteries, 
interest on saving deposit not exceeding 10,000 baht, income from sale of stocks registered in the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand, income from sale of investment units in a mutual fund, income of a 
mutual fund, inherited pension and inherited gratuity, inheritance excluding immovable property, 
etc.  
Not the whole amount of income is used to calculate personal income taxes, deductible 
expenses and allowance are allowed. There are two types of deductible expenses: standard and 
actual. See Table 2.2 for details of standard expenses.  Actual expenses are allowed from income 
in categories 5, 6, 7, 8 with the adequate proof of expenses. If the actual expense is lower than 
the allowed standard expenses after the actual method is chosen, only the actual expenses proved 
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by evidences can be deducted. Apart from deductible expenses, several types of allowance are 
also permitted. See Table 2.3 for the details of allowances. 
   
Categories Assessable Income Standard Expense 
1,2 
Personal service and by virtue of office 40% but not exceeding  
60,000 baht 
3 
Copyright 40% but not exceeding  
60,000 baht 
4 
Letting out property on hire  
 
- building and wharves 30% 
 
- agricultural land 20% 
 
- all other land 15% 
 
- vehicles 30% 
 
- any other property 10% 
5 
Breach of a hire-purchase contract or of a contract 
of installment sale 
20% 
6 
Liberal professions  
 
- medical profession 60% 
 
- other profession 30% 
7 
Contract of work 70% 
8 
Business, commerce and others 65-85% 
 
Table 2.2: Standard Deductible Expenses  
Source: A Guide to Thai Taxation (2005), Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry of Finance of Thailand  
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Types of Allowance Amount 
Personal allowance 30,000 baht 
Spouse allowance 30,000 baht 
Parent (and parent in law) allowance  30,000 baht 
Child allowance  15,000 baht 
Child’s education allowance   2,000 baht 
The taxpayer is an estate  30,000 baht 
The taxpayer is a nonjuristic partnership or body of 
persons allowance 
30,000 baht but not exceeding 60,000 baht in 
total 
Life insurance premium allowance actual amount but not exceeding 50,000 baht 
Social insurance fund allowance  actual amount 
Interest allowance for residential purpose actual amount but not exceeding 50,000 baht 
Provident fund or Pension Fund and Retirement Mutual 
Fund allowance 
300,000 baht or not exceeding 15% of net 
income 
Long Term Equity Fund  300,000 baht or not exceeding 15% of net 
income 
Donation allowance   amount donated but not exceeding 10% of 
remainder of income after the deduction of all 
the preceding allowances 
 
Table 2.3: Types of Allowance 
Source: A Guide to Thai Taxation (2005), Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry of Finance of Thailand  
 
The net income, after deductible expenses and allowances, is subjected to a 5-level 
progressive tax rate. Not surprisingly, Thailand current income tax rates have been used since the 
year 1992, which is almost 20 years. The only adjustment to these rates from the year 1992 was 
only to raise the exemption level from 100,000 to 150,000 Baht in 2008. See Table 2.4 for 
personal income tax rates.  
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Taxable Income (Baht) Tax Rate (%) 
0  -     150,000 exempted 
150,001  -     500,000 10 
500,001  -  1,000,000 20 
1,000,001  -  4,000,000 30 
Over      4,000,000 37 
 
Table 2.4: Personal Income Tax Rates 
Source: A Guide to Thai Taxation (2005), Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry of Finance of Thailand   
  
II. Tax Compliance Studies in Thailand and the Comparative Perspectives  
 Tax Compliance Studies in Thailand 
Tax compliance studies are still in an early stage for Thailand with less than 10 studies 
related to tax compliance done by both Thai and international scholars.  
The studies of Thai scholars are mostly from Master’s dissertations for Department of 
Law. Among these, the most relevant study is Gallkiew’s Problems and Propositions to Improve 
Direct Tax Administration in Thailand: Income Tax from Personal Service that was done since 
1985. Gallkiew (1985) used questionnaires (230 people in Bangkok and metropolitan area), 
interviews (8 people with different levels of education), and observation including documentary 
analysis (the Revenue Code, statistical documents, and local news). He found four problems for 
personal income taxes in Thailand: 1) low standard of education of taxpayers, 2) negative 
attitude of taxpayers toward the government and the Revenue department, 3) ambiguity of the 
Revenue Code, and 4) inefficiency in tax administration of the Revenue Department. Gallkiew’s 
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study could be considered so far the most comprehensive study in Thailand on personal income 
taxes.  
Meanwhile, the other two studies are very legal-specific.  Machamnean’s study on Anti-
Avoidance Tax Measure (1999) recommends the introduction of statutory general anti-avoidance 
measures instead of using interpretation from the Supreme Court’s decisions. Machamnean’s 
suggestions make sense as it is usually better to prevent than to correct problems after they 
happened. The remaining problems will be what should be stated in those measures. 
Machamnean recommended looking at taxpayers’ evasion actions, which result in the shift of tax 
burden. He also suggested the Revenue Department to announce regulations, explanations, and 
discussion about anti-avoidance tax measures to the public and allow disputes from related 
occupational organizations. Chanarong’s study on Anti-Tax Evasion Measures Related with 
Establishment of an Ordinary Partnership or a Non-Juristic Body of Persons (2009) proposed 
the amendment of the Revenue Code and related regulations to prevent the abuse of tax units in 
minimizing tax burden by filing personal income taxes as an ordinary partnership or a non-
juristic body of persons instead of individuals. Although these two studies are useful in legal 
perspectives, it is not designed to be comprehensive and is less relevant to this study.   
There are two international studies that explore tax compliance related issues in Thailand. 
McGee (2006) conducted a survey of Thai accounting students on opinions regarding tax 
evasion. There are four hypotheses: 1) the average respondent will believe that tax evasion is 
sometimes ethical; 2) tax evasion will be more acceptable when the statement refers to 
government corruption; 3) opposition to tax evasion will be strongest in cases where it appears 
that taxpayers are getting something in return for their money, or where there is a perception that 
there is a duty to other taxpayers to pay taxes, even if there may not be a duty to government; 
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and 4) females will be more strongly opposed to tax evasion than males. The results support all 
four hypotheses.  The interesting finding is that the respondents think tax evasion is more 
acceptable in the case of governmental corruption and unfair tax system. McGee claims that 
results of surveys from other countries namely Guatemala, Romania, and international business 
professors are also similar, which lead him to believe that the attitude toward tax evasion is 
similar across cultural and geographical differences. However, McGee’s later work in 2008
4
 on 
Opinion on Tax Evasion in Asia  reports variation in oppositional level and attitudes toward tax 
evasion among countries but still suggest strong opposition to tax evasion across countries 
(McGee, 2008). 
James, Svetalekth, and Wright (2006) studied the attitudes and perceptions of tax officials 
in which they considered having important effects on efficiency and effectiveness of tax 
administration. They conducted a survey of 1,175 Thai excise officials with a response rate of 
47.7 percent. There were also 25 follow-up interviews with excise staff, entrepreneurs, and tax 
advisers. James et al. attempted to find a balanced system for measuring organizational and 
employee performance and incorporating employee satisfaction measures. The findings suggest 
regional excise tax officials tend to have more positive attitudes than central officials, which 
could result from internal management, participation in decision-making, working experience, 
and living expenses. However, the relationship between attitudes and productivity is not simple. 
The Bangkok region has the highest productivity but lowest satisfaction scores of excise 
officials. Conversely, the survey results indicate that a low productivity region has the highest 
satisfaction scores.  
                                                          
4
 The work of McGee (2008) will be discussed in more details in the following section of this chapter. 
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These two international studies, however, tell only a small part of tax compliance story. 
McGee’s study reflects only opinion on tax evasion from a small group of accounting students, 
which could not represent the attitudes of a larger Thai taxpayers’ population. The study of 
James et al. focuses only at the attitudes of excise tax officials not the behavior of general citizen 
taxpayers.  
Overall these studies of both Thai and international scholars are tax compliance-related 
but not exactly tax compliance studies. So far, there is no study that attempts to approach tax 
evasion problems from tax compliance perspectives i.e., exploring citizens’ perception and 
finding determinants of tax compliance behaviors. Therefore, a more systematic study and 
analysis on taxpayer’s perceptions and factors that affect Thai citizens’ tax compliance behavior 
are needed. 
 Comparative Perspectives on Tax Compliance 
The comparative studies on tax compliance usually expect to see variations in attitudes 
and behaviors among various countries. There are relatively few studies that explore tax 
compliance problems in developing countries because of data availability problem (Alm, 1999). 
Ahmed Riahi-Belkaoui’s Bureaucracy, Corruption and Tax Compliance in Taxation and 
Public Finance in Transition and Developing Economies investigates the relationships between 
the size of bureaucracy and tax compliance situation and the level of corruption and tax 
compliance (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2008). The study includes 30 developed and developing countries 
that have data on tax compliance, bureaucracy, and corruption. Tax compliance is measured by 
an assessment of the level of tax compliance from the Global Competitive Report 1996 in La 
Porta, Lopez-deSilvanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (1999). Bureaucracy is measured by the 
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percentage of government expenditures over gross domestic product for 1991 to 1995 from the 
World Bank sources.  And, corruption is measured by a “control of corruption” score from 
Kaufman, Kray, and Zoido-Lobaton (2002), which measures perceptions of corruption or “the 
exercise of public power for private gain.” The findings show that tax compliance is positively 
related to the level of bureaucracy and negatively related to the level of corruption. In other 
words, smaller bureaucracy and lower corruption are associated with higher tax compliance. It 
could be implied that developing countries, which usually have bigger bureaucracy and higher 
corruption, has lower tax compliance. 
Robert W. McGee’ study on Opinion on Tax Evasion in Asia is published in the same 
book, which he is also an editor (McGee, 2008).  McGee focuses on whether tax evasion is 
justifiable. The literature indicates tax evasion is justifiable where government was corrupted or 
where the tax system was perceived as unfair. McGee employed the data from the Human 
Beliefs and Values Surveys, which were face to face interviews, which conducted in 13 Asian 
countries with the sample sizes between 780 and 2,002 during 2000-2003. The countries that 
were included are Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Kyrgyzstan, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Turkey, and Vietnam. Respondents were asked to rate 
on a ten-point scale on the statement “cheating on taxes if you have a chance”, where one is 
“never justifiable” and ten is “always justifiable.” Muslim countries are most opposed to tax 
evasion because of their religious beliefs. The Philippines had the highest score of 3.14, which 
indicates that even the country that was least opposed to tax evasion compared to other countries 
is still strongly opposed to tax evasion. The nature of the surveys of face to face interviews might 
lead the respondents into saying that they are strongly opposed to tax evasion. Some 
demographic factors were also suggested from the surveys including sex and age. Females are 
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generally more firmly opposed to tax evasion than men.  Besides, opposition to tax evasion 
increases with ages. McGee’s study points out variations among countries in perceiving tax 
evasion as justifiable.  
Tsakumis, Curatola, and Porcano’s The Relation between National Cultural Dimensions 
and Tax Evasion (2007) explores the cultural effects on intentional noncompliance across 
countries. Tsakumis et al. employed Hofstede’s cultural dimensions to explain international tax 
evasion diversity for 50 countries. Their hypotheses are: 1) the higher the uncertainty avoidance 
in a country, the higher the level of tax evasion in that country; 2) the higher individualism in a 
country, the lower the level of tax evasion in a country; 3) there will be a significant relation 
between masculinity and the level of tax evasion in a country; and 4) the higher the power 
distance in a country, the higher the level of tax evasion in a country. Tsakumis et al. used an 
economic estimate of actual unreported income within a country as a proxy for tax evasion. In 
other words, countries with larger shadow economy are perceived as less compliant. The results 
support all four hypotheses and suggest a direction of relationship for hypothesis 2 that higher 
masculinity is associated with lower tax evasion. Alternatively, low tax compliance countries 
have high uncertainty avoidance, low individualism, low masculinity, and high power distance. 
The implications suggested by Tsakumis et al. are that tax policy makers should consider cultural 
values in designing tax compliance measures. For example, social stigmatizations (punishment 
and disclosure of people who evade taxes) might work as effective penalty for tax evaders in the 
United States but might not work in the countries with less tax compliant cultural profile.  
Although these studies give some ideas related to tax compliance from the comparative 
perspectives, there are a lot more rooms for future research on international tax compliance 
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especially in developing countries. Comprehensive analyses on perceptions of taxpayers and 
various determinants of tax compliance have not yet been explored.   
 
III. Evolution of Tax Compliance Literature  
 The Traditional Approach: Utility Maximization Model of Taxpayers/ Compliance 
Lottery View/ Deterrence Model of Tax Evasion  
The classic tax compliance theory is based on an expected utility maximization model, 
which is a very well-known theory in the field of economics. In the expected utility 
maximization model, people weight possible lost and gain in their actions for a specific behavior 
in order to achieve the highest utility (i.e., satisfaction).  
Allingham and Sandmo’s Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis (1972) could be 
considered a landmark study that first systematically studied the issue of tax evasion via the 
expected utility maximization model of taxpayers. According to Allingham and Sandmo, the 
taxpayers have two choices 1) declare actual income, or 2) declare less than actual income. 
People will evade if they see the benefit of evading (tax amount that is kept for personal use) is 
higher than the cost of being caught (the probability of being caught and the penalty for evasion). 
Tax evasion decision is believed to be a rational decision making under uncertainty as whether to 
be audited or punished is uncertain. Mikesell and Birskyte (2007) classified this approach as the 
compliance lottery view while Slemrod (2007) called this approach the deterrence model of tax 
evasion. This approach focuses on targeting intentional compliance or noncompliance categories 
of taxpayers. It assumes that people pay taxes primarily because of the fear of detection and 
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punishment (Alm, 1999, p. 743). According to James Alm (1999), this stream of literature 
suggests that government can raise tax compliance by increasing the audits and penalty rates.  
However, Alm (1999) among others (Elffers, 1991; Gratez & Wilde, 1986; Smith & 
Kinsey, 1987) pointed out that government enforcement alone cannot account for this relatively 
high level of compliance. For example, audit rate of individual income tax returns in the United 
States is only one percent. The penalty on even fraudulent evasion is only 75 percent of unpaid 
taxes, which is infrequently imposed, and 20 percent of unpaid taxes for civil penalties on 
nonfraudulent evasion. With this levels of audit rate and penalties, it is expected from the 
expected utility theory that “most rational individuals should underreport income not subject to 
source withholding or overclaiming deductions not subject to independent verification because it 
is extremely unlikely that such cheating will be caught and penalized” (Alm, 1999, p. 744).  
In reality, it is not the case as individual income tax compliance is relatively high 
compared to an existing level of enforcement. Direct enforcement (i.e. audit, delinquency 
pursuit, forced collections, etc.) only represents 1.69 percent or $32 billion of $1,902 billion 
collected by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). This phenomenon could be explained by the 
prospect theory in psychology that said taxpayers “perceive” a much higher probability of being 
audited or punished than it actually is (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
In summary, the traditional approach seems to serve as a fundamental cost-benefit 
analysis of taxpayers in compliance decisions, which pays particular attention on enforcement 
among other factors that affect tax compliance decisions.   
 The Alternative Approach: Responsible Taxpayer View/ Behavioral Model of Tax 
Evasion 
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This alternative approach could be considered the most recent important development in 
tax compliance literature that could help explain what the traditional model cannot. Mikesell and 
Birskyte (2007) classified this approach as the responsible taxpayer view. Slemrod (2007) called 
this approach behavioral model of tax evasion. The theme of this approach is that tax compliance 
decision is not merely a monetary cost-benefit calculation as in the utility maximization model.  
It does not view the tax evasion only from the probability of getting caught and punished but also 
looks beyond economic factors that could impact tax compliance decisions.  
 According to Mikesell and Birskyte (2007), the alternative approach (the responsibility 
taxpayer view in Mikesell and Birskyte’s terms) believes that people are responsible, moral, and 
willing to comply and pay taxes when 1) they are motivated to do so, 2) they understand clearly 
what their tax obligations are, and 3) payment of those obligations is made convenient (Mikesell 
& Birskyte, 2007, p. 1048). This approach relies more on a softer approach to encourage 
taxpayer compliance via education rather than enforcement actions against taxpayers. The point 
is to make taxpayers understand their tax duties. This alternative approach targets the problem of 
unintentional noncompliance assuming there are still many taxpayers who actually don’t have 
enough knowledge about their tax duties, processes, and requirements.  It is also known as a 
“kinder and gentler IRS” approach (Mikesell & Birskyte, 2007).  
In addition to the education component, Slemrod (2007), who called this approach 
behavioral models of tax evasion, reviewed the importance of motivation, perceptions, and 
attitudes that affect tax compliance decisions including: 1) intrinsic motivation (civic virtue) 2) 
perceptions about the fairness of the tax system 3) perceptions about trust in government and 4) 
attitudes about acceptability of tax evasion.  
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Intrinsic motivation can affect tax compliance decision. Intrinsic motivation is the 
motivation that comes from within. For tax compliance decision, intrinsic motivation is known 
as civic virtue, which means I pay taxes because I want to be a good citizen or I want to 
contribute to the society not because I am forced to. However, civic virtue might be crowded out 
when penalties are introduced as taxpayers could feel they are forced to pay taxes (Frey, 1997). 
Scholz and Lubell’s experiment (2001) indicated a significantly lower level of cooperation of 
taxpayers after higher penalties were introduced.  This belief has also led to a softer approach of 
IRS in using rewards rather than penalties or carrots rather than sticks.  
Slemrod (2007) also suggests perceptions of the fairness of the tax system play a role in 
tax compliance behavior. If tax system is perceived as fair, the social norms against tax evasion 
will be strengthened. Tax evasion, then, become more costly by incurring a higher stake of bad 
reputation if caught and bad conscience if not caught. In other words, tax compliance should be 
higher with a fairer tax system that led the society to perceive evading tax is a bad thing to do.   
Trust in government plays a role in tax compliance decisions in the same way as the 
perceptions of fairness of the tax system. That is if taxpayers perceive government as fair and act 
in their interests, they will be more willing to pay taxes. Levi (1998) called these taxpayers 
“contingent consenters”, who cooperate and pay taxes even if it is against their short-term best 
interests of free-riding. The survey results of Torgler (2003) and Slemrod (2003) found that tax 
compliance has a positive relationship with trust in government across countries. Slemrod’s 
survey results of individuals in the United States and Germany also show a positive relationship 
between tax compliance and trust in government (Slemrod, 2003). In other words, higher tax 
compliance is associated with higher trust in government. The explanation is that trust in 
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government could help raise the confidence of taxpayers in knowing that their tax money will be 
spent fairly and usefully. 
Attitudes about acceptability in tax evasion could also influence taxpayer compliance. 
The World Values Surveys 1999-2002 show that acceptability in tax evasion varies across 
countries (Slemrod, 2007). The respondents were asked whether tax evasion is justifiable from 
the scale of 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable), the average of the United States and 
the OECD were 2.28 and 2.34 respectively. This means in the United States and the OECD 
people perceive tax evasion as a bad thing and mostly unacceptable. This could lead to a lower 
level of tax evasion in the United State and the OECD than in developing countries, where 
people might perceive tax evasion as more justifiable. Attitudes about acceptability in tax 
evasion can also vary among individuals, who have different cultural, educational, and religious 
background or even different personal beliefs, values, and characteristics.   
This alternative approach in tax compliance adds behavioral perspectives that are not 
presented in the traditional utility maximization approach. Taxpayers can be responsible and 
willing to contribute to the society. As tax compliance decision is not only limited to the 
calculation of monetary costs of getting caught and benefits from evading taxes, government 
policy to increase taxpayer compliance could include improving tax education, encouraging civic 
virtue of contributing to the society via paying taxes, offering rewards to compliance taxpayers, 
improving procedural fairness in tax and government administration, and establishing anti-tax 
evasion attitudes among citizens.  
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IV. Tax Compliance Research Methodologies 
Measuring and understanding tax compliance have never been easy tasks since people 
who avoid or evade taxes strongly intend to conceal their behaviors (Alm & McKee, 2006). Most 
studies on tax compliance focus on income taxes. Research methods on tax compliance could be 
classified into three major categories: historical data, surveys, and experiments (Slemrod, 1992). 
A. Historical Data 
Historical data on tax compliance in the United States is primarily based on the IRS data 
of Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP), which collected a stratified random 
sampling of 50,000 individual tax returns every three year for detailed line-by-line audits.  
TCMP data is used as an estimate of taxpayers’ true income that could be used to compare with 
what taxpayers reported. TCMP data provided information on many factors that affect tax 
compliance namely income source, socioeconomic grouping (age, sex, location), detection 
probability, marginal tax rate and income level. Surprisingly, the severity of penalties is not a 
significant factor from TCMP data, which could be because those penalties are rarely enforced 
(Franzoni, 2008). 
Nonetheless, using TCMP data as a measure for tax compliance has certain 
disadvantages. First, it could not capture all noncompliance as noncompliance that is not 
detected by IRS audits is excluded from TCMP data. In other words, TCMP data include only 
people who file taxes. For example, in 1976, it was estimated that non-filers accounted for 36 
percent of all unreported income. Moreover, the IRS has only a limited capacity to detect tax 
evasion of informal sector, self-employed, moonlighting, and cash-only business (J. Alm, 
Deskins, & McKee, 2009; Franzoni, 2008). Second, TCMP data could not detect honest 
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misreports. Alternatively, unintentional non-compliance could not be distinguished from 
intentional non-compliance, which gives little information on which strategies should be used to 
promote more compliance. Third, TCMP data has minimal demographic information, no 
information about taxpayers’ attitudes, and no information on other factors that might affect tax 
compliance (Slemrod, 1992).  
State amnesty data is another historical data that could measure noncompliance. 
However, amnesty data faces the same disadvantages as the TCMP data that it is limited to those 
who participated in tax amnesty and may not represent overall population (Andreoni, et al., 
1998).  
B. Survey Data 
Survey data is used to overcome some shortcomings of historical data by getting mostly 
information on attitudes that influence taxpayers’ compliance decisions. Survey method is very 
useful in exploring perceptions and assessing the determinants of tax compliance such as 
sociological factors, procedural fairness, audit rates, penalties, tax rates, and peer pressure, which 
could not be achieved by historical data.  Franzoni (2008) reviewed a lot of survey results and 
suggested that important determinants were: 1) perceived probability of detection, 2) severity of 
informal sanctions, 3) moral beliefs about tax compliance, 4) experience with other non-
compliers and past experience with IRS enforcement, and 5) demographic characteristics.  
There are still several problems with survey data. First, the accuracy of survey data is 
criticized as uncertain. Respondents might not remember correctly their reporting decisions or 
might not tell the truth. Individuals may want to protect their images and adhoc rationalize their 
own behaviors. Therefore, respondents might be reluctant to admit or report their non-
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compliance behavior (Alm, 1999; Elffers, Weigel, & Hessing, 1987; Franzoni, 2008).  Second, 
the causal direction of the relationship between determinants and noncompliance may not be 
determined easily (Alm, 1999; Franzoni, 2008). And third, reliability of survey results is difficult 
to achieve because it depends on the representativeness of the sample (Franzoni, 2008).  
C. Experiments  
Controlled experiment in laboratory setting is another method for studying tax 
compliance. This method is used to simulate as close as possible to the real situations to 
determine whether taxpayers will make decision to comply or not i.e. accurately report or 
underreport given specific audit rates, penalties, rewards, etc. In general, the results of 
experiments (see, for instance, Alm & McKee, 2006; Baldry, 1987; Webley, Robben, Elffers, & 
Hessing, 2010) suggest that audit rates play an important role in compliance decision. Also, 
higher income and lower tax rate are associated with higher compliance and vice versa. 
However, the size of fine does not really matter unless the audit rate is really high (Franzoni, 
2008). Moreover, social norms and ethical attitude seem to have a significant effect on tax 
compliance (Baldry, 1987).  
The limitation of experimental method is that it is not actual compliance data. Besides, 
experimental studies could not be conducted for a large sample unlike survey method. 
Experiments are usually done in a small group of individuals, which usually are students 
(Franzoni, 2008). It cannot be guaranteed that taxpayers will make the same decisions in reality.  
 Altogether, these three methods complement one another in tax compliance studies. 
Historical data provides actual and reliable information on tax compliance. Surveys give us more 
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insights on attitudes and perceptions that affect tax compliance decision. Experiments provide us 
opportunities to test for appropriate audit, punishment, and reward schemes. 
 
V. Determinants of Tax Compliance    
Many studies on tax compliance focus on exploring the determinants of tax compliance. 
The majority of the studies focuses on tax enforcement i.e. tax audits and penalties, which are 
those that matter in the traditional approach.  The others investigate alternative factors such as 
positive incentives, tax amnesties, attitudes and perceptions toward tax systems, tax rates, actual 
income levels, and demographic characteristics. All of these studies attempt to understand the 
determinants of tax compliance in order to find ways to improve tax administration to achieve 
higher tax compliance.  However, there is still no systematic study about these determinants in 
Thailand.  
A. Tax Audits 
Tax audits are very popular issues in tax compliance research. Audit probability, audit 
productivity (fraction of unreported income discovered), and prior audit notifications are those of 
interests to scholars. It is expected that higher audit rates will increase compliance (Alm, 1999). 
According to the compliance lottery view or expected utility theory, if audit probability and 
productivity are higher, the expected loss of being caught will be higher. As a result, taxpayers 
will report a larger amount of income (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). The studies that use TCMP 
data such as Witte and Woodbury (1985), Dubin and Wilde (1990) and surveys such as Kinsey 
(1992), Shreffinn and Triest (1992) support this hypothesis reporting that compliance is higher 
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when audit rates increase. Experimental methods also yield the same results as reviewed by Alm 
(1999, p. 756) with the estimated reported income-audit rate elasticity ranging from 0.1-0.2.  
Alm and McKee (2006) come up with very interesting findings. They use experimental 
method to examine individual compliance responses to advance information on audit probability 
and productivity. Productivity of audits refers to how much unreported income will be 
discovered via audits. The findings suggest announcement increased compliance for people who 
know they will be audited, but reduced compliance for those who will not be audited. The overall 
compliance actually falls with advance notification of audits. The results are interesting in the 
sense that telling taxpayers exactly what will happen to their reports might not always yield a 
positive outcome.  
Recently, Alm, Jackson, and McKee (2009) use laboratory experiments to examine the 
compliance impact of types of information dissemination (formal information by the tax 
authority and informal communication among taxpayers) regarding audit frequency and results. 
Pre-announcing audit rates credibly and emphasizing the previous period audit frequency in 
annual reporting of enforcement effort become important tools that tax authority could pursue to 
achieve higher compliance.  Another finding is that informal communication will only be 
effective with presence of official announcement of audit rates. 
B. Penalties 
Again, it is expected from the compliance lottery view that higher penalties will increase 
compliance. Alm (1999, p. 756) reports that compliance increases only slightly with an increase 
in penalty rate i.e. the income-fine rate elasticity of less than 0.1. The review by Kirchler, 
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Muehlbacher, Kastlunger, and Wahl (2007) suggests that several studies found no support for the 
increase of tax compliance from higher penalties.  
According to Mikesell and Birskyte (2007, p. 1064), the impact on compliance of 
penalties is much lower than the audit rates for two major reasons. First, there are political and 
social constraints in imposing high penalties. Second, penalties are only effective when 
accompanied with higher probability of audits. Increasing fine rates means very little if tax 
authority does not enforce those penalties more strictly. Furthermore, from the responsible 
taxpayer view, higher penalties might not always yield positive outcomes and could discourage 
voluntary compliance. Kirchler et al. interestingly conclude that: 
On the one hand, fines should be high enough to decrease the expected value of tax evasion and to 
assure its deterrent effect on taxpayers. On the other hand, if fines are too high, the tax system would 
be perceived as unjust and unfair and taxpayers would use any possibility to legally avoid their taxes. 
(Kirchler, et al., 2007, p. 15) 
C. Positive Incentives  
The perspective of tax compliance scholars have shifted toward more positive incentives 
for tax compliance instead of focusing only at deterrence of noncompliance through detection 
and punishment (Slemrod, 1992). Slemrod emphasizes the trend of using “carrot” rather than 
“stick” in solving tax compliance issues. Experimental studies report higher compliance with the 
use of positive rewards. Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992) use laboratory experiments to 
investigate the compliance effects of enforcement efforts (i.e., audit rate and penalties) and 
positive incentives (lottery prize, fixed reward, future audit reduction, and the increase in public 
good). The results suggest that both enforcement efforts and positive incentives help increase 
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taxpayer compliance. Positive incentives, in particular, must be immediate and salient to have a 
significant effect on taxpayer compliance. Taxpayers are qualified for rewards only if they fully 
comply. Therefore, compliance rates are shifted for those taxpayers from very low rates to very 
high rates.  
D. Tax Amnesties 
Tax amnesties could be considered another measure to increase tax compliance for both 
intentional and unintentional noncompliant taxpayers. According to Andreoni et al. (1998), tax 
amnesties have been used by 33 of 50 states to give chances for noncompliant taxpayers to 
voluntarily pay their back taxes without criminal investigation and penalties. Tax amnesties have 
raised significant amount of revenues for many states such as $401 million for New York and 
over $100 million for California, Illinois, Michigan, and New Jersey (Andreoni, et al., 1998, p. 
853). Conversely, tax amnesty could be perceived as increasing opportunity for tax evaders to 
evade more if provided too often. Alm et al. (1990) suggests two major interesting results from 
their experiments. First, tax amnesty could lower post-amnesty compliance because intentional 
compliant taxpayers expect future amnesties. Second, increase in post-amnesty enforcement 
effort (e.g., penalties) could reduce that reverse affect and could actually increase post-amnesty 
compliance better than just increasing enforcement alone.   
E. Attitudes and Perceptions toward Tax Administration 
Attitudes and perceptions toward the tax administration also affect tax compliance 
decisions (Shreffinn & Triest, 1992). There are three major types of attitude and perception that 
affect tax compliance decisions:  1) procedural fairness of tax systems and government 
administration, 2) quality of government services, 3) social norms about tax evasion.  
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Procedural fairness is important in tax systems and government administration because it 
gives taxpayers justifiable reasons for paying their share of taxes. According to Tyler (1997, p. 
1), procedural fairness gave the people feelings of obligation that they should obey group rules 
because they are legitimate and entitled to be obeyed. In seeing that everyone is treated equally, 
procedurally fair, and in a respectful manner, the social norms against tax evasion and trust in 
government are strengthen (Hanousek & Palda, 2004; Slemrod, 2003; Torgler, 2003). Procedural 
fairness in tax systems and government administration lead people to believe that fair procedures 
will lead to fair distribution (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Thus, procedural fairness creates positive 
attitudes and perceptions toward tax systems and government administration that help promotes 
taxpayer compliance.   
As well as procedural fairness, responsive service is effective for increasing compliance 
via positive attitudes toward tax administrators and tax systems (Smith, 1992). Hanousek and 
Palda (2004) found strong evidence that the quality of government services affect tax compliance 
decision. If taxpayers perceive that they are not receiving justifiable quality government services 
for their tax money, they will avoid taxes. From this perspective, taxpayers avoid tax because 
they believe the government is inefficient and unresponsive to their needs. Thus, citizens’ 
willingness to comply and pay taxes depends upon the quality of government services.  
Providing faster and better quality services will help increase taxpayer compliance.  
In addition to procedural fairness and responsive service of tax systems and government 
administration, social norms about tax evasion influence taxpayer compliance decisions.  
Particularly, social norms determine the degree to which tax evasion is perceived as acceptable 
behavior in the society. Negative publicity of noncompliance, for example, might increase tax 
evasion because of the change in social norm that noncompliance becomes acceptable behavior 
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in the society (Shreffinn & Triest, 1992). Seeing other people evade taxes send the signal to 
taxpayers that tax evasion becomes more acceptable, neglected by the government, and 
unfortunately is the norm (Alm, 1999).  
Procedural fairness, responsive service, and social norms are attitudes and perceptions 
that ultimately affect trust in government. Higher trust in government is associated with higher 
tax compliance (Hanousek & Palda, 2004; Slemrod, 2003; Torgler, 2003). Therefore, it is very 
crucial for the government to be procedurally fair, be responsive and maintain social norms 
against tax evasion.  
F. Tax Rates  
According to Alm (1999, p. 753),  empirical findings suggest that higher tax rates lead to 
less compliance with underreported income-tax rate elasticity ranging from -0.5 to -3.0. This 
could be interpreted that higher tax rates increase the gains from cheating from the compliance 
lottery view. However, it does not make much sense to lower marginal tax rates in order to 
reduce tax evasion. Tax rate should be designed based on efficiency and equity concerns 
(Sandmo, 2005).  
G. Actual Income Levels 
The positive relationship between actual income and tax compliance are general 
theoretical expectation. Alm et al. (1992) report that higher income leads to higher reported 
income, with an estimated reported income-income elasticity between 0 and 1 in empirical 
evidences and roughly ¾ in experimental results. However, Kirchler, et al., (2007) review the 
evidences on a direction of relationship between actual income and tax compliance and found 
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that the evidences are mixed. Some report a positive relationship between actual income and tax 
compliance (See, for example, Alm et al., 1992; Christian, 1994; Fishlow & Friedman, 1994) 
while others report a negative relationship (See, for instance, Baldry, 1987; Collins & Plumlee, 
1991; Slemrod, 1985) or even no relationship (See Feinstein, 1991; Kirchler, et al., 2007). 
H. Demographic Characteristics  
The TCMP data suggests that younger, single, and self-employed people tend to have less 
compliance. Experimental studies also find that younger people are less compliant. And, females 
are more compliant than males (Alm, 1999; Andreoni, et al., 1998). Younger people might have 
a more limited knowledge about tax obligation, as they are just starting their careers, and lower 
senses of citizenship. Single people might have lower compliance because they might perceive 
the tax systems as less fair because they are eligible to lower deductions than those with families. 
The income of self-employed people cannot be easily audited hence they are more likely to be 
less compliant. Female is believed to be more responsible than male at the same age so they may 
be more compliant.   
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VI. Conclusion 
This chapter began with the overview of Thai tax system and tax compliance studies in 
Thailand and the comparative perspectives, which found that Thailand relied too much on 
indirect taxes, had enormous amount of tax gap, and still lacked comprehensive tax compliance 
studies. In Thailand and other similar developing countries, where tax evasion is much more 
serious than in the United States, the factors that affect tax compliance should be systematically 
studied in order to find ways to increase taxpayer compliance. 
Then, the two major views of tax compliance were discussed. One is the traditional utility 
maximization approach that taxpayers weight expected gains and losses from noncompliance, 
which assuming people pay taxes primarily because the fear of punishment therefore 
enforcement and penalties are needed for compliance. The other is the alternative approach of 
responsible taxpayer view that believes people will pay taxes if they are motivated and 
understand their obligations, including when it is convenient to do so. Both views are necessary 
to understand tax compliance decision as those decisions are not made solely on monetary basis 
or moral basis but on both.  
In studying the determinants of tax compliance, the three major research methods are 
employed: historical data, surveys, and experimental studies. Each research method has different 
strengths and weaknesses that scholars choose to employ different methods to confirm various 
aspects of tax compliance issues. Important factors that affect tax compliance suggested by the 
literature are audit rates, penalties, positive incentives, tax amnesties, attitudes and perceptions 
toward tax administration, tax rates, actual income levels, and demographic characteristics.  
More attention was given to enforcement via audits and penalties, in which many scholars 
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studied the effects of the probability of audits and fines on tax compliance. Although less 
attention was given to incentives and softer motivational strategies such as making the tax 
system fair and convenient to improve tax compliance, it is on the rising trend. Nonetheless, 
there is no comprehensive study about these determinants in Thailand. The next chapter presents 
hypotheses in exploring tax compliance perceptions and determinants in Thailand and describes 
the research methods used to test these hypotheses. 
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Chapter 3 
 Research questions, Hypotheses, and Methodology 
The previous chapter reviewed the tax compliance literature and provided a fundamental 
background on this subject. That chapter also described the gap in comprehensive research on 
tax compliance in Thailand. To attempt to close that gap, this study will present the first 
empirical research on tax compliance in Thailand. This chapter will discuss the research 
questions, the hypotheses of the study, and the research methodology.   
I. The Research Questions 
This study asks two major research questions: 
Research Question 1:  
What are general citizens’ perceptions of the Thai personal income tax system, what are 
their tax compliance behaviors, and what strategies might help increase tax compliance in 
Thailand? 
Research Question 2:  
What are critical determinants of personal income tax compliance behavior in Thailand?  
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II. The Hypotheses 
The first research question is exploratory in nature thus there is no hypothesis. There are 
five major hypotheses for the second research question as follows5: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Perceptions of greater enforcement increase tax compliance behavior 
in Thailand. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Perceptions of fairer tax system increase tax compliance behavior in 
Thailand. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Perceptions of better government administration increase tax 
compliance behavior in Thailand.  
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Greater tax knowledge increases tax compliance behavior in 
Thailand. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Those with higher income (H5.1), those who are older (H5.2), those 
who are married (H5.3), those who are female (H5.4), those who are not self-employed (H5.5), 
and those with higher levels of education (H5.6) tend to have higher tax compliance. 
 
                                                          
5 The author acknowledges that there are other determinants that affect tax compliance behavior. There are a number 
of strategies that are not currently used but could have affected tax compliance if Thailand had adopted them e.g., 
announcement of who will be audited and who will not, formal dissemination of audit rates, positive incentives 
(lottery prize, cash back, future audit reduction, etc), and tax amnesty. These strategies are incorporated in my 
survey questions (question 20) by asking the respondents how likely they think that could be a good strategy to 
make them or people in general attempt to report income more accurately. For those non-existing strategies, the 
purpose is exploratory rather than testing the hypotheses.  
    47 
 
Hypothesis 1: The perceptions of greater enforcement increase tax compliance in 
Thailand. 
Hypothesis 1 represents a traditional approach of government in controlling tax 
noncompliance via enforcement. Perceptions of greater enforcement will increase tax 
compliance via increasing the expected costs of being caught in the compliance lottery view, 
which believes taxpayers compare the gains from cheating versus the costs of being caught. 
These enforcement perceptions include, for examples, perception of higher audit rates, 
perception of more serious tax law enforcement, and perception of stronger penalties. According 
to the prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the perceptions of enforcement (either 
audit rates or penalties) matter more than the actual enforcement, otherwise tax evasion would be 
much higher given the current level of enforcement. Therefore, it is expected that perceptions of 
greater enforcement will result in increased tax compliance in Thailand.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Perceptions of fairer tax system increase tax compliance in Thailand.  
 Hypothesis 2 represents the alternative approach of tax compliance. Behavioral models of 
tax evasion, in particular, pointed out that the perceptions of fairness of tax system affect tax 
compliance (Slemrod, 2007). Tax fairness perceptions include, for example, whether the rich pay 
a fair share, whether taxpayers should be taxed from their own earning, whether the tax rate is 
too high, and whether taxpayers think others evade taxes. If a tax system is perceived to be fair, 
the social norms against tax evasion will be strengthened. In other words, tax evasion would 
become less acceptable social behavior. Therefore, it is expected that perceptions of fairer tax 
system would increase tax compliance in Thailand.  
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Hypothesis 3: Perceptions of better government administration increase tax 
compliance in Thailand.  
Hypothesis 3 represents an alternative view of tax compliance (both the responsible 
taxpayer view and the behavioral models of tax evasion). Perceptions of government 
administration such as the quality of tax revenue administration, control of corruption in 
government, and attitudes toward the current government.  In this study, the perceptions of 
government administration reflect trust in government. People will increase tax compliance if 
they have higher trust in government (Hanousek & Palda, 2004; Slemrod, 2003; Torgler, 2003). 
Therefore, it is expected that the perceptions of better government administration will result in 
increased tax compliance in Thailand.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Greater tax knowledge increases tax compliance in Thailand 
Hypothesis 4 targets unintentional tax compliance according to the responsible taxpayer 
claim. In the responsible taxpayer view, there are many taxpayers who don’t have enough 
knowledge about their tax duties, tax processes, and requirements, and that such knowledge 
would increase compliance.  Since there is no tax education in the Thailand’s curricula, it is 
reasonable to suspect that some taxpayers might not have enough tax knowledge hence it is 
expected that tax knowledge would increase tax compliance in Thailand.  
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Hypothesis 5:  Those with higher income, those who are older, those who are 
married, those who are female, those who are not self-employed, and those with higher 
levels of education tend to have higher tax compliance.  
Taxpayers’ characteristics can affect their compliance behaviors. The hypotheses for 
Thailand are set according to previous literature in the United States and general theoretical 
expectations; people with higher income, those who are older, those who are married, those who 
are female, those who are not self-employed, and those with higher levels of education tend to 
have higher compliance. This study is, nevertheless, aware of the possibility of mixed results. 
For example, people with higher income can have either higher (earn more and pay more taxes) 
or lower compliance (earn more and find ways to evade more). Also, people with higher 
education can have either higher (have more knowledge so know how to pay taxes more 
accurately) or lower compliance (have more knowledge but unwilling to pay taxes so find ways 
to evade). Figure 3.1 summarizes the hypotheses of this study 
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Demographic  
Variables 
Fairness of Tax 
System Perception 
 
Enforcement 
Perception 
Government 
Administration 
Perception 
Tax Knowledge 
Tax 
Compliance 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Income Age Sex Marital 
Status 
Education Occupation 
 Figure 3. 1: Thailand’s Tax Compliance Behavior Determinants Hypotheses  
 
III. Research Methodology 
The primary research method of this study is a face-to-face survey of people in Bangkok, 
Thailand. Since there is currently no comprehensive study about income tax compliance 
behavior in Thailand, the survey method was chosen in order to develop the first income tax 
compliance database for Thailand. The survey explored perceptions and behaviors of the 
participants regarding tax compliance including strategies to increase tax compliance in 
Thailand. There were questions that used to test the five aforementioned hypotheses. In addition 
to the survey, in-depth interviews of tax administrators, tax policy experts, and university 
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professors were conducted to obtain further explanations of income tax compliance in Thailand. 
Thus, this study is an example of a mixed-methods research. Mixed methods research is defined 
as research that uses both quantitative and qualitative methods in a single study (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). The mixed methods are used in this study to best capture what might not 
be explained by an individual method alone. The in-depth interviews provide insight of the 
experts supplementary to the survey that help the study to get a more complete picture of tax 
compliance in Thailand. Both the quantitative (survey) and the qualitative (in-depth interviews) 
designs are discussed in this chapter.  
 
Quantitative Design 
The survey of tax compliance was conducted in Bangkok during July 2011 in order to 
explore tax compliance perceptions of Thai citizens and gauge determinants of tax compliance 
behavior in Thailand. This section presents the details of quantitative method employed in this 
research, which include the procedures, participants, questionnaire design, measures, and data 
analysis plan.  
 Data Collection Procedures 
This study focuses on exploring the behaviors of individual income taxpayers in 
Bangkok. Bangkok is the capital city of Thailand with the population of over 10 million people 
or about 2.5 million households (four people per family on average), which represents the largest 
proportion of taxpayers in Thailand. Samples of this study were derived from the population in 
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Bangkok via a multistage sampling. First, twelve districts6 in Bangkok were drawn from inner 
ring, middle ring, and outer ring areas according to a systematic sampling with probability 
proportional to size. Then, in each district, data were collected from individuals who live in 
households and work at public and private companies. Different blocks of location were 
randomly chosen from each district. Forty data collectors were sent out to collect the survey data 
at those locations together with 10 fieldwork supervisors during July 4-6, 2011.  
The survey is in Thai for ease of communication. See Appendix A and Appendix B for 
English and Thai questionnaires. There was also an information statement attached in the front of 
the survey, which indicates that: 1) they are willing to participate but free to withdraw at any 
time, 2) they are at least age eighteen, and 3) their responses are anonymous and could not be 
traced back to them. And, where appropriate, the statement was described orally. Then, the data 
collectors asked whether the participants prefer filling out the survey by themselves or being 
interviewed (read out questions from the survey) by the data collectors7. Ninety percent of the 
participant chose the self-filling method and ten percent chose the interview method. After the 
participants answered all questions, the data collectors thanked the participants without paying 
any incentives.  
 Participants 
There were 1,148 participants
8
, who lived in Bangkok, Thailand. There were 43% males 
(N = 488), 57% females (N = 650), and 1% of those who did not report their sex (N = 10). The 
                                                          
6
 The twelve districts are: 1. Rachathewi, 2. Sathon, 3.Thon Buri, 4. Chatuchak, 5. Saparnsoong, 6. Bang Phlat, 7. 
Lat Phrao, 8. Bang Kapi, 9. Bang Khen, 10. Min Buri, 11. Bang Khun Thian, and 12. Don Mueang. 
7
 The answer was recorded in question 1 of the questionnaire. 
8
 This study did not record the number of people who did not want to participate in the survey.  
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average age were 34.4 years (SD = 9.36 years, Ranges = 18-85). There were 60% of participants 
who were single, 38% were married, and 1% did not report their marital status.  
For levels of education, there were 2% of participants with primary school education or 
lower, 14% with secondary school education, 13% with two-year college’s degree, 60% with 
bachelor’s degree, 9% with master’s degree, 0.4% of participants with doctoral degree or higher, 
and 1% not reported their education level.  
For occupation, 45% of participants were employees of private organizations, 18% were 
businessmen and entrepreneurs, 17% were freelancers, 8% were other government employees, 7 
% were government officials, 5% reported other occupations, 0.4% were elected officials and 
politicians, and 1% did not reported their occupation.  
For levels of income, there were 41% of participants with income less than 150,000 Baht 
per year 39%, with 150,001-500,000 Baht per year, 8% with 500,001-1,000,000 Baht per year, 
2% with 1,000,001-4,000,000 Baht per year, and 1% with more than 4,000,001 Baht per year.9 
Nine percent of participants did not report their income. 
As Thai taxpayers’ profile is not available, the representativeness of the sample to Thai 
taxpayer’ population is difficult to determine. Moreover, the demographic characteristics of 
Bangkok population cannot be obtained because there are many taxpayers who live or work in 
Bangkok but not registered as Bangkok residents. Although the demographic characteristics of 
Bangkok taxpayers cannot be obtained,
10
  the multistage random sampling method used in this 
study was designed to best represent taxpayers in Bangkok by randomly selecting the areas 
throughout Bangkok for conducting the survey.   
                                                          
9
 Approximately 30 Baht = 1 US Dollar 
10
 The survey sample is closely comparable to registered Bangkok population in term of sex (Sample: male 43% vs. 
female 57%, 5.6 million registered Bangkok population: male 47% vs. female 53%).  
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 Questionnaire Design and Measures 
The questionnaire was conducted with the primary purpose of exploring tax compliance 
perceptions and behaviors of Thai people including strategies that could help increase tax 
compliance in Thailand. The secondary purpose was to predict the critical determinants of 
income tax compliance behavior in Thailand. There were 30 big questions with small questions 
inside along with demographic questions at the end. The respondents were mostly asked for their 
opinions on a five-point Likert scale under various circumstances according to the hypotheses. 
There were six major categories of questions: general exploration, reasons behind not filing 
taxes, reasons behind not declaring tax accurately, determinants of tax compliance, tax 
compliance behavior, and demographic. See English and Thai questionnaires in the Appendix A 
and Appendix B. 
1) General exploration questions 
Questions in the category are questions 2-5, 7, 9-18, 23-24, and 30. These questions aim 
to explore general perceptions and attitudes of the respondents toward the Thai income tax 
system. 
Question 2 asked the respondents about their perceptions on current income tax rates with 
two small questions: 1) tax rates in general and 2) taxes that the richest group of people in 
Thailand has been paying for half of the country’s personal income tax revenues. Question 24 
asked the respondents about the personal income tax they are paying when comparing to the 
public services they receive. The respondents were to rate these on a 5-point Likert scale from 
way too low to way too high. The purpose was to know whether they think the tax rates are too 
high and in which aspect.  
    55 
 
Question 3 investigated the respondents’ general tax compliance related perceptions with 
6 small questions about: 1) acceptability of tax evasion, 2) audit capacity of the Revenue 
Department, 3) procedural fairness of government administration, 4) procedural fairness of tax 
administration, 5) low severity of current penalties, and 6) lack of tax laws enforcement. The 
respondents were to rate these on a 5-point Likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
Question 4 continued to ask the respondents’ opinions on tax compliance related issues with 9 
small questions: 1) degree of corruption, 2) level of satisfaction with general governmental 
services, 3) level of satisfaction with the Revenue Department’s services, 4) degree of severity of 
current penalties, 5) degree of tax laws enforcement, 6) level of fairness of government 
administration, 7) level of fairness of tax administration, 8) degree of awareness of tax evasion 
situation, 9) degree of awareness of tax evasion punishment. The respondents were to rate these 
on a 5-point Likert scale from the lowest to the highest. The purpose was to get some general 
ideas of tax compliance related issues perceived by the respondents.  
Questions 5 and 7 asked their perceptions on the percentages of people who actually file 
taxes and who file their taxes accurately. There were five answers to choose from starting from 0 
- 20 % none or almost none to 81 – 100% all or almost all.  The purpose of these two questions 
was to see the severity of tax evasion problem perceived by Thai citizens. Question 9 asked 
about the percentage of people who they believed currently being audited by the Revenue 
Department. The answer choices were the same as questions 5 and 7. The purpose was to see 
how the respondents perceived about the effectiveness of the Revenue Department’s audits. 
Questions 10 to 17 explored the respondents’ knowledge about tax evasion penalties, 
which include the criminal penalties for intentionally not filing taxes, the surcharge penalty for 
not filing taxes on time, the penalty if audited by the Revenue Department and found not paying 
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accurate taxes, and the criminal penalties for intentional tax evasion. The respondents were asked 
first whether they know what the penalties are by choosing from yes, no, and not sure. Then, the 
four choices of answer were given for each type of penalties and the respondents were asked to 
choose by their knowledge or by their best guess. Finally, in question 18, those penalties were 
revealed and the respondents were to rate them on a 5-point Likert scale from way too soft to 
way too harsh. The purpose of these questions was to investigate the differences between 
perceptions and reality of tax evasion penalties.  
Question 23 asked about the personal income tax rate brackets that the respondents have 
been paying. They were given 7 choices: legally exempted from paying tax, 10%, 20%, 30%, 
37%, don’t know, and prefer not to answer.  This question could be crosschecked by the annual 
total income question in the demographic section at the end of the questionnaire, which asked the 
respondents’ income range according to the personal income tax rate brackets. This was to check 
whether the respondents really know what the tax rates they are paying are. 
Question 30 asked the respondents to provide further comments and suggestions they 
may have regarding personal income tax administration in Thailand, which can include why they 
believe people evade taxes, what they think could help make people be more willing to pay 
taxes, other rewards or penalties that should be introduced, what government should do more for 
citizens, etc.  Adequate space was provided for the respondents to write answers. 
2) Reasons behind not filing taxes questions 
Question 6 asked the respondents about the reasons “why some people do not even file 
their personal income taxes.” There were 16 small questions for the respondents to answer how 
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likely they think that could be a reason. The respondents were asked to answer a 5-point Likert 
scale from very unlikely to very likely.  
Questions 6.2 to 6.4 are about enforcement perceptions (H1) including audit probability, 
tax law enforcement, and severity of penalties.  
Questions 6.9 to 6.12 are about tax rates and fairness of the tax system perceptions (H2), 
which asked whether: the rich should pay instead, they should not be taxed from their own 
earnings, the tax rate is too high, and they think others evade taxes. Question 6.8 asked if they 
don’t want to be recognized in the tax system and avoid getting chased from the Revenue 
Department later on, which shows their intentions of not paying taxes and implies their 
perception against the tax system.  
Questions 6.1 and 6.5 to 6.7 target unintentional noncompliance and tax knowledge (H4) 
by identifying lack of knowledge about tax duty, lack of information about where to get tax 
forms, too complicated forms, and too time consuming as the reasons.  
Questions 6.13 to 6.15 are about government administration perceptions (H3) by asking if 
they think the government does not spend tax revenue appropriately and if there is too much 
corruption in government, and if they don’t like the government.  
In question 6.16, the respondents were asked to identify other possible reason.  
3) Reasons behind not declaring taxes accurately questions 
Question 8 asked the respondents about the reasons why some people do not declare their 
incomes accurately (e.g., overstate deduction or expenses). There were 15 small questions for the 
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respondents to answer how likely they think that could be a reason. The respondents were asked 
to answer a 5-point Likert scale from very unlikely to very likely.  
Questions 8.1 to 8.3 are about enforcement perceptions (H1) including audit probability, 
tax law enforcement, and severity of penalties.  
Questions 8.4 to 8.8 are about tax rates and fairness of the tax system perceptions (H2), 
which asked whether: the rich should pay more, they are paying too much compared to the 
services they received, they should not be taxed from their own earnings, and the tax rate is too 
high, and they think others pay less tax than they obliged to (e.g., understate their incomes). 
Questions 8.9 to 8.11 are about government administration perceptions (H3) by asking if 
they think the government does not spend tax revenue appropriately and if there is too much 
corruption in government, and if they don’t like the government.  
Questions 8.12 to 8.14 target unintentional noncompliance and tax knowledge (H4) by 
asking if the reasons would be that: they don’t know which sources of income they must declare 
(e.g., besides withholding taxes), they make honest mistakes as the tax form is so complicated, 
and they just make calculation mistakes.  
In question 8.15, the respondents were asked to identify other possible reason. 
4) Tax compliance strategies questions  
Question 20 asked the respondents about the strategies they think would help them or 
people in general attempt to report income more accurately. There were 19 small questions for 
the respondents to answer how likely they think that could be a good strategy. The respondents 
were asked to answer a 5-point Likert scale from very unlikely to very likely.  
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Questions 20.1 to 20.3 are audit strategies. The respondents were asked how likely they 
will attempt to report income more accurately if the chance of being audited by the Revenue 
Department is higher, if the Revenue Department informs them in advance that their tax returns’ 
file will be audited, and if he Revenue Department formally announces to the people the exact 
portion of people that will be audited each year.  
Questions 20.4 to 20.7 are penalty strategies. The respondents were asked how likely they 
will attempt to report income more accurately if minimum surcharge, fine penalty, criminal 
penalties, are double.  
Question 20.7 and 20.19 are other enforcement strategies. The respondents were asked 
how likely they will attempt to report income more accurately if there is more enforcement on 
tax laws and if they see more news or more aware that people who evade taxes have been 
punished.  
Questions 20.8 to 20.13 are incentive strategies. The respondents were asked how likely 
they will attempt to report income more accurately if several types of rewards are offered, which 
include lottery prices, honorary citizen certificates, cash back, future audit reduction, tax 
amnesties, and tax amnesties with stronger post-amnesty penalties.  
Questions 20.14 and 20.15 are government administration strategies related to 
responsiveness of government services.  The respondents were asked how likely they will 
attempt to report income more accurately if the service quality of government organizations in 
general is improved and if the service quality of the Revenue Department is improved.  
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Questions 20.16 to 20.18 are government administration strategies related to procedural 
fairness of government. The respondents were asked how likely they will attempt to report 
income more accurately if government administration procedure is fairer without selective 
treatment; if tax collection administration procedure of the Revenue Department is fairer; and if 
there is less corruption in government.  
5) Tax compliance behavior questions 
Questions in the category are questions 22 and 25-29. These questions were to investigate 
tax compliance behavior of the respondents, which include both past and future tax filing 
behavior, willingness to pay tax, intention to declare accurately, and possibilities of understating 
income and overstating deduction/expenses.   
Questions 22 and 27 asked about tax filing behavior of the respondents. For past 
behavior, in question 22, the respondents were asked whether they filed personal income tax 
within the past two years or so. For future behavior, in question 27, the respondents were asked 
whether they will file personal income tax next year. In both questions, they were to select from 
three choices: yes, no (please specify why), and prefer not to answer. 
Questions 25.1 and 28.1 asked about the respondents’ willingness to pay tax. Question 
25.1 asked whether, in the past two years or so, they were willing to pay all personal income 
taxes they were legally obliged to pay (regardless of whether they really filed tax). Question 28.1 
asked whether, for next year, they are willing to pay all personal income tax they legally obliged 
to pay. In both questions, the respondents were asked to answer a 5-point Likert scale from very 
unlikely to very likely and prefer not to answer. 
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Questions 25.2 and 28.2 asked about the respondents’ intention to declare information 
accurately when filing income tax. Question 25.2 asked whether, in the past two years or so, they 
intended to declare all information as accurately as possible when filing personal income tax. 
Question 28.2 asked whether, for next year, they intend to declare all information as accurately 
as possible when filing personal income tax. In both questions, the respondents were asked to 
answer a 5-point Likert scale from very unlikely to very likely and prefer not to answer. 
Questions 26 and 29 asked about the possibilities that the respondents might understate 
income or overstate deduction/expenses. Question 26.1 asked, in the past two years or so, how 
likely it is that they might have left some reportable income off when filling personal income tax. 
Question 29.1 asked, for next year, how likely it is that they might leave some reportable income 
off when filling personal income tax. Question 26.2 asked, in the past two years or so, how likely 
it is that they might have overstated deduction or expenses when filling personal income tax. 
Question 29.1 asked, for next year, how likely it is that they might overstate deduction or 
expenses when filling personal income tax.  
6) Demographic questions 
In the last page of the questionnaire, the respondents were asked to fill out their personal 
information. These include sex (Male or Female), age (please specify), highest level of education 
(primary school or lower, secondary school, two-year college’s degree, Bachelor, Master, and 
Ph.D./Doctorate or higher), occupation (government official, other governmental employee, 
private organization’s employee, businessman/entrepreneur, elected official/politician, freelance, 
and other/please specify), marital status (Single or Married), if married how do they file tax 
(jointly with spouse or separately), annual total income (below 150,000 Baht, 150,001-500,000 
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Baht, 500,000-1,000,000 Baht, 1,000,000-4,000,000 Baht, and 4,000,000 Baht and over), 
number of children (please specify), and number of people who are financially dependent of 
them (please specify number of kids under 18, number of seniors over 60, number of 
handicapped people, number of unemployed people).   
 
 Data Analysis  
The first research question asks what general citizens’ perceptions of the Thai personal 
income tax system are, their tax compliance behaviors, including strategies that could help 
include tax compliance in Thailand. The answers to this question were analyzed by descriptive 
statistics. Descriptive statistics that will be used include percentages, means, ranges, and standard 
deviations. Descriptive statistics serve best the exploration purpose of this research question by 
providing the overall picture and comparisons of several aspects of personal income tax 
compliance in Thailand. Chapter 4 will present descriptive statistics and interesting findings of 
six major categories of survey questions discussed earlier.  
The second research question asks what the critical determinants of personal income tax 
compliance behavior in Thailand are. These answers were analyzed through structural equation 
modeling (SEM). Structural equation modeling, according to Hair, Black et al (2010), “provides 
the appropriate and most efficient estimation technique for a series of separate multiple 
regression equations estimated simultaneously.” In other words, SEM can estimate multiple 
relationships at once. Those include the relationships between factors and indicators (factor 
analysis or latent transition analysis) and the relationship among factors (regression analysis).  
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In this study, determinants of tax compliance were represented in factors, which were 
extracted from questionnaire items (indicators). Also, tax compliance behavior factors were 
extracted from questionnaire items asking about past and future tax compliance behaviors. Then, 
the determinants/factors (not the individual items) were used to predict tax compliance behavior. 
Everything could be estimated within a single analysis framework, which made SEM become the 
most appropriate analysis framework for this study. 
 The two sub-models of structural equation modeling that I used in this study are factor 
analysis and latent transition analysis. Further technical details for this study can be found in 
Appendix C.  
1) Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis is the technique used to separate items into subgroups of items if those 
items have high correlations among one another. It assumes that high correlations among items 
are resulted from a latent variable that makes those variables covary (i.e., changing 
simultaneously). The strength of factor analysis is that it can control for measurement error of 
each questionnaire item. In this research, factor analysis was used to extract underlying reasons 
of tax compliance behind item sets. For example, enforcement perception could be an underlying 
factor explaining why four items in the questionnaire were correlated to one another.  
 Factor analysis can be classified into two types: exploratory and confirmatory. 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) is used to extract underlying factors without a priori 
hypotheses about how many underlying factors among the analyzed items and which items 
should be grouped together. On the other hand, Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is used 
when researchers have those hypotheses in advance and would like to test whether the 
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hypothesized factor arrangement fits the obtained data (i.e., correlation among items) Although I 
had already set up hypotheses about the groups of items, the exact hypotheses about item 
arrangement onto each factor was hard to set up. Therefore, almost all new scales usually start 
with EFA. I realize the weakness of EFA with respect to subjectivity therefore I used a cross-
validation strategy.  As the cross-validation strategy, EFA was used to explore factor 
arrangement in calibration sample and CFA was used to validate the factor solution from EFA on 
the validation sample. As a result, possible tax compliance determinants (factors) were extracted 
for predicting tax compliance behavior in the next step. Factors were extracted from the 
responses of two questions: reasons behind not filing taxes (question 6) and reasons behind not 
declaring taxes accurately (question 8).  Chapter 5 will present and discuss the two tax 
compliance factor results.  
 
2) Latent Transition Analysis 
Latent Transition Analysis (LTA) is the statistic involving classification of participants 
into subgroups based on their characteristics in multiple timepoints (Kaplan, 2008; Nylund, 
2008; Nylund, Asparouhov, & Muthén, 2007). The responses of these questions were analyzed 
and used to classify people into different groups in both timepoints simultaneously by 
constraining the group meanings equal across timepoints.  
LTA is very appropriate for this study because it was used to classify tax compliance 
behaviors in both sets of past behavior questions and future behavior (intention) questions. In 
each time point, there were three questions: 1) whether the participants file tax (2 categories), 2) 
whether they understate their income (5 ordered categories), and 3) whether they overstate 
deduction or expenses (5 ordered categories). For example, the resulting classes could be 1) 
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people who do not file tax, 2) people who accurately file tax, and 3) people who inaccurately file 
tax. LTA also shows how people change from their past behavior classes to their future intention 
classes. LTA shows, for example, among people who did not file tax in the past, what the 
probability that they intended to file tax accurately was.   
Next, in order to determine critical determinants of tax compliance behavior, independent 
variables were introduced in the model (e.g., factor scores of reasons behind tax compliance). 
The independent variables played three roles: 1) predicting tax compliance classes in past 
behavior (how determinants will affect past tax compliance behavior), 2) predicting tax 
compliance classes in the participant’s future intention controlling for the tax compliance classes 
in their past behavior (how determinants will affect tax compliance future intention), and 3) 
interacting with tax compliance classes in the past to predict the classes in their future intention 
(how future intention will change from past behavior based on the determinants).
11
 All 
predictions were analyzed similar to a multinomial logistic regression. The latter part of chapter 
5 will discuss the LTA analysis results of tax compliance determinants. 
 
Qualitative Design 
Interviews of tax policy experts, tax administrator, and university professors in Thailand 
were conducted in order to gain extra insight toward tax compliance issues supplementary to the 
survey findings. This section discusses the details of qualitative method I employed in this 
research. 
                                                          
11
 This study did not explore the third role because of non-convergence problem. 
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Qualitative data collection was conducted via in-depth interviews during July 2011. I 
conducted one-on-one interviews with 15 tax policy experts, tax administrators, and university 
professors. I selected people who worked closely or directly to tax policy and tax administration 
as possible and were willing to openly and honestly share their opinions regarding tax 
compliance issues. For tax policy experts, there were 3 executive-level public officials, 4 high-
ranking public officials, and 3 medium-ranking public officials. For tax administrators, there 
were 1 high-ranking and 1 medium-ranking public official. For university professors, there were 
2 from economics and 1 from public administration. Oral consent procedures were given and 
described to participants to ask their willingness to participate and their preferences regarding the 
disclosure of their names and identifiable information. The interviews were conducted in Thai 
and were audio-recorded upon the participants’ approval. 
The semi-structured interview technique was used where participants were asked the 
same set of open-ended questions as well as probing and new questions arising from the 
conversation. The semi-structured interview allows flexibility to explore participants’ opinions 
regarding tax compliance issue that might not be covered by the prepared questions. I also asked 
participants some of the survey questions regarding the hypotheses. Full interview questions in 
Thai and English are available in Appendix D. The followings are four major questions that were 
asked to every participant:  
 What is your opinion on tax evasion situation in Thailand? 
 What are the weaknesses and strengths of current Thai tax administration system?  
 What are the factors that affect tax compliant behavior of Thai people? 
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 What are the strategies you suggest could help make taxpayers become more 
compliant? 
 The interviews were analyzed and coded to identify the common themes in response to 
the above questions. However, different opinions among the participants were highly valued 
because of their uniqueness in experiences and visions, which would also benefit the study of tax 
compliance. The interviews’ results were sought both to provide explanations and cross-check 
with the survey results. The interview results and analysis are discussed in chapter 6.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
This chapter began with the two research questions of this research. First, what are 
general citizens’ perceptions of the Thai personal income tax system, what are their tax 
compliance behaviors, and what strategies that might help increase tax compliance in Thailand? 
Second, what are critical determinants of personal income tax compliance behavior in Thailand?  
Then, the five hypotheses were presented. Hypothesis 1 is that the perceptions of greater 
enforcement increase tax compliance in Thailand. Hypothesis 2 is that the perceptions of fairer 
tax system increase tax compliance behavior in Thailand. Hypothesis 3 is that the perceptions of 
better government administration increase tax compliance behavior in Thailand. Hypothesis 4 is 
that tax knowledge increases tax compliance behavior in Thailand. And, hypothesis 5 is that 
people with higher income, are female, are older, are married, are not self-employed, and with 
higher levels of education are associated with higher tax compliance.  
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After that, the research methodology was discussed. The mixed methods research with 
quantitative dominant was employed in this study in order to explore tax compliance perceptions 
of Thai citizens and determine determinants of tax compliance behavior in Thailand. The face-to-
face survey was the primary research method. There were 1,148 participants from Bangkok, 
which represented the largest population of taxpayers in Thailand. The questionnaires had six 
major categories of questions: general exploration, reasons behind not filing taxes, reasons 
behind not declaring tax accurately, determinants of tax compliance, tax compliance behavior, 
and demographic. The descriptive statistics were used to explore general citizens’ perceptions on 
tax compliance in response to the first research question. Factor analysis and latent transition 
analysis, which are sub-models of structural equation modeling, were used to answer the second 
research question on determinants of tax compliance behavior.  
 The one-on-one in-depth interviews of 15 tax policy experts, tax administrators, and 
university professors were chosen in order to gain the insights of the experts on tax compliance 
issue supplementary to the survey. The semi-structured interview technique was used to allow 
flexibility of probing and new questions arising from the conversation. Four major interview 
questions were about their opinions on tax evasion situation in Thailand, the weaknesses and 
strengths of current tax administration system, factors that affect tax compliance behavior of 
Thai people, and strategies they think could help make taxpayers become more compliant. The 
interviews were analyzed and coded to find the common themes in their answers. Different 
opinions were also highly valued as each of the participants was the expert, which could 
contribute to the understanding of tax compliance issues. 
The following chapters present results of the survey and the interviews. Chapter 4 and 
chapter 5 will present data analysis, findings, and discussions of the survey results. Chapter 4 
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will present personal income tax system and tax compliance perceptions of Thai citizens via 
descriptive statistics. Chapter 5 will explore reasons behind not filing taxes and not declaring tax 
accurately via factor analysis and present the determinants of tax compliance behaviors via latent 
transition analysis. After that, the interview results are presented and discussed in chapter 6. 
Finally, chapter 7 presents conclusion, implications, and future research. 
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Chapter 4 
Citizens’ Perceptions of the Thai Personal Income Tax System and Tax Compliance 
In the previous chapter, the research questions, hypotheses, and methodology of this 
research were described and discussed. Using simple descriptive statistics, this chapter attempts 
to explore the first research question of this study: what are general citizens’ perceptions of the 
Thai personal income tax system and tax compliance issues, what are their tax compliance 
behaviors, and what strategies might help increase tax compliance in Thailand? Six categories of 
findings are presented: tax rates perceptions, tax non-compliance reasons, perceptions of tax 
compliance related issues, audit and penalty knowledge and perceptions, tax compliance 
strategies, and tax compliance behaviors. These results are discussed at the end of the chapter.  
 
I. Findings on Tax Rates Perceptions: What do Thai Citizens in Bangkok think about 
their tax rates? 
The findings show that over 40% of the respondents thought they are paying personal 
income tax at the rate of 10% or are exempted from paying personal income tax. Almost half of 
the respondents thought that current personal income tax rates are about right while the other 
43% thought the tax rates are too high or way too high. When comparing to the public service 
they receive, over 40% of the respondents thought that personal income tax they are paying is 
about right. Interestingly, when provided with the information that the richest group of people in 
Thailand has been paying for half of the country’s personal income tax revenues, over 40% of 
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the respondents thought the richest group of people has been paying too much or way too much 
tax. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the survey results of tax rates perceptions’ questions. 
 
2. How do you feel about the following statements?  
 Way Too 
Low/Little 
Too 
Low/Little  
About 
Right 
Too 
High/Much 
Way Too 
High/Much 
1) You think current personal income 
tax rates are… 
22 
(2%) 
102 
(9%) 
529 
(47%) 
405 
(36%) 
78 
(7%) 
2) Revenue statistics has shown that the 
richest group of people in Thailand has 
been paying for half of the country’s 
personal income tax revenues. You think 
they are paying… 
26 
(2%) 
193 
(17%) 
437 
(39%) 
378 
(34%) 
92 
(8%) 
Table 4.1: Question 2 Survey Results on Tax Rate Perceptions (N = 1148) 
 
 N % 
23. Do you know which income tax rate brackets you have been paying?   
 I have been legally exempted from paying personal income tax 177 21% 
 10 % 217 25% 
 20 % 60 7% 
 30 % 34 4% 
 37 % 5 0.6% 
 I don’t know 184 21% 
 Prefer not to answer 181 21% 
24. Comparing to the public services you receive, personal income tax you are paying are... 
 Way too low 26 3% 
 Too low 89 10% 
 About right 367 43% 
 Too high 225 26% 
 Way too high 51 6% 
 Prefer not to answer 93 11% 
Table 4.2: Questions 23 and 24 Survey Results on Tax Rates Perceptions  
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II. Findings on Tax Non-Compliance Reasons: Why some Thai citizens do not file their 
personal income taxes or do not declare their incomes accurately? 
Government corruption (M = 3.85, SD = 0.99), inappropriate tax revenue spending (M = 
3.70, SD = 0.95), and seeing others evade taxes are the top three reasons why some people do not 
file their personal income taxes (M = 3.53, SD = 0.90). While, the three least possible reasons 
are unawareness of tax duty (M = 3, SD = 1), lack of tax knowledge about where to get tax form 
(M = 3.01, SD = 0.95), and the belief that the Revenue Department will not find out (M = 3.16, 
SD = 0.95). Table 4.3 shows the survey results on the reasons why some people do not file their 
personal income taxes. 
For the reasons why some people do not declare their incomes accurately, the top three 
reasons are government corruption (M = 3.71, SD = 0.98), inappropriate tax revenue spending 
(M = 3.59, SD = 0.93), and too high taxes comparing to public services they receive (M = 3.45, 
SD = 0.90). The three least possible reasons are the believes that the Revenue Department will 
not find out (M = 3.05, SD = 0.90), that they will not be punished even if the Revenue 
Department find out (M = 3.90, SD = 0.85), that they just make calculations mistakes, and that 
they just make honest mistakes as the tax form is so complicated (M = 3.25, SD = 0.84). Table 
4.4 shows the survey results on the reasons why some people do not declare their incomes 
accurately. 
These tax compliance general perception results will be further analyzed using factor 
analysis in Chapter 5.  
  
    73 
 
 
6. Do you think why some people don’t even file their personal income taxes? 
   (Very Unlikely = 1 to Very Likely = 5) M SD 
1) They don’t know that they must pay taxes  3.00 1.00 
2) They think the Revenue Department will not find out if they don’t file 
taxes  3.16 0.95 
3) They think even if the Revenue Department find out that they don’t file 
taxes, they will not be punished  
3.18 0.90 
4) They are not afraid of current penalties because the penalties are not 
strong enough  
3.35 0.92 
5) They don’t know how to get the form to pay taxes  3.01 0.95 
6) They think tax form is too complicated 3.30 0.93 
7) They think  it takes too much time to file taxes 3.23 0.91 
8) They don’t want to be recognized in the tax system of the Revenue 
Department and possibly get chasing later on 
3.39 0.93 
9) They think the rich should pay instead of them 3.37 0.97 
10) They think it’s not fair to be taxed from their own earnings  3.31 0.91 
11) They think the tax rate is too high 3.49 0.89 
12) They think others evade taxes  3.52 0.90 
13) They think the government does not spend tax revenues appropriately 3.70 0.95 
14) They think there is too much corruption in government operations 3.85 0.99 
15) They don’t like the government 3.43 0.89 
16) Other (Please specify) _____________________________ 4.10 1.05 
Table 4.3: Question 6 Survey Results on Tax Non-Filing Reasons (N = 1148) 
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8. Do you think why some people don’t declare their incomes accurately?  
    (Very Unlikely = 1 to Very Likely = 5) M SD 
1) They think the Revenue Department will not find out if they declare 
their incomes inaccurately 
3.05 0.90 
2) They think even if the Revenue Department find out that they declare 
their incomes inaccurately, they will not be punished 
3.07 0.85 
3) They are not afraid of existing penalties because they are too soft 3.29 0.85 
4) They think the rich should pay more 3.37 0.89 
5) They think they are paying too much compared to what they receive in 
government services 
3.45 0.90 
6) They think it’s not fair to be taxed from their own earnings  3.37 0.87 
7) They think the tax rate is too high 
 (regardless of the quality of government services or whether others pay 
more or less) 
3.35 0.86 
8) They think other people pay less taxes than they obliged to (e.g. 
understate their incomes) 
3.37 0.85 
9) They think the government spend their taxes inappropriately 3.59 0.93 
10) They think there is too much corruption in government operations 3.71 0.98 
11) They don’t like the government 3.35 0.89 
12) They don’t know which sources of income they must declare (e.g. 
besides withholding taxes) 
3.32 0.88 
13) They attempt to file accurately but make honest mistakes in filing as 
the tax form is so complicated 
3.25 0.84 
14) They just make calculation mistakes 3.07 0.85 
15) Other (Please specify) _____________________________ 3.54 1.10 
Table 4.4: Question 8 Survey Results on Inaccurate Tax Declaration Reasons (N = 1148) 
 
III. Findings on Perceptions of Tax Compliance Related Issues: What are perceptions of 
Thai citizens in Bangkok on tax compliance related issues? 
Regarding tax evasion situation, more than half of the respondents disagreed that evading 
taxes is acceptable behavior in the society.  However, almost 45% of the respondents agreed or 
was neutral with tax evasion behavior in Thai society.  More than one-third of the respondents 
saw the news or was aware of people evading taxes at high or the highest levels.  Moreover, over 
40% of the respondents saw the news or were aware of people evading taxes that had been 
punished at low or the lowest levels. 
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Regarding tax law enforcement, around 40% of the respondents agreed that it is difficult 
for the Revenue Department to find out who evade taxes and that current penalties are too low to 
make people obey tax laws. Approximately half of the respondents thought the severity of 
current penalties and the degree of tax law enforcement are at the average level while one-third 
perceived they are at low or the lowest levels. About 50% of the respondents agreed that there is 
not enough enforcement in existing tax laws. 
Regarding government administration, more than half of the respondents thought the 
degree of government/politicians corruption is high or very high. However, approximately 40% 
of the respondents agreed that government and tax administration procedures are fair.  More than 
half of the respondents thought the levels of fairness of government and tax administration are at 
the average levels still one-third perceived them at low or the lowest levels.   
Sixty percent of the respondents reported average satisfaction with the service quality of 
governmental organizations while one-third was not satisfied. Seventy percent of the respondents 
reported average satisfaction with the service quality of the Revenue Department while a quarter 
was not satisfied. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the survey results for tax compliance related issues. 
 
  
    76 
 
3. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
    (Strongly Disagree = 1 to Strongly Agree = 5) 1 2 3 4 5 
1) Not filing taxes or filing taxes lower than actual 
obligation is an acceptable behavior in Thai society 
221 
(19%) 
403 
(35%) 
337 
(29%) 
161 
(14%) 
21 
(2%) 
2) It is difficult for the Revenue Department to find 
out who are not filing taxes or filing taxes lower 
than actual obligation 
64 
(6%) 
246 
(22%) 
400 
(35%) 
373 
(33%) 
58 
(5%) 
3)  Governmental administration procedures in 
general have treated all people fairly whether rich or 
poor. Everyone is subjected to the same laws and 
enforcement and has an opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner 
94 
(8%) 
201 
(18%) 
375 
(33%) 
347 
(30%) 
127 
(11%) 
4) Tax administration procedures in general have 
treated all people fairly whether rich or poor. 
Everyone is subjected to the same tax laws and 
enforcement and has an opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner 
64 
(6%) 
199 
(17%) 
379 
(33%) 
382 
(33%) 
122 
(11%) 
5) Currents penalties are too low to make people 
obey tax laws 
31 
(3%) 
125 
(11%) 
438 
(38%) 
405 
(35%) 
144 
(13%) 
6) There is not enough enforcement despite the 
existing tax laws 
24 
(2%) 
92 
(8%) 
419 
(37%) 
470 
(41%) 
139 
(12%) 
Table 4.5: Question 3 Survey Results on Tax Compliance Related Issues  
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4. Please rate your opinion on the following issues from the lowest to the highest. 
    (Lowest = 1 to Highest = 5) 1 2 3 4 5 
1) What is the degree to which you believe 
government or politicians are corrupted (e.g. taking 
personal gains against taxpayers’ money)? 
15 
(1%) 
61 
(5%) 
243 
(21%) 
451 
(40%) 
369 
(32%) 
2) What is your level of satisfaction with the 
service quality of governmental organizations in 
general? 
88 
(8%) 
319 
(28%) 
615 
(54%) 
108 
(9%) 
10 
(1%) 
3) What is your level of satisfaction with the 
service quality of the Revenue Department? 
37 
(3%) 
221 
(20%) 
761 
(67%) 
105 
(9%) 
9 
(1%) 
4) What is the degree to which you believe the 
severity of current penalties for those who are not 
filing taxes or filing taxes less than actual 
obligation?   
53 
(5%) 
308 
(27%) 
599 
(53%) 
152 
(13%) 
25 
(2%) 
5) What is the degree to which you believe the tax 
laws have been enforced on those who are not 
filing taxes or filing taxes less than actual 
obligation? 
53 
(5%) 
288 
(25%) 
619 
(54%) 
152 
(13%) 
24 
(2%) 
6) What is the level of fairness of government 
administration without selective treatment? 
99 
(9%) 
296 
(26%) 
611 
(54%) 
109 
(10%) 
20 
(2%) 
7) What is the level of fairness of tax 
administration collection of the Revenue 
Department without selective treatment? 
50 
(4%) 
284 
(25%) 
653 
(57%) 
132 
(21%) 
17 
(1%) 
8) What is the degree to which you see the news or 
aware of people evade their taxes 
38 
(3%) 
193 
(17%) 
544 
(48%) 
298 
(26%) 
54 
(5%) 
9) What is the degree to which you see the news or 
aware of people evade their taxes that have been 
punished 
129 
(11%) 
374 
(33%) 
519 
(48%) 
93 
(26%) 
19 
(5%) 
Table 4.6: Question 4 Survey Results on Tax Compliance Related Issues 
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IV. Findings on Audit and Penalty Knowledge and Perceptions: What are Thai citizens’ 
audit and penalty knowledge and perceptions? 
Sixty-six percent of the respondents believed the probability that they will be audited by 
the Revenue Department is between 21 to 60%. A majority of the respondents (63 to 71%) 
answered that they do not know what those penalties are. However, 30 to 49% of the respondents 
answered correctly. In case of criminal penalties for intentional tax evasion, almost half of the 
respondents thought the penalties are softer than actual penalty. Table 4.7 summarized the survey 
findings on penalty knowledge and perceptions. Table 4.8 shows the survey findings on audit 
and penalty knowledge and perceptions. 
When the current levels of penalties were revealed to the respondents, approximately half 
of the respondents thought the current levels of penalties are appropriate (not too soft nor too 
harsh). When it comes to fine penalty if audited and found guilty by the Revenue Department, 
40% of the respondents thought the penalties are too harsh or way too harsh. Also for criminal 
penalties for intentional tax evasion, almost one-third thought current penalties are too harsh or 
way too harsh. Conversely, for criminal penalties for intentionally not filing taxes and surcharge 
penalty for not paying on time, 25-31% of the respondents thought current penalties are too soft 
or way too soft. Table 4.9 shows the survey results on how the respondents feel about current 
penalties.  
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Types of Penalty People claimed 
they do not know 
about the penalty 
People answered 
correctly 
People satisfied 
with current 
penalty 
1) Criminal penalties for 
intentionally not filing taxes 
63% 38% 49% 
2) Surcharge penalty for not paying 
on time 
66% 44% 51% 
3) Fine penalty if audited and 
found guilty by the Revenue 
Department 
71% 49% 50% 
4) Criminal penalties for 
intentional tax evasion 
70% 30% 52% 
Table 4.7: Summary Findings on Penalty Knowledge and Perceptions (N = 1148) 
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 N % 
9. How many percentages of people you believe are audited by the Revenue 
Department? 
  
 0-20%  None or Almost None 143 13% 
 21-40%  Less than Half 344 30% 
 41-60%  About Half 417 37% 
 61-80%  More than Half 177 16% 
 81-100%  All or Almost All 49 4% 
10. Do you know about criminal penalties for intentionally not filing taxes?   
 Yes 167 15% 
 No 717 63% 
 Not sure 252 22% 
11. What do you think current criminal penalties for intentionally not filing taxes 
according to the Revenue Code 2008 are (if you don’t know, please use your best 
guess)? 
  
 Maximum fine 2,000 Baht or maximum imprisonment 3 months or both 356 32% 
 Maximum fine 5,000 Baht or maximum imprisonment 6 months or both 453 39% 
 Maximum fine 10,000 Baht or maximum imprisonment 1 year or both 209 19% 
 Maximum fine 20,000 Baht or maximum imprisonment 2 year or both 120 11% 
12. Do know the surcharge penalty for not paying personal income tax on time?   
 Yes 125 11% 
 No 751 66% 
 Not sure 255 23% 
13. What do you think current surcharge penalty for not paying personal income tax on 
time according to the Revenue Code 2008 is (if you don’t know, please use your best 
guess) 
  
 0.5 % per month of that tax obligation 404 36% 
 1.5 % per month of that tax obligation 503 45% 
 5 % per month of that tax obligation 155 14% 
 10 % per month of that tax obligation 57 5% 
14. Do you know about the fine penalty if audited by the Revenue Department and 
found paying inaccurate taxes? 
  
 Yes 103 9% 
 No 811 72% 
 Not sure 216 19% 
15. What do you think current fine penalty if audited by the Revenue Department and 
found not paying accurate taxes according to the Revenue Code 2008 is (if you don’t 
know, please use your best guess)? 
  
 0.5 to 1 time of that tax obligation 398 36% 
 1 to 2 times of that tax obligation 559 50% 
 3 to 4 times of that tax obligation 117 10% 
 4 to 5 times of that tax obligation 44 4% 
16. Do you know about criminal penalties for intentional tax evasion?   
 Yes 124 11% 
 No 794 71% 
 Not sure 208 18% 
17. What do you think the criminal penalties for intentional tax evasion according to the 
Revenue Code 2008 are? (if you don’t know, please use your best guess)? 
  
 Imprisonment 3 months - 5 years and fine 1,000 – 100,000 Baht 539 48% 
 Imprisonment 3 months - 7 years and fine 2,000 – 200,000 Baht 342 31% 
 Imprisonment 6 months - 7 years and fine 5,000 – 200,000 Baht 148 13% 
 Imprisonment 6 months - 10 years and fine 5,000 – 500,000 Baht 83 7% 
Table 4.8: Questions 9 to 17 Survey Results on Audit and Penalty Knowledge and Perceptions 
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18. The following statements are penalties according to the Revenue Code 2008. How do you feel about 
each penalty? 
 Way 
Too 
Soft 
Too 
Soft 
Not Too 
Soft nor 
Too 
Harsh 
Too 
Harsh 
Way 
Too 
Harsh 
1) The criminal penalties for intentionally not 
filing taxes are to pay maximum fine 5,000 Baht or 
maximum imprisonment 6 months or both. How do 
you feel about that? 
69 
(6%) 
282 
(25%) 
566 
(50%) 
163 
(14%) 
50 
(4%) 
2) The surcharge penalty for not filing taxes on 
time is to pay 1.5 percent per month of that tax 
amount. That is if your tax obligation is 10,000 
Baht, you must pay at least 150 Baht each month. 
How do you feel about that? 
39 
(3%) 
248 
(22%) 
587 
(52%) 
195 
(17%) 
58 
(5%) 
3) If audited by the Revenue Department and 
found not paying accurate taxes, there will be 
fine of one or two times of that tax obligation in 
addition to the 1.5% surcharge. That is if your tax 
obligation is 10,000 Baht, you will have to pay 
extra 20,000 or 30,000 Baht plus 150 Baht per 
month.  How do you feel about that? 
20 
(2%) 
178 
(16%) 
579 
(52%) 
268 
(24%) 
79 
(7%) 
4) The criminal penalties for intentional tax 
evasion are to imprison from three months to seven 
years and pay fines from 2,000 to 200,000 Baht. 
How do you feel about that? 
43 
(4%) 
180 
(16%) 
593 
(53%) 
236 
(21%) 
70 
(6%) 
Table 4.9: Question 18 Survey Results on Current Penalty Perceptions  
 
V. Findings on Tax Compliance Strategies Perceptions: Which strategies might help 
increase tax compliance in Thailand? 
The top three tax compliance strategies that would make people attempt to report income 
more accurately are cash back to compliant taxpayers (M = 3.47, SD = 0.97), more enforcement 
on tax laws (M = 3.44, SD = 0.95), improved service quality of government organizations (M = 
3.40, SD = 0.84), and more news/awareness that people who evaded taxes have been punished 
(M = 3.40, SD = 0.89).  
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The least effective strategies from the respondents’ perspectives are honorary citizen 
certificates for compliant taxpayers (M = 3.18, SD 0.93), tax amnesty (M = 3.21, SD = 0.83), and 
doubled fine penalty (M = 3.22, SD = 0.90). Table 4.10 shows the survey results for tax 
compliance strategies. 
 
20. How likely is that you or people in general will attempt to report income more accurately in the 
following situations?     
     (Very Unlikely = 1 to Very Likely = 5) M SD 
20.1) If the chance of being audited by the Revenue Department is higher 3.26 0.87 
20.2) If the Revenue Department informs you in advance (before filing tax 
returns) that your tax returns’ file will be audited 
3.38 0.84 
20.3) If the Revenue Department formally announces to the people the 
exact portion of people that will be audited each year 
3.34 0.88 
20.4) If minimum surcharge of 1.5 percent per month is doubled to 3 
percent 
3.26 0.88 
20.5) If fine penalty of 1-2 times of tax obligation is doubled to  3-4 times  3.22 0.90 
20.6) If criminal penalties for intentional tax cheating are to imprison from 
3 months to 7 years and pay fines from 2,000 to 200,000 Baht are doubled 
to imprison from 6 months to 14 years and pay fines from 4,000 to 
400,000 Baht  
3.27 0.92 
20.7) If there is more enforcement on tax laws 3.44 0.95 
20.8) If lottery prices are offered as rewards to compliant taxpayers who 
file taxes accurately 
3.26 0.95 
20.9) If honorary citizen certificates are offered as rewards to compliant 
taxpayers who file taxes accurately 
3.18 0.93 
20.10) If cash back is offered as rewards to compliant taxpayers who file 
taxes accurately 
3.47 0.97 
20.11) If future audit reduction is offered as rewards to compliant 
taxpayers who file taxes accurately 
3.38 0.88 
20.12) If one time opportunity is offered to noncompliant taxpayers to 
voluntarily pay back taxes without criminal investigation and penalties  
3.21 0.83 
20.13) If the Revenue Department announces that penalties for tax evasion 
will be stronger after that one time opportunity to pay back taxes has been 
offered 
3.28 0.80 
20.14) If the service quality of government organizations in general is 
improved 
3.40 0.84 
20.15) If the service quality of the Revenue Department is improved 3.39 0.84 
20.16) If government administration procedure is fairer without selective 
treatment 
3.25 0.96 
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20. How likely is that you or people in general will attempt to report income more accurately in the 
following situations?     
     (Very Unlikely = 1 to Very Likely = 5) M SD 
20.17) If tax collection administration procedure of the Revenue 
Department is fairer without selective treatment 
3.34 0.92 
20.18) If there is less corruption in government 3.37 1.05 
20.19) If you see more news or more aware that people who evade their 
taxes have been punished 
3.40 0.89 
Table 4.10: Question 20 Survey Results on Tax Compliance Strategies (N = 1148) 
 
VI. Findings on Tax Compliance Behaviors: What are Thai citizens’ tax compliance 
behaviors?
 
 
More than half of the respondents claimed that they filed personal income tax within the 
past two years and will file personal income tax next year. Interestingly, 21-30% preferred not to 
answer about their tax filing behaviors. If we assume that those who said they prefer not to 
answer did not file or will not file personal income tax, it means there are about 40% who did not 
file or will not file personal income tax.  
For both willingness to pay tax and intention to declare all information accurately in the 
past, approximately one-third of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that they were willing 
to pay personal income tax and intended to declare as accurately as possible within the past two 
years.  
For future intention on willingness to pay tax and intention to declare all information 
accurately, over 40% agreed or strongly agreed that they are willing to pay tax and intend to 
declare as accurately as possible next year, which are higher than what they claimed for the past.  
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For possibilities of understating income and overstating deduction/expenses, only 17% 
believed it is likely or very likely that they might have understated income or overstated 
deduction/expenses within the past two years.  While for next year, about 20% said that it is 
likely or very likely that they might understate income or overstate deduction/expenses, which 
has slightly increased from what they claimed for the past.  
Table 4.11 presents survey findings on various perspectives of Thai citizens’ tax 
compliance behaviors including willingness to pay tax, intention to declare accurately, and 
possibilities of understating income and overstating deduction/expenses. Chapter 6 will present 
and discuss further how people change their behaviors from one group in the past to another 
group in the future (or remain in the same group) via latent transition analysis. 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Prefer 
Not to 
Answer 
1) Willingness to pay tax       
- Past  13 
(1%) 
47 
(4%) 
357 
(28%) 
265 
(23%) 
66 
(6%) 
101 
(9%) 
- Future   24 
(2%) 
37 
(3%) 
418 
(36%) 
381 
(33%) 
95 
(8%) 
126 
(11%) 
2) Intention to declare 
accurately 
- Past 
 
 
 
7 
(1%) 
 
 
25 
(2%) 
 
 
329 
(29%) 
 
 
296 
(24%) 
 
 
83 
(7%) 
 
 
107 
(9%) 
- Future 13 
(1%) 
44 
(4%) 
390 
(34%) 
394 
(34%) 
118 
(10%) 
135 
(12%) 
 Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Neither 
Likely 
nor 
Unlikely 
Likely Very 
Likely 
Prefer 
Not to 
Answer 
3) Possibility of understating 
Income 
- Past 
 
 
 
47 
(4%) 
 
 
 
181 
(16%) 
 
 
321 
(28%) 
 
 
183 
(16%) 
 
 
14 
(1%) 
 
 
106 
(9%) 
- Future 67 
(6%) 
239 
(21%) 
448 
(39%) 
199 
(17%) 
19 
(2%) 
126 
(11%) 
4) Possibility of overstating 
deduction/expenses 
- Past 
 
 
39 
(3%) 
 
 
 
185 
(16%) 
 
 
321 
(28%) 
 
 
178 
(15%) 
 
 
18 
(2%) 
 
 
108 
(9%) 
- Future 65 
(6%) 
246 
(21%) 
429 
(37%) 
206 
(18%) 
18 
(2%) 
127 
(11%) 
Table 4.11: Survey Results of Thai citizens’ Tax Compliance Behaviors 
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VII. Discussion of Results  
The results presented earlier in this chapter have answered the first research question of 
this study: what are general citizens’ perceptions of Thai personal income tax system, what are 
their tax compliance behaviors, and what strategies might help increase tax compliance in 
Thailand? Those results are further discussed here by categories of findings.  
First, on tax rates perceptions’ findings, as expected, 43% of the respondents thought the 
tax rates are too high.  When discussing in public, it is not surprising among Thai people to hear 
how much they hate paying taxes and how they think the government is unable to deliver good 
public services. However, the fact that half of the respondents thought current personal income 
tax rates are about right is very interesting. When the respondents were asked to compare income 
tax they are paying with the public service they receive, 40% still think what they are paying is 
about right.  
All these could be because almost half of the respondents believed that they are paying 
personal income tax at the lowest rate at 10% or even got exemption from paying personal 
income tax. This is not included the other 21% that said they have no idea about the tax rate they 
are paying. The fact (when matching their reported income in demographic questions with tax 
rate brackets) is 80% of the respondents are paying personal income tax at the lowest rate at 10% 
or even got exemption. The sensible explanation is that these citizens may expect only a 
reasonable quality of public service in return for what they paid for. Ones might expect that 
people will almost always hate to pay taxes no matter what amount but that is not the case. There 
are still a lot of Thai citizens are able to perceive personal income tax rates as about right mostly 
when they have to pay only little amount of tax.  
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And, when the respondents were informed that the richest group of people has been 
paying for half of the personal income tax revenues, 40% of the respondents thought those 
people are paying too much or way too much tax. The issue here might be that the citizens do not 
have enough exposure to tax revenues’ information. As when they really have that information, 
they realize that there are other people who paying much more personal income taxes than 
themselves. Again, 80% of the respondents indicated their salary at less than 500,000 Baht per 
year, which is in the two lowest brackets of Thailand’s personal income tax rates. Thus, it is 
reasonable to believe that those who are in lower tax rate brackets perceived that the richest 
group of people has been paying too much.   
Second, on findings of tax non-compliance reasons, the top three reasons why people do 
not file their personal income taxes are directly related to government administration, namely 
government corruption, inappropriate tax revenue spending, and seeing others evade taxes. 
Similarly, the top three reasons why people do not declare their incomes accurately are 
government corruption, inappropriate tax revenue spending, and too high taxes comparing to the 
public service they receive. These results confirm the behavioral model of tax evasion, which is 
the alternative approach in tax compliance, that suggests perceptions about fairness of tax system 
and trust in government and attitudes about acceptability of tax evasion affect tax compliance 
decisions (Slemrod, 2007). This is very interesting results for Thailand and other developing 
countries where corruptions are still prevalent and government administrations have a lot of 
rooms for improvement.  
Third, on perceptions of other tax compliance related issues findings regarding tax 
evasion situation, more than half of the respondents confirm the moral belief that evading taxes 
is not an acceptable behavior even in Thai society. However, if we look at the results from 
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another perspective, there are almost 45% of the respondents who agreed or were neutral with 
tax evasion behavior in Thai society. Moreover, there are more than one-third of the respondents 
that saws news or was aware of people evading tax at high or the highest levels. This result is 
intimidating and suggests that Thailand might have a serious problem with social norms 
regarding tax evasion.  
On perceptions of other tax compliance regarding tax law enforcement, not enough 
enforcement in existing tax laws, difficulty for the Revenue Department in detecting tax evasion, 
and too low current levels of penalties seem to be the problems reported by 40-50% of the 
respondents. These results suggest Thailand’s enforcement problems regarding tax evasion, 
which require more attention from the government and all related agencies.  
On perceptions of other tax compliance regarding government administration, as 
expected, more than half of the respondents perceived Thai government/politicians corruption as 
high or very high. When asked more specifically about government and tax administration, only 
40% perceived that government and tax administration procedures are fair. People, however, 
seem to be more satisfy with service quality and fairness of the Revenue Department than with 
government administration in general. Nevertheless, there is one-third (for most) to one-quarter 
(for service quality of the Revenue Department) who rated government and tax administration 
issues at low or the lowest levels, which signal that there are still many people who are not 
satisfied. These, again, are valuable information for Thai government in addressing issues related 
to tax compliance.    
Forth, on audit and penalty knowledge and perceptions findings, 66% of the respondents 
believed that their chance of being audited by Thailand’s Revenue Department is between 21% 
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and 60%. Although the Revenue Department has never disclosed its audit rate, it surely has a 
limited audit capacity considering approximately 9 million people file tax each year given its 
5,000 audit personnel. This result emphasizes the importance of perception according to the 
prospect theory that people could perceive higher audit rate than they actually are (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979).  
 For penalty knowledge and perceptions, the majority of the respondents (63%-71%) 
claimed having no idea about the penalties but 30-50% of the respondents could answer correctly 
what those penalties are. This means although people do not know exactly about actual penalties, 
a lot of them can somehow “guesstimate” correctly. This implies that Thai people have fairly 
accurate perceptions on the levels of penalties. When it comes to satisfaction with those levels of 
penalties, around half the respondents are satisfied. However, for fine penalty if audited and 
found guilty by the Revenue Department and criminal penalties for intentional tax evasion, there 
are 40% and 27% respectively who thought the penalties are too harsh or way too harsh. On the 
contrary, for criminal penalties for intentionally not filing taxes and surcharges penalty for not 
paying on time, 31% and 25% thought current penalties are too soft or way too soft. These 
findings could be very helpful for government in revising tax evasion penalties as there are still 
penalties that are too soft in the citizens’ eyes.  
Fifth, on tax compliance strategies findings, the results suggest that cash back to 
compliant taxpayers, more enforcement on tax laws, improved service quality of government 
organizations, and more news/awareness that people who evaded taxes have been punished will 
make people attempt to report income more accurately. These results support both the traditional 
(tax evasion deterrence through enforcement of audits and penalties) and the alternative 
approaches of tax compliance (responsible taxpayers that can be motivated via rewards, senses of 
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civic duties, education, etc) (Mikesell & Birskyte, 2007). The results, therefore, convey a very 
interesting meaning that both the traditional and the alternative approaches of tax compliance 
should be employed as joint strategies to promote tax compliance.  
Lastly, on tax compliance behaviors findings, the results show us that more than half of 
the respondents filed personal income tax within the past two years and will file personal income 
tax next year. Still, there are about 40% who did not file or will not file personal income tax 
assuming those who said preferred not to answer did not file or will not file personal income tax. 
Moreover, there are only 40% of the respondents who agreed or strongly agreed that they are 
willing to pay tax and intend to declare accurately next year, which are just slightly higher than 
what they claimed for the past (around one-third). Also 17% of the respondents said that it is 
likely or very likely that they might have understated income or overstated deduction/expenses 
within the past two years and 20% said they might be in the next year. These findings draw 
attention to existing tax compliance problems in Thailand regarding citizens’ tax filing 
behaviors, willingness to pay tax, intention to pay tax, and possibilities of understating income or 
overstating deduction/expenses, which should be addressed more seriously by the government.  
 
VIII. Conclusion  
The findings presented in this chapter provide the answers to the first research question of 
this study by exploring tax rates perceptions, tax non-compliance reasons, perceptions of tax 
compliance related issues, audit and penalty knowledge and perceptions, tax compliance 
strategies, and tax compliance behaviors.  
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Only approximately half of the respondents said they filed personal income tax within the 
past two years and will file personal income tax next year. The top reasons for not filing personal 
income tax and not declaring their incomes accurately are all related to government 
administration and fairness of the tax system namely government corruption, inappropriate tax 
revenue spending, social norms about tax evasion, and too high taxes comparing to the public 
service they received. Obviously, there is room for the Thai government to enhance tax 
compliance of Thai citizens. The strategies for promoting tax compliance that the respondents 
said would work best are cash back to compliant taxpayers, more enforcement on tax laws, 
improved service quality of government organizations, and more news or more aware that people 
who evaded taxes have been punished. These results tell us that the government needs not only 
enforcement e.g. audits and penalties according to the traditional tax evasion approach but also 
rewards and motivation from improving fairness and service quality of government and tax 
administration according to alternative approaches of tax compliance. These results serve as the 
first database on Thai personal income tax compliance for Thailand that researchers and the Thai 
government can build up on.  
In the next chapter (Chapter 5), the data will be analyzed further using factor analysis and 
latent transition analysis to answer the second research question on critical determinants of 
personal income tax compliance behavior in Thailand.  
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Chapter 5 
Critical Determinants of Thai Citizens’ Tax Compliance 
The previous chapter presented the overall survey results on Thai citizens’ perceptions of 
personal income tax system and tax compliance and answered Research Question 1: What are 
general citizens’ perceptions of the Thai personal income tax system, their tax compliance 
behaviors, and strategies for increasing tax compliance in Thailand? This chapter analyzes the 
survey results further to find the groups of tax non-compliance reasons of Thai citizens who live 
in Bangkok. The aim of this chapter and the next is to answer Research Question 2: What are 
critical determinants of personal income tax compliance behavior in Thailand? The five 
hypotheses of this study will also be answered in this chapter.  
The quantitative methods employed in this chapter are factor analysis and latent transition 
analysis. As mentioned earlier in chapter 3, technical details of these methods could be found in 
Appendix C. Factor analysis is a sub-model of structural equation modeling that is used to 
separate items into subgroups of items that have high correlations among one another. Here, the 
reasons for tax non-filing and inaccurate tax declaration (Questions 6 and 8 in the survey) were 
grouped and analyzed by factor analysis to see possible tax compliance determinants (factors). 
Latent transition analysis was used to find subgroups (classes) of tax compliance behaviors. 
After that, tax compliance factors from factor analysis were used to predict those tax compliance 
behavior classes. In this way, the critical determinants of tax compliance were identified.  
This chapter presents: 1) factor analysis results of tax non-filing reasons, 2) factor 
analysis results of inaccurate tax declaration, 3) latent transition analysis results of tax 
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compliance behavior subgroups, 4) latent transition analysis results of tax compliance 
determinants, and 5) discussion of results. There are finding highlights at the end of each section.     
 
I. Factor Analysis Results of Tax Non-Filing: Why some Thai citizens do not file their 
personal income taxes?  
In question 6, there were 15 items (reasons) why some Thai citizens do not file their 
personal income taxes. In deriving tax non-filing factors, I analyzed Exploratory Factor Analysis 
(EFA) from one to ten underlying factors of the calibration sample but the result of the ten-factor 
solution did not converge. Table 5.1 shows the model fit statistics of the results from one to nine 
factors. The factor solution with 4 factors or more had adequate fit such that RMSEA < .10, CFI 
> .90, TLI > .90, and SRMR < .08. However, when the four-factor was increased to five-factor 
solution, the fifth factor did not have high loading on any indicators. Therefore, the four-factor 
solution was selected.  
Number of Factor 
2
 df p RMSEA CFI TLI SRMR 
1 1791.581 90 < .001 .182 .759 .719 .114 
2 1048.287 76 < .001 .150 .862 .810 .079 
3 549.24 63 < .001 .116 .931 .885 .050 
4 301.818 51 < .001 .093 .965 .927 .033 
5 159.033 40 < .001 .072 .983 .956 .022 
6 81.115 30 < .001 .055 .993 .975 .015 
7 44.424 21 .002 .044 .997 .983 .010 
8 14.21 13 .359 .013 1.000 .999 .005 
9 3.853 6 .697 .000 1.000 1.005 .003 
Note.  RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation, CFI = comparative fit index, TLI = 
Tucker-Lewis Index, SRMR = standardized root mean squared residuals. 
 
Table 5.1: Model Fit Statistics of Different Factor Results of Tax Non-Filing Question 
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The four factors can be interpreted as 1) perception of low enforcement (items 6.2, 6.3, 
and 6.4)
12
, 2) lack of tax knowledge of the tax filing requirements (items 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7)
13
, 3) 
perception of unfairness of tax system (items 6.9, 6.10, 6.11, and 6.12)
14
, and 4) perception of 
poor government administration (items 6.13, 6.14, and 6.15)
15
. These four factors fit into the four 
major hypotheses of this study: H1, H4, H2, and H3 respectively.  
Here I used factor loadings more than .4 (or less than -.4) to indicate high loadings and 
items 6.1 and 6.8 were not highly loaded to any factor. Therefore, both items were dropped from 
the analysis. Then, the four-factor solution was re-analyzed. The model fit was still adequate, 
2 
(32, N= 571) = 153.73, p < .001, RMSEA = .082, CFI = .982, and TLI = .955. The four-factor 
solution was retained with the same interpretation as earlier. The factor loadings and factor 
correlations of this EFA are shown in the left panel of Table 5.2. 
In the validation sample, the four-factor Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) solution 
adequately fit the data, 
2 
(59, N= 571) = 330.85, p < .001, RMSEA = .09, CFI = .959, and TLI = 
.946. The non-zero factor loadings from CFA were not greatly different from the loadings from 
EFA. Thus, the four-factor solution was suggested with the same interpretation namely 
perception of low enforcement, lack of tax knowledge, perception of unfairness of tax system, 
and perception of poor government administration. The factor loadings and factor correlations of 
                                                          
12
 Item 6.2, they think the Revenue Department will not find out if they don’t file taxes. Item 6.3, they think even if 
the Revenue Department finds out that they don’t file taxes, they will not be punished. Item 6.4, they are not afraid 
of current penalties because the penalties are not strong enough.  
13
 Item 6.5, they don’t know how to get the form to pay taxes. Item 6.6, they think tax form is too complicated. Item 
6.7, they think it takes too much time to file taxes. 
14
 Item 6.9, they think it takes too much time to file taxes. Item 6.10, they think it’s not fair to be taxed from their 
own earnings. Item 6.11, they think the tax rate is too high. Item 6.12, they think others evade taxes. 
15
 Item 6.13, they think the government does not spend tax revenues appropriately. Item 6.14, they think there is too 
much corruption in government operations. Item 6.1, they don’t like the government. 
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this CFA are shown in right panel of Table 5.2. The relationships between demographic variables 
and the resulting factors of tax non-filing are shown in Table 5.3. 
 
 
EFA (N = 571) CFA (N = 571) 
 
ENF KNOW FAIR GOV ENF KNOW FAIR GOV 
Item 2 .596 .087 .121 -.096 .682 .000 .000 .000 
Item 3 .791 .052 -.093 -.007 .687 .000 .000 .000 
Item 4 .646 -.062 .049 .073 .695 .000 .000 .000 
Item 5 .046 .645 .080 -.147 .000 .585 .000 .000 
Item 6 .002 .847 -.025 .123 .000 .856 .000 .000 
Item 7 .083 .574 .116 .029 .000 .734 .000 .000 
Item 9 -.016 .158 .678 -.098 .000 .000 .651 .000 
Item 10 -.060 .082 .760 -.004 .000 .000 .743 .000 
Item 11 .002 -.016 .749 .117 .000 .000 .806 .000 
Item 12 .220 -.113 .601 .219 .000 .000 .800 .000 
Item 13 .041 .001 .173 .734 .000 .000 .000 .910 
Item 14 -.001 .047 -.048 .994 .000 .000 .000 .901 
Item 15 -.057 .026 .213 .515 .000 .000 .000 .682 
FORM .284 
   
.156 
   RATE .262 .421 
  
.169 .204 
  GOV .269 .270 .599 
 
.193 .212 0.446 
 Note.  EFA = Exploratory factor analysis. CFA = Confirmatory factor analysis. ENF = Low 
enforcement perception. KNOW = Lack of Tax Knowledge. FAIR = Unfairness of tax system perception. 
GOV = Perception of poor government administration.  
 
Table 5.2: Factor Loadings (upper layer) and Factor Correlations (lower layer) of Tax 
Non-Filing using Four-factor Solution from EFA and CFA on Calibration and Validation 
Groups respectively  
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  N 
ENF KNOW FAIR GOV 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Sex Male 488 -0.021 0.589 -0.010 0.499 -0.051 0.584 -0.075 0.836 
 Female 650 0.012 0.644 0.003 0.547 0.030 0.581 0.032 0.832 
Education Primary 25 0.074 0.441 -0.148 0.415 0.012 0.601 -0.047 0.932 
 Secondary 63 -0.041 0.626 -0.039 0.467 -0.079 0.529 -0.093 0.784 
 College 151 -0.086 0.674 -0.029 0.571 -0.057 0.598 -0.091 0.877 
 Bachelor 688 0.010 0.610 0.013 0.526 0.012 0.590 0.005 0.830 
 Master 100 0.063 0.645 0.022 0.594 0.049 0.617 0.076 0.874 
 Doctorate 5 0.523 0.650 0.107 0.323 0.351 0.209 0.718 0.544 
Marital 
Status 
Single 693 0.044 0.622 0.038 0.526 0.050 0.586 0.042 0.844 
Married 440 -0.072 0.610 -0.063 0.521 -0.091 0.567 -0.104 0.817 
Income 
(thousand 
Baht) 
< 150 473 -0.021 0.658 -0.003 0.553 0.015 0.605 0.012 0.844 
150-500 453 0.018 0.574 0.038 0.492 0.007 0.548 0.010 0.790 
500-1000 93 -0.065 0.618 -0.134 0.537 -0.177 0.590 -0.294 0.836 
1000-4000 21 -0.021 0.665 -0.030 0.485 -0.300 0.594 -0.508 1.019 
> 4000 7 0.192 0.607 -0.387 0.583 -0.082 0.528 0.364 0.817 
Age 18-30 482 0.023 0.630 0.044 0.528 0.045 0.600 0.040 0.836 
 31-40 383 0.004 0.611 -0.006 0.506 -0.012 0.577 -0.031 0.839 
 41-50 183 -0.053 0.573 -0.066 0.519 -0.100 0.528 -0.072 0.786 
 51-60 62 -0.210 0.712 -0.180 0.608 -0.118 0.668 -0.165 0.956 
 > 61 8 0.413 0.853 0.235 0.585 0.108 0.621 -0.031 1.085 
Occupation Non-self 674 -0.004 0.613 -0.011 0.510 -0.009 0.571 -0.030 0.815 
 Self 389 -0.010 0.653 -0.001 0.565 -0.026 0.617 -0.020 0.891 
 Others 57 0.052 0.530 0.114 0.479 0.189 0.524 0.234 0.699 
Note.  EFA = Exploratory factor analysis. CFA = Confirmatory factor analysis. ENF = Low 
enforcement perception. KNOW = Lack of Tax Knowledge. FAIR = Unfairness of tax system perception. 
GOV = Perception of poor government administration. 
 
Table 5.3: Demographic Variables and the Resulting Factors of Tax Non-Filing 
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Finding Highlights: 
The factor analysis results classify 15 questionnaire items into 4 factors that account for 
tax non-filing behavior: 1) perception of low enforcement, 2) lack of tax knowledge of the tax 
filing requirements, 3) perception of unfairness of the tax system, and 4) perception of poor 
government administration. These four factors fit the four major hypotheses set in this study and 
will be tested later in this chapter by latent transition analysis. 
 
II. Factor Analysis Results of Inaccurate Tax Declaration: Why some Thai citizens do 
not declare their income accurately? 
In question 8, there were 15 items (reasons) why some Thai citizens do not declare their 
income inaccurately. Again, the responses from calibration sample were used for EFA. Since the 
reasons of question 8 and 6 are closely related, I expected four-factor solution in EFA for the 
inaccurate tax declaration as well. Thus, I ran EFA of four-factor solution. As expected, the 
model fit was adequate, 
2 
(41, N= 571) = 253.148, p < .001, RMSEA = .095, CFI = .974, TLI = 
.943, and SRMR = .025.  
The four factors can also be interpreted as: 1) perception of low enforcement (items 8.1 
and 8.2)
16
, 2) lack of tax knowledge of the tax filing requirements (items 8.12, 8.13, and 8.14)
17
, 
                                                          
16
 Item 8.1, they think the Revenue Department will not find out if they declare their incomes inaccurately. Item 8.2, 
they think even if the Revenue Department finds out that they declare their incomes inaccurately, they will not be 
punished. 
17
 Item 8.12, they don’t know which sources of income they must declare. Item 8.13, they attempt to file accurately 
but make honest mistakes in filing as the tax form is so complicated. Item 8.14, they just make calculation mistakes. 
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3) perception of unfairness of tax system (items 8.4, 8.5, 8.6 and, 8.7)
18
, and 4) perception of 
poor government administration (items 8.9 and 8.10)
19
. Again, these four factors fit into the four 
major hypotheses of this study: H1, H4, H2, and H3 respectively.  
 Items 8.3, 8.8, and 8.11 were not highly loaded to any factors or had their two highest 
loadings differences not over .10 (i.e., dual loading). Therefore, these three items were excluded 
from the analysis and the four-factor solution was analyzed again. The model fit was still 
adequate, 
2 
(17, N= 571) = 121.61, p < .001, RMSEA = .104, CFI = .987, and TLI = .956. Even 
though RMSEA did not indicate good fit (greater than .10), CFI and TLI were very high (close to 
1). The meanings of factors were not changed after dropping those items. I also ran EFA with 
five factors. The factor solution was not interpretable. Thus, the four-factor solution was 
retained. The factor loadings and factor correlations of this EFA are shown in the left panel of 
Table 5.4. 
Then, the four-factor solution was used as the hypothesis in CFA on validation sample. 
The four-factor solution adequately fitted the data, 
2 
(59, N= 571) = 330.85, p < .001, RMSEA 
= .113, CFI = .961, and TLI = .943. Again, the non-zero factor loadings from CFA were not 
largely different from the loadings from EFA. Therefore, four factors were also suggested for 
inaccurate tax declaration: low enforcement perception, lack of tax knowledge, perception of 
unfairness of the tax system, and perception of poor government administration. The factor 
loadings and factor correlations of this CFA are shown in the right panel of Table 5.4. The 
                                                          
18
 Item 8.4, they think the rich should pay more. Item 8.5, they think they are paying too much compared to what 
they receive in government services. Item 8.6, they think it’s not fair to be taxed from their own earnings. Item 8.7, 
they think the tax rate is too high. 
19
 Item 8.9, they think the government spends their tax revenues inappropriately. Item 8.10, They think there is too 
much corruption in government operations. 
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relationships between demographic variables and the resulting factors of inaccurate tax 
declaration are shown in Table 5.5. 
 
 
EFA (N = 571) CFA (N = 571) 
 
ENF KNOW FAIR GOV ENF KNOW FAIR GOV 
Item 1 .628 .022 .099 .072 .838 .000 .000 .000 
Item 2 1.000 .000 -.026 -.027 .794 .000 .000 .000 
Item 4 .211 .029 .504 .112 .000 .000 .772 .000 
Item 5 .093 .088 .608 .142 .000 .000 .878 .000 
Item 6 -.055 -.010 .968 -.046 .000 .000 .793 .000 
Item 7 .104 .074 .534 .141 .000 .000 .767 .000 
Item 9 .017 -.022 .059 .868 .000 .000 .000 .920 
Item 10 -.024 .021 -.039 .951 .000 .000 .000 .913 
Item 12 .121 .474 .173 .080 .000 .803 .000 .000 
Item 13 -.022 .988 -.004 .019 .000 .850 .000 .000 
Item 14 .024 .711 -.022 -.077 .000 .577 .000 .000 
FORM .459 
   
.416 
   RATE .437 .470 
  
.614 .537 
  GOV .340 .547 .667 
 
.414 .589 .710 
 Note.  EFA = Exploratory factor analysis. CFA = Confirmatory factor analysis. ENF = Low 
enforcement perception. KNOW = Lack of Tax Knowledge. FAIR = Unfairness of tax system perception. 
GOV = Perception of poor government administration. 
 
Table 5.4: Factor Loadings and Factor Correlations of Inaccurate Tax Declaration using 
Four-Factor Solution from EFA and CFA  
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  N 
ENF KNOW FAIR GOV 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Sex Male 488 -0.021 1.327 -0.059 1.130 -0.071 1.049 -0.100 2.288 
 Female 650 0.016 1.319 0.037 1.188 0.046 1.063 0.023 2.230 
Education Primary 25 0.186 1.207 -0.162 0.883 0.156 0.985 0.017 1.788 
 Secondary 63 -0.137 1.233 -0.109 1.094 -0.183 0.956 -0.372 2.061 
 College 151 -0.110 1.385 -0.126 1.197 -0.151 1.102 -0.554 2.435 
 Bachelor 688 0.047 1.322 0.052 1.153 0.065 1.043 0.158 2.228 
 Master 100 0.022 1.364 0.015 1.362 0.001 1.243 0.030 2.477 
 Doctorate 5 0.648 1.982 0.548 0.761 0.405 0.665 0.988 0.704 
Marital 
Status 
Single 693 0.028 1.329 0.069 1.165 0.047 1.068 0.071 2.261 
Married 440 -0.033 1.310 -0.113 1.156 -0.079 1.041 -0.175 2.241 
Income 
(thousand 
Baht) 
< 150 473 0.006 1.384 0.029 1.201 0.011 1.043 -0.064 2.291 
150-500 453 0.061 1.273 0.015 1.116 0.031 1.082 0.011 2.263 
500-1000 93 -0.298 1.234 -0.281 1.156 -0.285 0.969 -0.394 1.999 
1000-4000 21 -0.052 1.429 -0.392 1.376 -0.567 0.835 -0.788 2.288 
> 4000 7 -0.265 1.267 0.042 1.617 0.183 1.372 1.512 1.836 
Age 18-30 482 0.010 1.327 0.055 1.168 0.043 1.047 0.011 2.225 
 31-40 383 0.079 1.299 0.045 1.123 0.075 1.061 0.049 2.315 
 41-50 183 -0.150 1.336 -0.172 1.177 -0.221 1.085 -0.271 2.324 
 51-60 62 -0.158 1.343 -0.305 1.364 -0.208 1.031 -0.049 2.010 
 > 61 8 0.494 1.839 -0.064 1.253 0.106 1.150 0.273 2.085 
Occupation Non-self 674 0.006 1.260 0.029 1.124 0.011 1.012 -0.017 2.193 
 Self 389 -0.007 1.417 -0.082 1.228 -0.038 1.130 -0.063 2.359 
 Others 57 -0.019 1.357 0.219 1.166 0.134 1.135 0.201 2.374 
Note.  EFA = Exploratory factor analysis. CFA = Confirmatory factor analysis. ENF = Low 
enforcement perception. KNOW = Lack of Tax Knowledge. FAIR = Unfairness of tax system perception. 
GOV = Perception of poor government administration. 
 
Table 5.5: Demographic Variables and the Resulting Factors of Inaccurate Tax Declaration 
 
Finding Highlights: 
 
The factor analysis results also classify 15 questionnaire items into 4 factors that account 
for inaccurate tax declaration behavior: 1) perception of low enforcement, 2) lack of tax 
knowledge of the tax filing requirements, 3) perception of unfairness of the tax system, and 4) 
perception of poor government administration. These four factors fit into the four major 
hypotheses set in this study and will be tested later in this chapter via latent transition analysis. 
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III. Latent Transition Analysis Results of Tax Compliance Behavior Subgroups: What 
are types of tax compliance behavior in Thailand? 
I analyzed LTA with 2 to 8 classes for 6 tax compliance behavior questions that include 
two time points (past behaviors and future intention).
 20
 The solution with five classes provided 
the lowest Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and the clearest interpretation.
21
 Table 5.6 
provides model fit statistics of each solution. Table 5.7 shows the probability of responses of the 
five tax compliance classes for each tax compliance behavior question. From Table 5.6, the five 
tax compliance behavior subgroups were:  
1. People who file tax and declare very accurately (FILE/VA) 
2. People who file tax and declare accurately (FILE/A) 
3. People who file tax but did not provide information regarding declaration accuracy 
i.e. those who answer in neither agree nor disagree category (FILE/NK) 
4. People who file tax but declare inaccurately (FILE/I) 
5. People who do not file tax (NOFILE)  
 
 
Number of Classes AIC BIC SSBIC Entropy 
2 9531.76 9636.32 9569.62 .808 
3 8909.84 9084.11 8972.93 .746 
4 8630.14 8884.07 8722.09 .814 
5 8558.42 8752.61 8628.74 .852 
6 8347.33 8796.09 8507.06 .841 
7 Not Convergent 
8 Not Convergent 
Note.  AIC = Akaike Information Criterion, BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion, SSBIC = Sample-
Size Adjusted Information Criterion.  
 
Table 5.6: Model Fit Statistics of Latent Transition Analysis Solution with 2-8 Classes on 
Tax Compliance Behavior 
                                                          
20
 Questions for past behavior are 22, 26.1, and 26.2 and questions for future intention are 27, 29.1, and 29.2. 
21
 The solution with six classes provided the best fit from AIC and SSBIC however the interpretation from five 
classes is clearer. The results from 7 and 8 classes did not converge. Therefore, the five class solution is used. 
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Items FILE/VA FILE/A FILE/NK FILE/I NOFILE 
File personal income tax? 
    
 
Yes 100% 100% 97% 100% 0% 
No 0% 0% 3% 0% 100% 
Understate Income? 
    
 
Very Unlikely 72% 0% 0% 0% 5% 
Unlikely 16% 88% 0% 5% 12% 
Neither 3% 12% 100% 9% 56% 
Likely 4% 0% 0% 82% 22% 
Very Likely 5% 0% 0% 5% 5% 
Overstate Deductions? 
    
 
Very Unlikely 77% 0% 0% 0% 6% 
Unlikely 23% 82% 5% 5% 12% 
Neither 0% 13% 91% 16% 59% 
Likely 0% 5% 5% 72% 24% 
Very Likely 0% 0% 0% 8% 0% 
Note.  FILE/VA = People who file tax and declare tax very accurately. FILE/A = People who file tax 
and declare tax accurately. FILE/NK = People who file tax and provide no information whether they 
declare tax accurately or not. FILE/I = People who file tax and declare tax inaccurately. NOFILE = 
people who do not file tax. The bold numbers mean the categories with the highest proportion.  
 
Table 5.7: The Probability of Each Tax Compliance Behavior Category  
 
The expected proportions of each class for past behavior and future intention, as well as 
transition probability, are shown in Table 5.8. The regression coefficients from multinomial 
logistic regression are provided in Table 5.9. For past behavior, there were approximately 25% 
of people who filed tax and declared accurately or very accurately (17% and 6% respectively). 
The proportions of people who filed tax but declared inaccurately, people who did not file tax, 
and people who filed tax but did not provide information regarding declaration accuracy were 
approximately 25% each (23%, 27%, and 27% respectively).  
For future intention (regardless of past behaviors), approximately 30% of people intended 
to file tax and declared accurately or very accurately in the next year. Another 30% intended to 
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file tax but did not report their intention whether they will declare accurately or not. About 20% 
of people intended not to file tax. The other 20% intended to file tax inaccurately. 
For transition in their tax compliance behaviors, the majority of people intended to 
remain in the same groups as their past behaviors. Sixty percent of people who filed tax very 
accurately in the past intended to file tax very accurately next year. Seventy percent of people 
who filed tax accurately in the past intended to find tax accurately next year. Seventy percent of 
people who filed tax but did not provide information regarding declaration accuracy in the past 
intended to remain in the same group for next year. Sixty-six percent of people who did not file 
tax in the past intended not to file tax next year. Fifty-seven percent of people who filed tax 
inaccurately in the past intended to still file tax inaccurately however 25% of them intended not 
to report their intention whether they will declare accurately or not.   
 
Past Behavior \ Intention FILE/VA FILE/A FILE/NK FILE/I NOFILE Percent 
FILE/VA .623 .303 .000 .033 .041 6% 
FILE/A .092 .710 .122 .062 .015 17% 
FILE/NK .018 .112 .717 .138 .016 27% 
FILE/I .014 .139 .257 .570 .019 23% 
NOFILE .034 .067 .144 .088 .667 27% 
Percent 7% 22% 31% 20% 19%  
Note.  FILE/VA = People who file tax and declare tax very accurately. FILE/A = People who file tax 
and declare tax accurately. FILE/NK = People who file tax and provide no information whether they 
declare tax accurately or not. FILE/I = People who file tax and declare tax inaccurately. NOFILE = 
people who do not file tax. Percent is the model-based percentage of participants being in each class. 
 
Table 5.8: The Expected Proportions of Each Tax Compliance Behavior Class and Latent 
Transition Probability predicted by LTA analysis 
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Effect FILE/VA FILE/A FILE/NK FILE/I 
Intercept -2.988*** -2.292*** -1.536*** -2.028 
FILE/VA 5.714*** 4.297*** -23.015
F
 1.823 
FILE/A 4.792*** 6.144*** 3.625*** 3.441** 
FILE/NK 3.099* 4.260*** 5.360*** 4.200*** 
FILE/I 2.667** 4.280*** 4.140*** 5.427*** 
Note.  *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, 
F
The parameter is fixed to be a constant by model in 
order to make other parameters’ standard errors able to be estimated. 
The class of people not file tax is used as reference group for both timepoints. The 
intercept and slope of this class are fixed to 0. 
FILE/VA = People who file tax and declare tax very accurately. FILE/A = People who file tax 
and declare tax accurately. FILE/NK = People who file tax and provide no information whether they 
declare tax accurately or not. FILE/I = People who file tax and declare tax inaccurately. NOFILE = 
people who do not file tax. Percent is the model-based percentage of participants being in each class. 
 
 
Table 5.9: Regression Coefficients of Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Intended 
Tax Compliance Groups from Past Tax Compliance Groups  
 
 
Finding Highlights: 
There were five tax compliance behavior subgroups from LTA: 1) people who file tax 
and declare very accurately (FILE/VA), 2) people who file tax and declare accurately (FILE/A), 
3) people who file tax and do not report whether they declare accurately or not (FILE/NK), 4) 
people who file tax and declare inaccurately (FILE/I), and 5) people who do not file tax 
(NOFILE). These classes will be used in the subsequent analyses. 
There were at least 23% of people who declared tax inaccurately and 27% who did not 
file tax in the past. For future intention, at least 20% intended to file tax inaccurately and about 
20% of people intended not to file tax. The majority of people intended to stay in the same 
groups as their past behaviors. However, 25% of people who filed tax inaccurately in the past 
intended not to report their intention whether they will declare accurately or not. 
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IV. Latent Transition Analysis Results of Tax Non-Compliance: What are critical 
determinants of tax compliance behavior in Thailand? 
Here, the factor analysis results of tax noncompliance reasons and demographic variables 
were used to predict tax compliance behavior subgroups from previous LTA results in order to 
find critical determinants of tax compliance behavior in Thailand. 
 Demographic Characteristics and Tax Compliance Behavior in Thailand  
 I will discuss first the effect of demographic variables, which include occupation, sex, 
education, marital status, income, and age. Table 5.10 shows Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
comparison results of constrained and free regression coefficients from demographic variables 
onto tax compliance (past behavior and future intention). The results of multinomial logistic 
regression coefficients are shown in Table 5.11.  
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Effect AIC (Free) AIC (Fixed) Result 
Past Behavior of Tax Compliance 
Occupation (Group 1) 3701.383 3696.344 Fixed 
Occupation (Group 2) 3701.383 3694.929 Fixed 
Sex 3701.383 3706.221 Free 
Education 3701.383 3706.303 Free 
Marital Status 3701.383 3702.275 Free 
Income 3701.383 3735.320 Free 
Age 3701.383 3699.933 Fixed 
Intention of Tax Compliance 
Occupation (Group 1) 3701.383 3696.994 Fixed 
Occupation (Group 2) 3701.383 3694.027 Fixed 
Sex 3701.383 3695.509 Fixed 
Education 3701.383 3694.507 Fixed 
Marital Status 3701.383 3699.249 Fixed 
Income 3701.383 3705.398 Free 
Age 3701.383 3702.182 Free 
Note.  In the result column, free is similar to the effect of that independent variable is significant. Fixed 
is similar to the effect of that independent variable is not significant. 
 
Table 5.10: The AIC Comparison Results of Constrained and Free Regression Coefficients 
from Demographic Variables onto Tax Compliance (past behavior and future intention) 
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Effect FILE/VA FILE/A FILE/NK FILE/I 
Past Behavior  
Intercept -5.916** -7.775*** -2.89 -3.183* 
Occupation (Group 1) -0.247 0.024 -0.174 -0.22 
Occupation (Group 2) -0.182 0.105 0.102 0.099 
Sex 0.77 0.278 -0.614 -0.071 
Education 0.235* 0.268** 0.178 0.157* 
Marital Status -0.799 0.062 -0.835* 0.066 
Income 4.777*** 4.394*** 4.747*** 2.94** 
Age 0.033 0.047 -0.002 0.016 
Intention  
Intercept -8.864** -6.763* -1.275 -0.74 
Occupation (Group 1) 0.632 0.312 0.166 0.008 
Occupation (Group 2) 0.047 0.005 -0.153 -0.129 
Sex 0.462 0.701 0.453 0.174 
Education 0.148 0.091 0.033 0.029 
Marital Status -0.763 -1.261 -0.367 -0.183 
Income -1.004 -0.889 -1.105* -2.488* 
Age 0.047 0.036 -0.029 -0.035 
FILE/VA (Past) 22.224*** 21.143*** 16.096* 18.798
F
 
FILE/A (Past) 16.584*** 19.698*** 16.853*** 16.961
F
 
FILE/NK (Past) 3.508* 5.631*** 5.974*** 5.108*** 
FILE/I (Past) 2.078 4.821*** 4.329*** 5.492*** 
Note.  *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, 
F
The parameter is fixed to be a constant by model in order to 
make other parameters’ standard errors able to be estimated. 
The class of people who do not file tax is used as a reference group for both timepoints. The 
intercept and slope of this class are fixed to 0. 
FILE/VA = People who file tax and declare tax very accurately. FILE/A = People who file tax 
and declare tax accurately. FILE/NK = People who file tax and provide no information whether they 
declare tax accurately or not. FILE/I = People who file tax and declare tax inaccurately. NOFILE = 
people who do not file tax.  
 
Table 5.11: The Multinomial Logistic Regression Coefficients of Predicting Past and 
Intended Classes (Demographic Variables) 
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For past tax compliance behavior, there were 4 significant demographic variables as 
shown in Table 5.10: sex, education, marital status, and income.  
1) Sex and Past Tax Compliance Behavior 
Sex had a significant effect on past tax compliance behavior. Table 5.12 presents the 
proportions of male and female in each tax compliance class. The results show that females were 
more in FILE/VA and FILE/A classes and less in FILE/NK and FILE/I than males, which means 
females tend to have higher tax compliance than males.  
 
 
FILE/VA File/A File/NK File/I NOFILE 
Male .125 .083 .368 .279 .145 
Female .275 .112 .202 .264 .147 
 
Table 5.12: Sex and Past Tax Compliance Behavior Classes 
 
2) Marital Status and Past Tax Compliance Behavior 
Marital status had a significant effect on past tax compliance behavior. Table 5.13 shows 
the proportions of people who were single and married in each tax compliance class. The results 
show that people who were single were more in FILE/VA and FILE/NK and less in FILE/I and 
NOFILE, which means people who are single tend to have higher tax compliance.   
 
 
FILE/VA FILE/A FILE/NK FILE/I NOTFILE 
Single .236 .085 .318 .232 .129 
Married .149 .127 .194 .349 .181 
 
Table 5.13 Marital Status and Past Tax Behavior Classes 
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3) Education and Past Tax Compliance Behavior 
Education had a significant effect on past tax compliance behavior. Figure 5.1 presents 
the proportions of people for each level of education in each tax compliance class. The results 
show that people with higher education were more in FILE/VA and FILE/A classes and less in 
NOFILE class. Moving along from the left to the right side of the graph, the probabilities of 
being in FILE/VA and FILE/A classes increased by approximately 20% for each class or 40% 
altogether when years of education increased. The probability of being in NOFILE class also 
decreased by almost 50% when years of education increased. In other words, people with higher 
levels of education tend to have higher tax compliance.  
 
Figure 5.1: Education and Past Tax Compliance Behavior Classes 
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4) Income and Past Tax Compliance Behavior 
Income had a positively significant effect on past tax compliance behavior. Figure 5.2 
shows the proportions of people for each level of income in each tax compliance class. The 
results show that people who had higher income tended to be more in FILE/VA and FILE/NK 
classes and less in NOFILE class. The probabilities of being in FILE/VA and FILE/NK classes 
increased by approximately 30% for each when level of income increased from 0 to 5 million 
Baht. The probability of being in NOFILE class also decreased by almost 35% when level of 
income increased. And, the proportion of FILE/I class decreased by almost 30% when the level 
of income increased from 0 to 5 million Baht. Hence, people with higher income tend to have 
higher tax compliance.  
    111 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Income and past tax compliance behavior classes 
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For future intention of tax compliance, controlling for past behavior, there were two 
significant demographic variables as shown in Table 5.10: income and age.  
1) Income and Future Tax Compliance Behavior 
Income had a significant effect on future tax compliance behavior but the results were 
mixed. Figure 5.3 shows the probability plots of intended tax compliance classes as a result of 
different levels of income, given past behavior class membership. The dashed lines show the 
range of the income in each past behavior class that was greater than 10%.
22
 
From the figure, people who had higher income intended to: 
 Keep filing tax and declaring very accurately or accurately 
- The proportion of people who intended to be in FILE/VA or FILE/A class 
increased by 20% when income increased from 0 to 5 million Baht, given 
FILE/VA as their past behavior (as shown in graph 1) 
- The proportion of people who intended to be in FILE/A class increased by 
30% when income increased from 250,000 Baht to 2 million Baht, given 
FILE/A as their past behavior (as shown in graph 2) 
 Change to/remain in not file tax class 
- The proportion of people who intended to be in NOFILE class increased by 
80% when income increased from 0 to 5 million Baht, given FILE/NK as their 
past behavior (as shown in graph 3) 
                                                          
22
 The lines outside this bound in Figure 5.3 were estimated based on small samples; therefore, the results outside 
the bound are not reliable and will not be used for interpretation. 
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- The proportion of people who intended to be in NOFILE class increased by 
10% when income increased from 0 to 500,000 Baht, given NOFILE as their 
past behavior (as shown in graph 5) 
 File tax less inaccurately  
- The proportion of people who intended to be in FILE/I class decreased by 
40% when income increased from 0 to 1 million Baht, given FILE/I as their 
past behavior (as shown in graph 4).  
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Figure 5.3: Income and Future Tax Compliance Behavior Classes when Controling for Past 
Behaviors 
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2) Age and Future Tax Compliance Behavior 
Age had a significant effect on future tax compliance behavior i.e. people who are older 
tend to have higher tax compliance. Figure 5.4 shows the probability plots of intended tax 
compliance classes as a result of different levels of age, given past behavior class membership. 
The dashed lines show the range of the age in each past behavior class that was greater than 
10%. 
From the figure, people who were older intended to: 
 Keep filing tax and declaring very accurately or accurately 
- The proportion of people who intended to be in FILE/VA class increased by 
40% when age increased from 18 to 85, given FILE/VA as their past behavior 
(as shown in graph 1). 
- The proportion of people who intended to be in FILE/A class increased by 
50% when age increased from 35 to 85, given FILE/A as their past behavior 
(as shown in graph 2). 
 Change to file tax accurately class 
- The proportion of people who intended to be in FILE/A class increased by 
40% when age increased from 18 to 75, given FILE/NK as their past behavior 
(as shown in graph 3). 
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- The proportion of people who intended to be in FILE/A class increased by 
55% when age increased from 18 to 75, given FILE/I as their past behavior 
(as shown in graph 4). 
 Be less in filing inaccurately or unknown classes 
- The proportions of people who intended to be in FILE/I class decreased by:  
o 50% when age increased from 18 to 85 given FILE/VA as their past 
behavior (as shown in graph 1),  
o 35% when age increased from 35 to 85 given FILE/A as their past 
behavior (as shown in graph 2),  
o 10% when age increased from 18 to 75 given FILE/NK as their past 
behavior (as shown in graph 3),  
o 50% when age increased from 18 to 75 given FILE/I as their past 
behavior (as shown in graph 4), 
o 10% when aged increased from 18 to 58 given NOFILE as their past 
behavior (as shown in graph 5). 
- The proportions of people who intended to be in FILE/NK class decreased by:  
o 30% when age increased from 35 to 85 given FILE/A as their past 
behavior (as shown in graph 2),  
o 30% when age increased from 18 to 75 given FILE/NK as their past 
behavior (as shown in graph 3),  
o 20% when age increased from 18 to 75 given FILE/I as their past 
behavior (as shown in graph 4),  
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o 15% when aged increased from 18 to 58 given NOFILE as their past 
behavior (as shown in graph 5). 
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Figure 5.4: Age and Future Tax Compliance Behavior Classes when Controlling for Past 
Behaviors 
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 Critical Determinants of Tax Compliance Behavior in Thailand  
There were eight independent variables from four factors of tax non-compliance (low 
enforcement perception, lack of tax knowledge, unfairness of tax system perception, and lack of 
trust in government administration) and 2 types of tax non-compliance (tax non-filing and 
inaccurate tax declaration from Questions 6 and 8). I used Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to 
see whether the effect of independent variables onto tax compliance behavior subgroups exists 
(i.e., the determinant is significant). Income was used as the only covariate in this analysis 
because the effect of income on the past and intention classes was the largest compared to other 
demographic variables (see in Table 5.10 that the AIC difference for income variable was the 
largest and much larger than the second largest AIC difference). Moreover, the analysis that 
included all significant demographic variables did not converge and the analysis without any 
covariates provided untrustworthy parameter estimates (e.g., some logistic regression 
coefficients had values greater than 100). Table 5.14 shows AIC comparison results of 
constrained and free regression coefficients from independent variables onto tax compliance 
(past behavior and future intention).  The results of multinomial logistic regression are shown in 
Table 5.15. 
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Effect AIC (Free) AIC (Fixed) Result 
Past Behavior of Tax Compliance 
ENF (Not File Tax) 30355.92 30357.81 Free 
KNOW (Not File Tax) 30355.92 30351.98 Fixed 
FAIR (Not File Tax) 30355.92 30350.4 Fixed 
GOV (Not File Tax) 30355.92 30352.63 Fixed 
ENF (Inaccurate Declaration) 30355.92 30352.73 Fixed 
KNOW (Inaccurate Declaration) 30355.92 30358.84 Free 
FAIR (Inaccurate Declaration) 30355.92 30354.24 Fixed 
GOV (Inaccurate Declaration) 30355.92 30350.4 Fixed 
Income 30355.92 30411.15 Free 
Intention of Tax Compliance 
ENF (Not File Tax) 30355.92 30349.48 Fixed 
KNOW (Not File Tax) 30355.92 30351.77 Fixed 
FAIR (Not File Tax) 30355.92 30352.08 Fixed 
GOV (Not File Tax) 30355.92 30351.83 Fixed 
ENF (Inaccurate Declaration) 30355.92 30349.21 Fixed 
KNOW (Inaccurate Declaration) 30355.92 30354.01 Fixed 
FAIR (Inaccurate Declaration) 30355.92 30356.34 Free 
GOV (Inaccurate Declaration) 30355.92 30355.16 Fixed 
Income  30355.92 30363.22 Free 
Note.  In the result column, free is similar to the effect of that independent variable is significant. Fixed 
is similar to the effect of that independent variable is not significant. 
FILE/VA = People who file tax and declare tax very accurately. FILE/A = People who file tax 
and declare tax accurately. FILE/NK = People who file tax and provide no information whether they 
declare tax accurately or not. FILE/I = People who file tax and declare tax inaccurately. NOFILE = 
people who do not file tax. Percent is the model-based percentage of participants being in each class. ENF 
= Low enforcement perception. KNOW = Lack of Tax Knowledge. FAIR = Unfairness of tax system 
perception. GOV = Perception of poor government administration.  
 
Table 5.14: AIC Comparison Results of Constrained and Free Regression Coefficients from 
Independent Variables onto Tax Compliance (past behavior vs. intention) 
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Effect FILE/VA FILE/A FILE/NK FILE/I 
Past Behavior  
Intercept -2.796 -1.377 -0.949 -0.870 
ENF (Not File Tax) -0.691 -0.411 -0.134 0.202 
KNOW (Not File Tax) 0.670 -0.093 0.172 -0.240 
FAIR (Not File Tax) 0.904 -0.190 -0.122 0.016 
GOV (Not File Tax) -0.604 0.307 -0.009 -0.123 
ENF (Inaccurate Declaration) -0.419 -0.184 -0.134 -0.073 
KNOW (Inaccurate Declaration) 0.379 -0.057 -0.037 0.320* 
FAIR (Inaccurate Declaration) -0.131 0.556* 0.166 0.007 
GOV (Inaccurate Declaration) 0.178 -0.032 -0.031 -0.030 
Income  4.736*** 4.575*** 4.596*** 3.822*** 
Intention  
Intercept -2.896*** -2.104*** -1.318*** -1.946*** 
ENF (Not File Tax) -0.092 0.029 -0.298 -0.171 
KNOW (Not File Tax) -0.361 0.035 -0.357 -0.661 
FAIR (Not File Tax) -0.215 0.213 0.126 0.976 
GOV (Not File Tax) 0.853 0.360 0.290 0.006 
ENF (Inaccurate Declaration) 0.188 0.009 0.032 0.113 
KNOW (Inaccurate Declaration) -0.244 0.147 0.088 0.309 
FAIR (Inaccurate Declaration) -0.222 -1.022 -0.467 -0.691 
GOV (Inaccurate Declaration) 0.127 0.377 0.189 0.209 
Income  -0.605** -0.679*** -1.050*** -0.836 
FILE/VA (Past) 5.918*** 4.081*** -6.753*** 1.688 
FILE/A (Past) 5.449*** 6.850*** 4.380*** 4.262*** 
FILE/NK (Past) 3.354*** 4.306*** 5.661*** 4.599*** 
FILE/I (Past) 3.271** 4.598*** 4.582*** 5.876*** 
Note.  *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001,  
The class of people who do not file tax is used as a reference group for both timepoints. The 
intercept and slope of this class are fixed to 0. 
FILE/VA = People who file tax and declare tax very accurately. FILE/A = People who file tax 
and declare tax accurately. FILE/NK = People who file tax and provide no information whether they 
declare tax accurately or not. FILE/I = People who file tax and declare tax inaccurately. NOFILE = 
people who do not file tax. Percent is the model-based percentage of participants being in each class. ENF 
= Low enforcement perception. KNOW = Lack of Tax Knowledge. FAIR = Unfairness of tax system 
perception. GOV = Perception of poor government administration.  
 
Table 5.15: The Multinomial Logistic Regression Coefficients of Predicting Past and 
Intended Classes (Tax Compliance Determinants) 
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 From the analysis, there were three critical determinants of tax compliance behavior in 
Thailand: enforcement perception, tax knowledge, and fairness of the tax system. Enforcement 
perception and tax knowledge have significant effects on past tax compliance behavior. And, 
fairness of tax system perception has a significant effect on tax compliance intention in the 
future.  
1) Enforcement Perception as A Critical Determinant of Past Tax Compliance 
Behavior 
Enforcement perception significantly affects past tax compliance behavior i.e., people 
who perceive greater enforcement tend to have higher tax compliance. Figure 5.5 shows the 
probabilities of each tax compliance behavior class in each level of enforcement perception as a 
determinant for tax filing/non-filing behavior. The results show that, when people perceived 
lower enforcement, they tended to be more in the inaccurate declaration class. Alternatively, 
when people perceived greater enforcement, they tended to be less in the inaccurate declaration 
class. From the graph, the probability of being in class FILE/I decreased by approximately 45% 
when enforcement perception increased from -2 (extremely low) to 2 (extremely high) in 
standard deviations. Also, people tended to be more in accurate and very accurate declaration 
classes when they perceived greater enforcement. The probability of being in class FILE/A 
increased by approximately 25% when enforcement perception increased from -2 to 2 in 
standard deviations. The probability of being in class FILE/VA increased by approximately 15% 
when enforcement perception increased from -2 to 2 in standard deviations.  
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Figure 5.5: Enforcement Perceptions and Past Tax Compliance Behavior Classes 
 
2) Tax Knowledge as a Critical Determinant of Past Tax Compliance Behavior 
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Tax knowledge significantly affects past inaccurate tax declaration but with mixed 
results. Figure 5.6 shows the probabilities of each tax compliance behavior class in each level of 
tax knowledge as a determinant of accurate/inaccurate tax declaration. People with more tax 
knowledge tended to be less in filing tax inaccurately class. From the graph, the proportion of 
FILE/I class was the highest among all classes when tax knowledge was extremely low (-2 in 
standard deviation). When tax knowledge was extremely high (2 in standard deviation), the 
proportion of FILE/I class became the fourth position. The probability of being in class FILE/I 
decreased by approximately 25% when enforcement perception increased from -2 to 2 in 
standard deviations. However, about 15% of the decrease in FILE/I class was replaced by an 
increase in FILE/NK class. Note that the probability of being in FILE/VA class dropped about 
10%, which might be compensated by the increase in the FILE/A class. As the behaviors of 
FILE/NK group could turn into either FILE/VA, FILE/A, or FILE/I, it is not that clear whether 
the reduction of FILE/I class will mean higher tax compliance.   
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Figure 5.6:  Tax Knowledge and Past Accurate Declaration Behavior 
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3) Fairness of Tax System Perception as a Critical Determinant of Accuracy of Tax 
Declaration in Future Intention  
For future intention prediction, fairness of the tax system perception is the only 
significant variable. Fairness of the tax system perception positively affects accuracy of tax 
declaration in future intention. Figure 5.7 shows the probability plots of intended tax compliance 
classes as a result of different levels of fairness of tax system perception, given past behavior 
class membership. The dashed lines show the range of the income in each past behavior class 
that was greater than 10%.
23
 
From the figure, if people perceived more fairness in tax system, they intended to: 
- File tax more  
o The proportion of people who retained in NOFILE class decreased by 50% 
when fairness perception increased from -2 (extremely unfair) to 2 (extremely 
fair), as shown in graph 5.  
- Keep filing tax and declaring accurately  
o The proportion of people who retained in FILE/A class increased by 50% 
when fairness perception increased from -2 to 1.5 (as shown in graph 2).  
                                                          
23
 The proportion of FILE/VA class in past behavior (graph 1 in Figure 5.7) is lower than 10% of the total sample 
therefore there was no dashed line for this graph. This means the results of this group are not reliable and will not be 
used for interpretation.  
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- Change to file tax accurately class 
o The proportion of people who changed from FILE/I to FILE/A class increased 
by 20% when fairness perception increased from -2 to 2 (as shown in graph 
4).  
o The proportion of people who changed from FILE/NK to FILE/A class 
increased by 20% when fairness perception increased from -2 to 2 (as shown 
in graph 3).  
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Figure 5.7: Fairness of Tax System Perception and Accuracy of Tax Declaration in Future 
Intention 
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Finding Highlights: 
The four significant demographic variables that affected past tax compliance behavior 
were sex, education, marital status, and income. Those who are female, are single, have higher 
levels of education, and have higher income tend to have higher tax compliance. 
When controlling for past behavior, the two significant demographic variables that 
affected future intention of tax compliance behavior were age and income. People who are older 
tend to have higher tax compliance. However, the effects of income on future tax compliance 
behavior were mixed (increase tax compliance in terms of tax declaration accuracy but decrease 
tax compliance in terms of tax filing).    
The three critical determinants of tax compliance behavior were enforcement perception, 
tax knowledge, and fairness of the tax system. For past tax compliance behavior, people who 
perceived greater enforcement tended to have higher tax compliance. However, it was not clear 
whether people who had higher tax knowledge would have higher tax compliance as the 
reduction in inaccurate tax declaration was also accompanied with the increase in filing tax with 
unknown accuracy. For future tax compliance behavior (intention), people who perceived more 
fairness in tax system intended to be more compliant.  
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V. Discussion of Results 
The results presented in this chapter answered the second research question: What are 
critical determinants of personal income tax compliance behavior in Thailand? The results show 
that enforcement perception, tax knowledge, and fairness of tax system were critical 
determinants of tax compliance. Sex, education, marital status, income, and age were also 
significant demographic variables that affect tax compliance. Figure 5.8 presents the 5 
hypotheses of this study along with the results.   
Figure 5.8: Critical Determinants of Tax Compliance Behavior in Thailand: Hypotheses 
and Results 
Demographic  
Variables 
Fairness of Tax 
System Perception 
 
Enforcement 
Perception 
Government 
Administration 
Perception 
Tax Knowledge 
Past Tax 
Compliance 
+ 
 
+ 
Income Age Sex 
Marital 
Status 
Education Occupation 
Future Tax 
Compliance 
(Intention) 
+ 
  +  + 
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Hypothesis 1, perception of greater enforcement increase tax compliance behavior in 
Thailand, is supported. Enforcement perception positively affected past tax compliance behavior. 
The results confirm the universal importance of the traditional approach (utility maximization 
model of taxpayers/ tax compliance lottery view/ deterrence model of tax evasion) that focus on 
the enforcement of audits and penalties (Alm, 1999). In order to increase tax compliance, the 
government and the Revenue department should increase the severity of some penalties that are 
too soft
24
 and make sure that Thai citizens know that tax laws are seriously enforced.  
Hypothesis 2, perception of fairer tax system increase tax compliance behavior in 
Thailand, is supported. Fairness of tax system positively affected future tax compliance behavior. 
The results support the alternative approach of tax compliance (responsible taxpayer view/ 
behavioral model of tax evasion) that people are responsible, moral, and willing to comply when 
they are motivated to do so (Mikesell & Birskyte, 2007). And, people could be motivated when 
they see the tax system as fair e.g., everybody pays their fair share. It is very important that Thai 
citizens perceive the tax system as fair to increase tax compliance in Thailand. 
Hypothesis 3, perception of better government administration increase tax compliance 
behavior in Thailand, is not supported. When controlling for other independent variables, 
government administration was not a significant determinant of tax compliance behavior for both 
past and future intention. It is possible that the perceptions of government administration were 
similar among tax compliance subgroups. It is also possible that the differences in perceptions of 
government administration were highly correlated with other significant determinants e.g. 
enforcement or fairness of the tax system. 
                                                          
24
  For example, criminal penalties for not filing tax according to the survey results presented in 
Chapter 4. 
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Hypothesis 4, greater tax knowledge increases tax compliance behavior in Thailand, is 
partially supported.  Tax knowledge significantly affected past tax compliance behavior. People 
who had more tax knowledge tended to be less in file tax inaccurately group. However, the 
reduction in inaccurate tax declaration group was accompanied with the increase in filing tax 
with unknown accuracy group, which could mean very accurate, accurate, or inaccurate tax 
declaration groups. The results suggest that educating taxpayers with tax knowledge and 
improving tax facilitation could at least help people file tax less accurately according to 
responsible taxpayer view (Mikesell & Birskyte, 2007).  
Hypothesis 5.1, those with higher income tend to have higher tax compliance, is partially 
supported. Income positively affected past tax compliance behavior i.e., people who had higher 
income tend to be more compliant. This part of the results confirms general theoretical 
explanation of the positive relationship between actual income and tax compliance (Alm et al., 
1992). However, for future intention, when controlling for past behavior, the effects of income 
on future tax compliance behavior were mixed as it increased tax compliance intention in terms 
of tax declaration accuracy but decrease tax compliance in terms of tax filing. A possible 
explanation would be that people who had more income also find ways to evade more.      
Hypothesis 5.2, those who are older tend to have higher tax compliance, is supported. 
Age had a positively significant effect on future tax compliance behavior. This result is the same 
as suggested by the U.S. literature from both the TCMP data and experimental studies (Alm, 
1999; Andreon, et al., 1998). As people grow older, they realize more that paying tax is one of 
the duties of a good citizen. They have higher sense of responsibility to the society i.e. sense of 
citizenship. Younger people, on the other hand, are just starting their careers and may have lower 
sense of citizenship. 
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Hypothesis 5.3, those who are married tend to have higher tax compliance, is rejected. 
The results show that for Thailand single people were more compliant than married people, 
which is against the TCMP data of the U.S. (Alm, 1999; Andreoni, et al., 1998).  The belief was 
that married people will have higher tax compliance as they are more responsible but it is not the 
case for this study. One explanation could be that as married couples, they were allowed to have 
more deductions/expenses when filing taxes. That means married people could have more rooms 
for inaccurate declaration.  
Hypothesis 5.4, those who are female tend to have higher tax compliance, is supported. 
Sex had a significant effect on past tax compliance behavior. This result supports the findings in 
the U.S. that females are more compliant than males (Alm, 1999; Andreoni, et al., 1998). It is 
possible that females follow rules more, less willing to take risk, or have higher sense of 
citizenship.  
Hypothesis 5.5, those who are not self-employed tend to have higher tax compliance, is 
not supported. Occupation (self-employed vs. others) was not a significant determinant of tax 
compliance behavior in this study. The effects of occupation on tax compliance were less than 
other significant demographic variables e.g. income and age. 
Hypothesis 5.6, those who are with higher levels of education tend to have higher tax 
compliance, is supported. Education had a positively significant effect on past tax compliance 
behavior. People with higher education are equipped with more knowledge and skills to file tax 
more accurately. They are also more educated that paying tax is a duty of citizen.  
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VI. Conclusion 
This chapter presented the answer to the second research question of this study about the 
determinants of tax compliance behavior in Thailand. The determinants of tax compliance 
behavior in Thailand are enforcement perception, tax knowledge, and fairness of tax system 
perception. The significant demographic variables are income, sex, education, marital status, and 
age. These results provide the first data base and analytical framework for tax compliance study 
in Thailand that could help tax Thai government and tax scholars develop effective tax 
compliance strategies.  
The next chapter (chapter 6) will present the interview results of the experts that will help 
to get more understanding about tax compliance issues in Thailand and help explain further the 
quantitative results of this study.  
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 Chapter 6 
Opinions from Tax Experts 
This chapter presents the results from the interviews of 15 Thai tax experts including 10 
tax policy experts (3 executive-level, 4 high-ranking, and 3 medium-ranking public officials), 2 
tax administrators (1 high-ranking and 1 medium-ranking public officials), and 3 university 
professors in Thailand (2 economics and 1 public administration professors). See Appendix E for 
a brief profile of each interview participant. The primary purpose of the interview was to get the 
insight information and explanation on tax compliance issues from experts so as to add to the 
survey results. The experts’ answers on four major questions about tax compliance in Thailand – 
reasons for tax non-compliance and tax evasion situation in Thailand, weaknesses and strengths 
of current tax administration system, factors that affect tax compliance behavior, and strategies 
that could help increase tax compliance – are discussed in this chapter.  
 
I. Reasons for Tax Non-Compliance and Tax Evasion Situation in Thailand 
 Why some people do not file their personal income taxes? 
It turns out that tax knowledge is the most important determinants in the eyes of every 
expert interviewed. All 15 experts believed that lack of tax knowledge is the most important 
reason why people do not file personal income tax. The experts agreed that Thailand has a lot of 
low income people whose annual incomes do not reach the minimum 150,000 Baht level for 
paying tax so they just assume they do not have to file. There are also many people that 
misunderstand that they do not have to file tax because they have already paid withholding tax. 
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However, according to the laws, those people must still file tax returns. Currently, out of 60 
million people, 30 million people are in the labor force, 10 million people file tax, and only 2 
million people actually pay taxes. Besides those who misunderstand that they do not have to pay 
tax, there are also people who really do not know that they must file tax.  Moreover, there is no 
tax education in Thai general schools or universities. Therefore, a majority of Thai citizens are 
not educated about their tax duties.  
For those who know but intend not to file tax returns, some experts thought that they see 
more gain from evading tax. These people also do not see the benefits from filing tax. And, if 
they are outside of the system, they do not want to start to be in the system and allow the 
Revenue Department to be able to trace their incomes.  
On the enforcement side, a few experts believed that the Revenue Department does not 
think it is worthwhile in terms of administrative costs and revenue gains to chase those low-
income people to file tax returns. Thus, there is not enough penalty enforcement on those who do 
not file personal income tax and the penalties are not severe enough to make people afraid. There 
are also difficulties in catching people who work in the informal sector such as freelancers, 
entrepreneurs, and those in E-commerce business.   
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 Why some people do not declare their incomes accurately? 
There are two types of action regarding inaccurate declaration of income: unintentional 
and intentional. For unintentional inaccurate declaration of income, 7 experts pointed to 
complication of tax laws and tax forms with too many deductions and allowance as the problem. 
Since tax laws and tax forms are very complicated, it is difficult for ordinary citizens to 
understand and fill out the forms by themselves. These experts, thus, accepted that unintentional 
mistakes do happen because of the complication of tax laws and tax forms. 
However, most experts believe that when it comes to inaccurate declaration of income, 
there are those people who actually intend to evade tax particularly those who have different 
sources of income and those who are in the informal sector of the economy.  Lack of penalty 
enforcement, arbitrary tax law enforcement, limited Revenue Department’s audit capacity, 
seeing others who evade, too high tax rates, getting no benefit from paying tax, and corrupted 
politicians were mentioned as the reasons for intentional tax evasion.   
 
 Do Thai people perceive tax evasion as acceptable behavior? Is the situation 
getting better or worse than the past? 
The majority of experts stated clearly that tax evasion is unacceptable behavior because it 
is against the laws. My understanding is that these experts are very well-educated and have very 
strong opinions against tax evasion. Therefore, they did not have any second thought in saying 
tax evasion is unacceptable in the society regardless of current tax evasion situation. However, 
there are a few experts that said tax evasion is acceptable in Thai society. People who can evade 
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taxes are perceived as smart and people who pay in full amount are perceived as dumb. Usually, 
they evade because they see others evade. Personally, I believe this is the case; that tax evasion 
really happens in Thai society but it might be too difficult for many people to admit.  
The experts’ opinions on whether tax evasion is getting better or worse than in the past 
were mixed. Many experts said they do no not know or did not answer this question, 3 experts 
said the situation is similar to the past, 1 expert said the situation is worse than the past, and 3 
experts said the situation is better than the past. Those experts who said the situation is better 
than the past believed that the Revenue Department is getting stronger.  The Revenue 
Department has changed and treated taxpayers as customers, which is better than the past. Tax 
administration is also improved with technological advancement. The one expert who said the 
situation is worse than the past thought so because most people who evade tax these days are 
high income people. 
 
II. Weaknesses and Strengths of Current Thai Tax Administration System 
The Thai tax administration system has four major weaknesses according to the experts’ 
opinions: Revenue Department’s limited audit capacity, too many deductions and allowances, 
the limited tax base, and no penalty for Revenue Department’s personnel.  
First, many experts agreed that the Revenue Department has a limited auditing capacity. 
With only a very limited number of audit personnel, the Revenue Department uses randomized 
post-audit system and self-assessment of taxpayers. The Revenue Department relies solely on 
withdrawing cases from the tax database. There is no database linkage between the Revenue 
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Department and other revenue departments, financial institutions, and the Social Security Office 
in order to crosscheck financial activities and sources of income.  
Second, tax laws are very complicated with too many deductions and allowances. 
Politicians often use tax measures by offering special tax deductions and allowances as political 
campaigns. This not only makes it difficult for the citizens to understand but also cause 
discrepancy problems among citizens. The tax system favors higher income people. According to 
tax expert no.5 (university professor from Thammasat University, personal communication, July 
7, 2011), “Tax structure has been distorted and less fair. Higher income people can buy a 
retirement mutual fund, long term equity fund, or insurances and pay tax equal or less than lower 
income people.” 
Third, from an opposite standpoint, some experts suggested that there is only one group 
of people who pay taxes because of a limited tax base. Tax expert no. 6 (executive-level public 
official from Ministry of Finance, personal communication July 11, 2011) said, “The 
government has never tried to increase tax base. Whatever the government wants to do, either 
increase or decrease tax rates, it affects only this group of people. It turns out that good people 
are penalized for paying tax. Our tax base is not growing.” People who are in the tax system are 
in it forever and get audited by the Revenue Department. The Revenue Department pays less 
attention in chasing people who are outside the system. 
Fourth, a few experts mentioned that there is no penalty for the Revenue Department’s 
personnel if they assess tax obligation incorrectly. Tax officials assess tax obligation differently 
and interpret the laws differently, which results in inconsistent and arbitrary tax law 
enforcement. Taxpayers also face difficulties in getting accurate and consistent advice. 
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Moreover, the citizens are not happy that there are tax officials and politicians that are corrupt 
but do not get punished. 
The strengths of current tax administration system upon which most experts agree are the 
technological advancement of the Revenue Department e.g. internet tax filing and the friendlier 
approach of the Revenue Department. Internet filing
25
 makes filing tax much faster and more 
convenient. This reduces the marginal cost of both the government and taxpayers.  However, 
supported documents still needed to be submitted via postal mail. The Revenue Department also 
attempts to be friendlier in giving advices to citizens and develop customer-oriented strategies in 
order to promote citizens’ willingness to pay tax, which the experts believe is a good thing.  
 
III. Factors that Affect Tax Compliance Behavior of Thai People 
For this question, I asked the experts what factors affect tax compliance behavior of Thai 
people. I provided some examples for them to think about: enforcement perception (e.g. audit 
rate, penalties), monetary incentive perception (e.g. rewards, tax amnesty), tax/governmental 
administration perception (e.g. fairness, responsiveness). Some experts thought that all of these 
factors are important but some factors are more important than others. The followings are the 
factors that experts agreed upon.  
Most of the experts agreed that enforcement perception is among the most important 
factors. The experts raised many points regarding penalties. First, the penalties must be seriously 
enforced. Tax expert no.15 (high-ranking public official from Ministry of Finance, personal 
                                                          
25
 In 2011, there were 7 million people who filed tax returns via internet out of 9 million people who filed tax 
returns.  
    141 
 
communication, July 1, 2011) said, “People must know that if they evade tax they will get 
penalized.” Second, there must be no exception if audited and found guilty by the Revenue 
Department. Third, however, if the taxpayers come forward and ask for advice from the Revenue 
Department, Revenue Department should make them pay only fines but not surcharges. And, 
fourth the penalties must be more severe.  
Almost all of the experts also perceived tax knowledge as a very important factor. First, 
the Revenue Department should educate taxpayers more about tax laws and citizens duties. Tax 
expert no.7 (medium-ranking public official/tax policy expert from Ministry of Finance, personal 
communication, July 11, 2011) said, “The government should educate people about tax laws and 
changes in tax laws that affect taxpayers including benefits such as deductions and allowances.”  
Tax expert no.13 (university professor from Thai University Research Association, personal 
communication, July 19, 2011) said, “I think socialization and education to citizens about tax 
knowledge and citizen duty are very important.” Tax expert no.9 (executive-level public 
official/tax policy expert from Ministry of Finance, personal communication, July 11, 2011) 
suggested that, “Revenue Department should promote more about where the tax revenues go in 
or order to increase citizens’ willingness to pay tax.”  The Revenue Department should also 
reach out to educate specific groups of taxpayers such as small entrepreneurs, actors/actresses. 
Second, tax officials should also be educated so they have correct understanding about tax laws 
and be able to give standardize rulings to taxpayers. The rulings should also be accessible to the 
public. Third, tax laws must be simple and easy. 
Many experts pointed to the fairness of the tax system as another important factor. 
According to tax expert no.9 (executive-level public official/tax policy expert from Ministry of 
Finance, personal communication, July 11, 2011), “Tax structure should be fair. Tax rate must 
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not be too high. Instead, tax base should be expanded to include more people.” Tax expert no.3 
(high-ranking public official/tax policy expert from Ministry of Finance, personal 
communication, July 1, 2011) emphasized that, “There should be no special treatment to anyone. 
Currently, there are a lot of deductions and allowances that favor rich people.” Tax expert no. 6 
(executive-level public official from Ministry of Finance, personal communication July 11, 
2011) said, “If one person sees others can evade tax, they will want to evade tax too.” 
Regarding incentives, a few experts suggested that filing tax should be linked with the 
social welfare the people will receive. Tax expert no.10 (university professor from Durakij 
Pundit University, personal communication, July 13, 2011) said, “Benefits must incur directly to 
me, not to others.” Tax expert no.5 (university professor from Thammasat University, personal 
communication, July 7, 2011) suggested, “Incentives associated with social welfare are 
interesting such as free health check-up to compliant taxpayers or increase retirement money for 
compliant taxpayers after they reach 60 years old.” 
Some experts have strong opinions against particular aspects of tax compliance behavior. 
A few experts believed that rewards and incentives are not necessary. For examples, tax expert 
no. 6 (executive-level public official from Ministry of Finance, personal communication July 11, 
2011) said, “I don’t think incentives affect tax compliance at all. For corporate income tax, 
maybe but for personal income tax, no way!” Tax expert no.4 said (high-ranking public 
official/tax policy expert from Ministry of Finance, personal communication, July 1, 2011), “The 
Revenue Department is using incentives such as good taxpayer award for corporate income tax 
still never uses it for personal income tax.”  Tax expert no. 7 (medium-ranking public official/tax 
policy expert from Ministry of Finance, personal communication, July 11, 2011) said, 
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“Incentives should be used to persuade people who are outside the system to file tax but for 
people who are already in the system penalties must be seriously enforced.”  
A few experts pointed out that government administration perception, although 
seemingly important, may not affect much on tax compliance behavior. These experts believed 
that it is tax administration not general government administration that matters for tax 
compliance. According to Tax expert no.10 (university professor from Durakij Pundit 
University, personal communication, July 13, 2011), “Government efficiency directly benefits 
taxpayers but maybe difficult to link. There are time distortion and linkage stopper. Thai people 
are forgetful.” Tax expert no.5 (university professor from Thammasat University, personal 
communication, July 7, 2011) said, “I think government administration perception is not related. 
People don’t care. The question is whether Revenue Department is better. Public relations of 
what Revenue Department is doing are very important.” Tax expert no.2 (medium-ranking public 
official/tax policy expert from Ministry of Finance, personal communication, July 1, 2011) said, 
“I believe it could help if Revenue Department develops a friendly approach to reach taxpayers.  
 
IV. Strategies for Increasing Tax  Compliance in Thailand 
The experts suggested various strategies for increasing tax compliance in Thailand. These 
strategies could be grouped into four major categories: enforcement strategy, tax knowledge 
strategies, fairness of tax system strategies, and government administration strategies. Table 6.1 
presents the strategies recommended by the experts. 
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Types of Strategy Strategies Quotations from Experts 
1. Enforcement - Seriously enforce 
penalties  
 
“People should see Revenue Department seriously 
enforce penalties. It should not take long to penalize 
people who evade tax. Even when get caught, 
penalties are still negotiable so people not afraid.” – 
Tax expert no.5 (university professor from 
Thammasat University, personal communication, 
July 7, 2011) 
“Actively enforce penalties” – Tax expert no.1 
(high-ranking public official/tax administrator from 
Ministry of Finance, personal communication, June 
23, 2011) 
“Those who evade tax must be penalized. Improve 
enforcement of tax laws” – Tax expert no. 13 
(university professor from Thai University Research 
Association, personal communication, July 19, 
2011) 
2. Tax knowledge 
and tax 
facilitation 
- Use public 
relations and 
educate citizens 
about tax duties 
and sense of 
citizenship 
“Children have never learned about citizens’ duties 
in school. They know about their rights but not 
duties. The government should promote awareness 
of citizens that each should help the country.” – Tax 
expert no.5 (university professor from Thammasat 
University, personal communication, July 7, 2011) 
“Citizens duties must be emphasized. People must 
respect others’ right and accept their own duties in 
democratic society.” – Tax expert no.10 (university 
professor from Durakij Pundit University, personal 
communication, July 13, 2011) 
“Use a lot of public relations.” – Tax expert no. 9 
(executive-level public official /tax policy expert 
from Ministry of Finance, personal communication, 
July 11, 2011) 
“Tax education campaign, create culture and educate 
taxpayers in every community/province/public and 
private sectors.” – Tax expert no. 13 (university 
professor from Thai University Research 
Association, personal communication, July 19, 
2011) 
“Educate taxpayers, give advice to taxpayers, issue 
warnings, PR, and develop sense of citizenship and 
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Types of Strategy Strategies Quotations from Experts 
sense of tax duty.” –  Tax expert no.1 (high-ranking 
public official/tax administrator from Ministry of 
Finance, personal communication, June 23, 2011) 
“Social norms against tax evasion must be 
promoted. People should not think that whoever 
evades tax is smart.” – Tax expert no.3 (high-
ranking public official/tax policy expert from 
Ministry of Finance, personal communication, July 
1, 2011) 
 “The Revenue Department should be more active 
and try to educate taxpayers to gradually change 
behaviors” – Tax expert no.2 (medium-ranking 
public official/tax policy expert from Ministry of 
Finance, personal communication, July 1, 2011) 
“Educate taxpayers to have more understanding 
about tax laws.” – Tax expert no.14 (executive-level 
public official from Bureau of the Budget, personal 
communication, July 19, 2011) 
“Develop training programs for educating taxpayers 
to have knowledge and social responsibility and to 
let them know where tax revenues go.” – Tax expert 
no. 9 (executive-level public official/tax policy 
expert from Ministry of Finance, personal 
communication, July 11, 2011) 
 - Make paying tax 
easier 
 “Tax forms must be easy.” – Mayoon Boonyarat, 
tax policy expert from Fiscal Policy Office – Tax 
expert no.8 (medium-ranking public official/tax 
policy expert from Ministry of Finance, personal 
communication, July 11, 2011) 
“Tax laws must be easy. Revenue Department 
should find easier way for collecting tax.” – Tax 
expert no. 9 (executive-level public official/tax 
policy expert from Ministry of Finance, personal 
communication, July 11, 2011) 
“Tax rates must be simple.” – Tax expert no. 15 
(high-ranking public official/tax policy expert from 
Ministry of Finance, personal communication, July 
1, 2011) 
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Types of Strategy Strategies Quotations from Experts 
“Paying tax must be convenient.” – Tax expert no. 6 
( executive-level public official/tax policy expert 
from Ministry of Finance, personal communication 
July 11, 2011) 
“Make regulations less complicated. So many 
allowances and deductions, these things should be 
reduced” Tax expert no.1 (high-ranking public 
official/tax administrator from Ministry of Finance, 
personal communication, June 23, 2011) 
“Revenue Department should facilitate taxpayers 
more. Make it convenient.” – Tax expert no. 15 
(high-ranking public official/tax policy expert from 
Ministry of Finance, personal communication, July 
1, 2011) 
 - Educate tax 
personnel 
“Educate Revenue Department personnel. Revenue 
Department personnel don’t have enough knowledge 
about new occupations such as bloggers, internet/E-
commerce.” – Tax expert no.14 (executive-level 
public official from Bureau of the Budget, personal 
communication, July 19, 2011) 
“Set standards for Revenue Department personnel in 
answering questions from taxpayers.” – Tax expert 
no.14 (executive-level public official from Bureau 
of the Budget, personal communication, July 19, 
2011) 
“Educate tax personnel to have the right mindset 
about serving the taxpayers. And any personnel that 
are corrupted must be punished.” – Tax expert no. 9 
(executive-level public official/tax policy expert 
from Ministry of Finance, personal communication, 
July 11, 2011) 
3. Fairness of  the 
Tax System 
- Reduce personal 
income tax rates  
“I think personal income tax should be reduced and 
increase VAT instead as VAT affects everyone not 
penalizes only people in the system. If high income 
tax, people expect higher welfare just like in 
European countries. If the rate is lower, people 
might be more willing to pay tax as the benefit of 
evading might not worth it” – Tax expert no. 6 
(executive-level public official/tax policy expert 
from Ministry of Finance, personal communication 
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Types of Strategy Strategies Quotations from Experts 
July 11, 2011) 
 “Collect tax at a lower rate but from more 
taxpayers.” – Tax expert no. 9 (executive-level 
public official/tax policy expert from Ministry of 
Finance, personal communication, July 11, 2011) 
 
 - Link welfare 
benefits to tax 
filing 
“There must be incentives. For example if they pay 
tax, they should get more benefits linked to it such 
as social welfare.” – Tax expert no.8 (medium-
ranking public official /tax policy expert from 
Ministry of Finance, personal communication, July 
11, 2011) 
 “Government needs to tell taxpayers about benefits 
of paying tax. Thailand doesn’t have good local tax 
systems.  People can’t see the benefits of the tax 
they pay to the central government because it is too 
far away from their lives.” – Tax expert no.3 (high-
ranking public official/tax policy expert from 
Ministry of Finance, personal communication, July 
1, 2011) 
 “The government needs to build a welfare system to 
make citizens see the benefits of paying tax.” – Tax 
expert no.3 (high-ranking public official/tax policy 
expert from Ministry of Finance, personal 
communication, July 1, 2011) 
“The government should use the welfare as a 
strategy. For example, pay more money during 
unemployment to people who pay higher tax or pay 
tax longer.” – Tax expert no. 11  (high-ranking 
public official /tax policy expert from Ministry of 
Finance, personal communication, July 1, 2011) 
 “People should know what government gives to 
citizens and make them see the linkage between the 
benefits they get and the tax they pay. Although 
those government policies may not affect them 
directly, they can help the society.” – Tax expert no. 
13 (university professor from Thai University 
Research Association, personal communication, July 
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Types of Strategy Strategies Quotations from Experts 
19, 2011) 
“Make everybody get tax ID when making citizen 
ID. And whatever activities with government and 
private sector need to require tax ID. Stop them from 
doing any activities without the government and 
private sector.” – Tax expert no.5 (university 
professor from Thammasat University, personal 
communication, July 7, 2011) 
 - Make tax 
structures fairer 
“Those deductions and allowances should be 
improved to be fairer for all citizens. Some currently 
exempted interests and capital gains in investment 
market should also be included.” –  Tax expert no. 9, 
(executive-level public official/tax policy expert 
from Ministry of Finance, personal communication, 
July 11, 2011)  
“Tax laws must be reformed. Cancel the 
unnecessary deductions. Tax structure should be 
fair” –  Tax expert no. 9 (executive-level public 
official/tax policy expert from Ministry of Finance, 
personal communication, July 11, 2011) 
4. Government  
Administration 
- Improve services 
of the Revenue 
Department to be 
friendlier and 
faster 
“Nobody likes Revenue Department as no one likes 
paying tax. So Revenue Department should be 
friendlier and helpful not threatening all the time.” – 
Tax expert no.5 (university professor from 
Thammasat University, personal communication, 
July 7, 2011) 
“Today even RD has call center for people who have 
tax filing problems, it still take so long before 
someone pick up the phone. Sometimes there is no 
one pick up. Sometime, the line can’t be connected. 
The service is too slow.” – Tax expert no. 9 
(executive-level public official/tax policy expert) 
from Ministry of Finance, personal communication, 
July 11, 2011) 
“Revenue Department should service more like a 
commercial bank service and promote both tax 
obligations and tax deductions/allowances. What 
happen how is that only the rich has access to tax 
consultants and know all about tax planning.” – Tax 
expert no.4 (high-ranking public official/tax policy 
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Types of Strategy Strategies Quotations from Experts 
expert from Ministry of Finance, personal 
communication, July 1, 2011) 
“Revenue Department should use turbo tax. When 
filing online, taxpayers should not be required to 
send in documents again. It should be paperless and 
all information must be in the database and linked. 
Withholding tax must be a requirement rather than 
an option.” – Tax expert no. 7 (medium-ranking 
public official/tax policy expert from Ministry of 
Finance, personal communication, July 11, 2011) 
“Revenue Department must improve IT and increase 
staffs” – Tax expert no.1 (high-ranking public 
official/tax administrator from Ministry of Finance, 
personal communication, June 23, 2011) 
 - Improve 
government 
administration 
“For long-term, use public administration theories in 
improving public administration such as NPA (New 
Public Administration), good governance, and IT.” – 
Tax expert no. 13 (university professor from Thai 
University Research Association, personal 
communication, July 19, 2011)  
“People who commit corruptions must get criminal 
penalties.” – Tax expert no. 9 (executive-level 
public official/tax policy expert from Ministry of 
Finance, personal communication, July 11, 2011) 
 - Improve tax 
revenue 
administration 
“For long-term, national development plan should 
include tax revenue administration plan too.” – Tax 
expert no. 13 (university professor from Thai 
University Research Association, personal 
communication, July 19, 2011) 
 “Tax revenue administration must be good and for 
the development of the country.” – Tax expert no. 6 
(executive-level public official/tax policy expert 
from Ministry of Finance, personal communication 
July 11, 2011) 
Table 6.1: Tax Compliance Strategies Recommended by Thai experts 
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V. Discussion of Results 
In the previous chapter, the survey results suggest enforcement perception, fairness of the 
tax system perception, and tax knowledge as critical determinants of tax compliance behavior in 
Thailand. Interestingly, in this chapter, opinions from tax experts provided explanations that 
confirm the survey results. 
 Regarding enforcement perception, there are many supportive explanations from the 
experts why Hypothesis 1, perception of greater enforcement increase tax compliance behavior 
in Thailand, is supported by the survey results. First, the experts believed there is not enough 
enforcement on those who do not file personal income tax. This is mainly because Thai people 
have low income and chasing those people to file tax forms may not be worth for the Revenue 
Department. Moreover, the penalties were so soft that people are not afraid. Also, the Revenue 
Department faces difficulties in catching people in the informal sector of the economy. Second, 
for the case of intentional inaccurate tax declaration, the experts believed lack of penalty 
enforcement, arbitrary tax law enforcement, and limited Revenue Department’s audit capacity 
are the reasons. Third, the experts believed that Revenue Department’s audit capacity and no 
penalty for Revenue Department’s personnel are among the major weaknesses of current tax 
administration system. Forth, most experts agreed that enforcement perception is among the 
most important factors that affect tax compliance behavior in Thailand. Finally, many experts 
suggested serious enforcement of penalties as a strategy for increasing tax compliance in 
Thailand. These opinions from the experts confirm enforcement perception as an important 
determinant of tax compliance in Thailand.  
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Regarding fairness of the tax system perception, the experts’ opinions also explains why 
Hypothesis 2, perception of fairer tax system increases tax compliance behavior in Thailand, is 
supported by the survey results. First, many experts believed that personal income tax rates are 
too high and they see others evade tax so that some people do not declare their incomes 
accurately. Second, too many deductions and allowances and a limited tax base, which make tax 
structure less fair to all citizens, are among the major weaknesses of current tax administration 
system in the eyes of the experts. Third, many experts pointed to the unfairness of the tax system 
as an important factor that affect tax compliance behavior of Thai people. Finally, reducing 
personal income tax rates, linking welfare benefits to tax filing, and making tax structures fairer 
were suggested by the experts as strategies for increasing tax compliance in Thailand. These 
opinions from the experts confirm fairness of the tax system perception as another 
important determinant of tax compliance in Thailand.  
Regarding tax knowledge, experts’ opinions support the survey results of Hypothesis 4, 
greater tax knowledge increases tax compliance behavior in Thailand. First, all of the experts 
believed that lack of tax knowledge is the most important reasons why some people do not file 
personal income taxes. Second, tax laws and tax forms are very complicated and ordinary 
citizens cannot understand are the major reasons for unintentional inaccurate tax declaration in 
the eyes of the experts. Third, almost all of the experts perceived tax knowledge as a very 
important factor that affects tax compliance behavior of Thai people. Finally, using public 
relations and educating citizens about tax duties and sense of citizenship, making paying tax 
easy, and educating tax personnel were suggested by the experts as strategies for increasing tax 
compliance in Thailand. These opinions from the experts confirm tax knowledge as one of 
the critical determinants of tax compliance in Thailand.  
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On the other hand, the experts provided interesting explanations why Hypothesis 3, 
perceptions of better government administration increases tax compliance behavior in Thailand, 
is not supported by the survey results. First, although many people complain about poor 
government service and corruption that wastes their tax money, they cannot easily link to their 
tax compliance decisions. People are more interested in whether paying tax is made easy and 
convenient for them at the time they have to file tax returns. Second, better government 
administration benefits society as a whole but people also want benefits for themselves such as 
their own welfare benefits from paying tax. Those who pay tax want something tangible that 
differentiate them from other people who are not paying tax. Finally, it may not be realistic for 
people to believe that government administration be easily to get better. The experts suggested 
improving government administration and revenue administration as long-term strategies for 
increasing tax compliance in Thailand. Citizens’ willingness to pay tax should increase in a long-
term rather than a short-term if government administration gets better. These experts’ opinions 
help explain why government administration is not one of the critical determinants of tax 
compliance in Thailand from the survey results. 
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VI. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed tax experts’ opinions about tax compliance in Thailand from four 
major questions: reasons for tax non-compliance and tax evasion situation in Thailand, 
weaknesses and strengths of current tax administration system, factors that affect tax compliance 
behavior, and strategies for increasing tax compliance.  
About reasons for tax non-compliance and tax evasion situation in Thailand, all of the 
experts believed lack of tax knowledge as the most important reason why some people do not file 
their personal income taxes. However, the experts believed that inaccurate declaration of income 
is mostly intentional from people who have different sources of income or in the informal sector 
of the economy. These, however, are different from the citizens’ opinions from the survey results 
presented earlier in Chapter 4 that address government administration and fairness of the tax 
system as the top reasons for tax non-filing and inaccurate declaration of income.  
On tax evasion situation, a majority of experts said tax evasion is an unacceptable 
behavior as it is against the laws. However, only approximately half of the citizens responded 
that tax evasion is unacceptable in the survey. These experts, nevertheless, thought differently on 
whether tax evasion situation is getting better or worse than in the past.  
On weaknesses and strengths of current Thai tax administration system, the experts 
thought four major weaknesses are Revenue Department’s limited audit capacity, too many 
deductions and allowances, limited tax base, and no penalty for Revenue Department’s 
personnel. On the other hand, the experts believed that technological advancement and friendlier 
approach of the Revenue Department are major strengths of current tax administration system.  
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For factors that affect tax compliance behavior, the experts believed enforcement 
perception, tax knowledge, and fairness of tax system perception are the most important factors.  
While, some experts suggested that government administration perception may not be important 
as people cannot see immediate linkages when they are making tax compliance decision. 
Citizens’ willingness to pay tax should increase in a long-term rather than a short-term if 
government administration gets better. These experts’ opinions provided supportive explanations 
to the survey results from Chapter 5 that suggest enforcement perception, tax knowledge, and 
fairness of tax system perception as critical determinants of tax compliance. 
Four types of strategies were recommended by the experts: enforcement strategy (i.e., 
seriously enforce penalties), tax knowledge strategies (i.e., use public relations and educate 
citizens about tax duties and sense of citizenship, make paying easy, and educate tax personnel), 
fairness of tax system strategies (i.e., reduce personal income tax rates, link welfare benefits with 
tax filing, and make tax structures fairer), and government administration strategies (e.g. improve 
Revenue Department’s services, improve government administration, and improve tax revenue 
spending). These experts’ suggestions could be used in combination with citizens’ recommended 
strategies presented earlier in Chapter 4, which include cash back to compliant taxpayers, more 
enforcement on tax laws, improved service quality of government organizations, and more news 
that people who evade have been punished.   
The last chapter (Chapter 7) will present conclusion, implications and recommendations, 
contributions, limitations, and future research directions from this study. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
In democratic government, understanding citizens is a key to effective public 
management because government’s actions always involve citizens. Tax administration, in 
particular, deals with citizens i.e., taxpayers, and this makes understanding taxpayers a key to 
successful tax administration. Tax compliance has long been a prevalent issue in many countries 
including Thailand. Thailand is among the three least tax compliant countries (Tsakumis, et al., 
2007) with only 9 million people who filed tax in 2009 out of 30 million people who were in the 
labor force (Ministry of Finance of Thailand, 2011a). It is reasonable to expect a very large 
personal income tax gap of at least 200 billion Baht or 6.7 billion US dollars, which would equal 
to 10% of total revenues for Thailand. Nevertheless, personal income tax compliance issues have 
not been given enough attention. There are only a very limited number of studies related to tax 
compliance. In particular, there is no comprehensive tax compliance study of the personal 
income tax in Thailand either from the perspective of tax administration or from the citizens’ 
point of view. The two major research purposes of this study are 1) to explore citizens’ 
perceptions of the Thai personal income tax system and the matter of tax compliance and 2) to 
identify important determinants of tax compliance behavior in Thailand. This study used two 
research methods: a face-to-face survey of 1,148 citizens in Bangkok and interviews with 15 
Thai tax experts.  
There are two major approaches of tax compliance literature in the United States: a 
traditional utility maximization approach and an alternative approach. The traditional utility 
maximization approach holds that taxpayers weigh expected gains and losses from tax non-
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compliance and assumes people pay taxes primarily because the fear of punishment. Therefore, 
if following the utility maximization approach, enforcement and penalties are essential for 
taxpayer compliance. The alternative approach holds that people will pay taxes if they are 
motivated, educated, and if paying tax is made convenient (responsible taxpayer view) and if 
people have good attitudes and perceptions towards tax system and towards government 
administration (behavioral models of tax evasion). This study argues that both views are 
necessary to the understanding of tax compliance behavior because tax compliance decisions are 
not made solely on a monetary or on a moral basis but on both. The primary hypotheses of this 
study are designed to cover both the traditional and the alternative approaches by studying 
whether enforcement perception (H1), fairness of tax system perception (H2), government 
administration perception (H3), tax knowledge (H4), and other demographic characteristics (H5) 
are important determinants of tax compliance behavior in Thailand. 
The first research question of this study on Thai citizens’ tax compliance perceptions has 
three sub-questions – (1) what are general citizens’ perceptions of the Thai personal income tax 
system and tax compliance issues, (2) what are tax compliance behaviors of Thai citizens, and 
(3) which strategies might help increase tax compliance in Thailand? – This study answers these 
questions as follows: 
 Simple descriptive statistics of the survey results from Chapter 4 show that the top 
reasons for tax non-filing and inaccurate tax declaration are related to government administration 
and fairness of the tax system namely government corruption, inappropriate revenue spending, 
knowledge or belief that others evade taxes, and taxes which are too high taxes compared to 
public service received by the payers. However, experts’ opinions as shown in Chapter 6 differ. 
Tax experts believed that lack of tax knowledge is the most important reason why some people 
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do not file their personal income taxes. Although the experts mentioned seeing others evade 
taxes, tax rates that are too high, and government corruption as reasons for inaccurate declaration 
of income, enforcement-related reasons including lack of penalty enforcement, arbitrary tax laws 
enforcement, and limited Revenue Department’s audit capacity were perceived by experts to be 
more important than tax fairness and government administration – the primary reasons Thai 
citizens justify tax non-compliance.  
Regarding tax compliance behavior of Thai citizens, only half of the respondents said 
they file personal income tax within the past two years and will file personal income tax next 
year. According to the results from latent transition analysis in Chapter 5, there were 27% who 
did not file tax in the past and at least 23% of people who declared tax inaccurately. For future 
intention, at least 20% intended to file tax inaccurately and about 20% of people intended not to 
file tax. Tax compliance behaviors were classified by the analysis into 5 groups: File/Very 
Accurate, File/Accurate, File/Unknown accuracy, File/Inaccurate, and No File. The majority of 
people intended to stay in the same groups as their past behaviors. However, 25% of people who 
filed tax inaccurately in the past intended not to report their intention whether they will declare 
accurately or not. 
The strategies for promoting tax compliance that Thai citizens believe would work best 
are: (1) cash back to compliant taxpayers; (2) more enforcement on tax laws; (3) improved 
governmental service quality; and (4) more news that people who evade taxes have been 
punished. Various strategies were also recommended by tax experts in Chapter 6 including 
enforcement strategies, tax knowledge strategies, fairness of tax system strategies, and 
government administration strategies.  
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For enforcement strategies, tax experts emphasize more serious enforcement of penalties 
so that there are no exceptions if audited and found guilty by the Revenue Department. About 
50% of the citizens agreed that there is not enough enforcement in existing tax laws, which 
support tax experts’ recommendations. 
For tax knowledge strategies, the Revenue Department should educate taxpayers more 
about tax laws and citizen duties, tax officials should also be educated, tax laws must be simple 
and easy, and tax filing must be facilitated. These are supported by citizens’ opinions. The 
survey results show that 21% of citizens do not know about tax rates and a majority of citizens 
do not know about tax penalties. Almost 45% of the citizens agreed or was neutral with the 
statement that tax evasion is acceptable behavior in Thai society.    
For fairness of the tax system, experts pointed out that: tax structures should be fairer 
(i.e., not favor the rich), tax rate should be lower, there should be no special treatment to anyone 
if found evading tax, and welfare benefits should be linked to tax filing. These are supported by 
citizens’ viewpoints from the survey. Forty-three percent thought that current personal income 
tax rates are too high or way too high. However, over 40% of the respondents thought the richest 
group of people has been paying too much or way too much tax. 
And for government administration strategies, improvement in government 
administration and tax revenue administration were recommended by the experts as long-term 
strategies. The citizens’ opinions back these recommendations.  More than half of citizens 
thought the degree of government/politicians corruption is high or very high.  Only 40% of the 
respondents thought that government and tax administration procedures are fair.  Currently, 60% 
of citizens reported average satisfaction with the service quality of governmental organizations 
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while one-third was not satisfied. Specifically for the Revenue Department, the experts suggested 
the Revenue Department to provide faster and friendlier services. Currently, 70% of citizens 
reported average satisfaction with the service quality of governmental organizations while a 
quarter was not satisfied. 
The second research question - what are critical determinants of personal income tax 
compliance behavior in Thailand? - is answered as follows:  
The survey results from factor analysis and latent transition analysis in Chapter 5 suggest 
that significant determinants of tax compliance behavior in Thailand were perceptions of 
enforcement, perceptions of fairness of the tax system, tax knowledge, and demographic 
characteristics. For past tax compliance behavior, people who perceived greater enforcement 
tended to have higher tax compliance (H1 is supported). However, it was not clear whether 
people who had higher tax knowledge would have higher tax compliance as the reduction in 
inaccurate tax declaration was also accompanied with the increase in filing tax with unknown 
accuracy (H4 is partially supported). For future tax compliance behavior, people who perceived 
more fairness in tax system intended to be more compliant (H2 is supported). These results 
confirm that both the traditional utility maximization approach (that focuses on enforcement of 
tax laws) and the alternative approach (that focuses on tax knowledge education and motivation 
via better attitude of citizens toward tax system) in tax compliance literature are necessary to 
understanding tax compliance behavior in Thailand.  Opinions from tax experts in chapter 6 
provide the same results as the survey results from chapter 5 that enforcement perception, tax 
knowledge, and fairness of tax system perception are the most important determinants of tax 
compliance behavior in Thailand.   
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It is interesting to note that government administration perception was not among the 
significant determinants from the survey findings (H3 is rejected). This is also supported by the 
experts’ opinions in Chapter 6 that: 1) people cannot see immediate linkages when they are 
making tax compliance decision, 2) people want direct benefits to themselves not just to society 
as a whole, and 3) people may not believe that government administration can get better easily. 
However, experts recommend that government administration be improved to increase 
willingness to pay tax of Thai citizens in the long run.   
Demographic characteristics also affect tax compliance behavior in Thailand (H5 is 
supported). The four demographic variables that significantly affected past tax compliance 
behavior were sex, education, marital status, and income. Those who are female, are single, have 
higher levels of education, and have higher income tend to have higher tax compliance. When 
controlling for past behavior, the two significant demographic variables that affected future 
intention of tax compliance behavior were age and income. People who are older tend to have 
higher tax compliance. However, the effects of income on future tax compliance behavior were 
mixed (increase tax compliance in terms of tax declaration accuracy but decrease tax compliance 
in terms of tax filing).    
 
Implications and Recommendations 
From the findings of this study, I suggest that tax compliance strategies should be 
developed as a comprehensive package that includes enforcement strategies, tax knowledge 
strategies, tax system fairness strategies, as well as long term government administration 
strategies.  
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First, the Revenue Department should employ serious enforcement of audits and 
penalties, which involves developing the technological and staff capacity of the Revenue 
Department and actively enforcing penalties with no exceptions.  By publicizing more news of 
people who evade tax that have been punished, a serious message would be sent from the 
government and the Revenue Department that tax evasion will not be tolerated  
Second, Thai government should focus on educating citizens about tax knowledge and 
sense of citizenship from an early age. It is unfortunate that many Thai people have not been 
educated about their tax duties and sense of citizenship. Educating citizens should not be the jobs 
of only the Revenue Department but also the Ministry of Education, Department of Public 
Relations, Ministry of Labor, the media, the general public, and all other related public and 
private organizations. Social norms against tax evasion must be established. Citizens should be 
informed about their tax obligations as well as all deductions and allowances. Changes in tax 
laws must be publicized. In addition, tax revenue information should be publicized more. For 
example, the tax revenue data from each tax bracket so that the citizens have an idea about who 
are paying taxes for the country. 
Third, paying tax must be more convenient. Tax forms must be made easier. Tax laws 
should be less complicated. Unnecessary deductions and allowances should be abolished. The 
Revenue Department should offer friendly advices and reach out to educate and facilitate 
taxpayers in various occupations. Tax-filing via internet should no longer require mail-in 
documents. Rulings on tax cases must be made available for the public and must be easy to 
access. Tax personnel should be trained to give correct standardized advice to taxpayers.  
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Fourth, tax structure should be made more fair. Tax rates should be reduced and more 
citizens should be included in the tax base. Currently, there are only 2 million citizens who 
actually pay taxes, only 9 million citizens who file taxes, of 30 million citizens who are in the 
labor force. It seems very unfair that those 2 million citizens need to bear the cost of 70 million 
Thai citizens. People should not feel that they are the only one group who has to pay taxes, 
which usually means medium to high income people. Every citizen should be included in the tax 
system from the day they start working. Every Thai citizen must be aware of their tax duties. A 
very low tax rate of 100 Baht a month or 1,200 Baht a year from 30 million citizens would 
generate a lot of extra tax revenues of approximately 3.6 billion Baht per year rather than 
exempted all those people. In this way, everyone can contribute at least something to the country 
and people who have always been paying tax will feel that tax system is fairer. In addition, 
deductions and allowances should be reduced. With many deductions and allowances that allow 
high income people to do a lot of tax planning, medium income people often end up paying the 
same rate as higher income people, and often pay more.  
Fifth, the government should offer benefits directly linked to tax-filing.  Citizens have 
legitimate rights in expecting the government to provide them something in return from their tax 
money. However, it is harder for many citizens to realize the benefits that incur to society than 
the benefits that incur to themselves. Survey results show that citizens thought cash-back to 
compliant taxpayers is the best strategy for increasing taxpayer compliance, which means they 
want some benefits for themselves. Government can use cash-back as a temporary strategy but to 
make people really see the benefits, those benefits should be linked to their welfare benefits. 
People should get different welfare benefits based on the different levels of tax they are paying. 
People who pay more taxes should get more benefits such as higher unemployment 
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compensation, more healthcare benefits, and higher pensions. This could start with something 
very simple such as free basic or premium health checkup for people who file tax returns to 
persuade all citizens to get into the tax system.   
Lastly, government administration should be improved so that people will see the 
benefits of their tax money and be more willing to pay tax. According to the survey results in 
chapter 4, government corruption and inappropriate revenue spending are among the top reasons 
for tax non-filing and inaccurate declaration of income in the opinions of Thai citizens. 
Government administration must be better and more fair. Politicians and public officials 
including tax officials who are corrupted must be severely penalized. 
 
Contributions  
This study offers three major contributions to academics and practitioners as follows. 
First, this study theoretically benefits the fields of public administration and public 
finance by integrating both the traditional utility maximization and the alternative behavioral 
approaches of tax compliance literature to determine what critical determinants of tax 
compliance are. The results suggest that understanding tax compliance issues needs both 
traditional and alternative approaches, which include enforcement perception, tax knowledge, 
and fairness of tax system perception. Although the traditional approach has long been 
developed, it is still significant at present especially in combination with educational and 
motivational strategies proposed by the alternative approach. 
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Second, this study offers the Thai government and tax policy makers information on 
citizens’ perceptions and tax experts’ opinions related to current tax administration system and 
personal income tax compliance including their tax compliance behaviors, determinants of tax 
compliance behavior, and strategies that could help increase tax compliance in Thailand. This 
valuable information should help Thai government and tax policy makers understand Thai 
taxpayers better and able to develop effective strategies to increase taxpayer compliance to 
achieve tax revenue goals. The results also benefit tax authorities of similar developing countries 
seeking to understand the determinants of tax compliance in those countries.   
Lastly and most importantly, this study provides the first comprehensive database of 
personal income tax compliance in Thailand that includes both citizens’ perceptions and tax 
experts’ opinions. This contributes to Thai and international tax compliance literature as an 
addition to existing tax compliance literature in the United States and other developing countries. 
Researchers can also use the results of this study to develop further in their topics of interest 
related to tax compliance and tax administration, which will be suggested in the last section. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
 There are some limitations in this study. First, the samples of this study include only 
citizens in Bangkok. Although Bangkok represents the largest proportion of taxpayers in 
Thailand, future research could collect the data from all provinces to reflect tax compliance 
perceptions of Thai citizens as whole. Second, as with other survey data, this study faces 
limitations from self-reporting data. The respondents may or may not tell the truth regarding 
their tax compliance behaviors and opinions. The respondents may also have selective memory, 
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exaggerate their feelings, or remember incorrectly about the events, which all could affect the 
reliability of the survey. The respondents, however, may or may not tell the truth regarding their 
tax compliance behaviors or their opinions.  
 
Future Research Directions 
Although various perspectives of tax compliance are covered in this study, there are 
many things that can be studied further. In order to improve the body of knowledge on tax 
compliance, future research should be conducted more on 1) comparative studies, 2) time-series 
analyses, and 3) comprehensive perspectives.  
Comparative studies are needed to see how tax compliance differs across cultural and 
geographical differences, which will help develop tax compliance strategies that could work in 
similar and different settings. Currently, the challenge of comparative tax compliance research is 
that there is a very limited tax compliance data available in developing countries. More tax 
compliance research should be done in developing countries so that tax compliance situation 
could be realistically assessed and comparative tax compliance strategies could be developed.  
Time-series analyses should be done in both developed and developing countries to see 
the patterns of tax compliance behavior and what factors make compliance situations better or 
worse over time. Collecting and analyzing tax compliance data take time and money but could 
benefit countries over the long run. Correcting tax compliance problems from their sources by 
understanding taxpayers more should improve the tax compliance situation in any country.   
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Comprehensive studies that analyze tax compliance from a larger scope are also needed. 
There should be tax compliance studies of different types of taxes i.e. personal income taxes, 
corporate income taxes, VAT, excise taxes, and customs all together in order to explore which 
types of taxes people are more willing to pay, which could help improve tax administration 
systems as a whole.   
 
 This study proposes that understanding citizens is a key to effective public management 
and understanding taxpayers is a key to successful tax administration. The results of this study 
explore Thai citizens’ perceptions and tax experts’ opinions on various perspectives of tax 
compliance including reasons for tax non-compliance, Thai citizens’ tax compliance behavior, 
and strategies for increasing tax compliance.  The study found that enforcement perception, 
fairness of tax system perception, tax knowledge, and demographic characteristics are significant 
determinants of tax compliance behavior in Thailand, which confirm that both the tradition 
utility maximization and the alternative behavioral approaches are necessary for understanding 
tax compliance issues. This study recommends a comprehensive package of strategies for 
increasing tax compliance in Thailand which includes making tax structure more fair (by 
lowering tax rates, broadening tax base, and eliminating unnecessary allowances and 
deductions), linking welfare benefits to tax filing, enforcing penalties more seriously, educating 
citizens about tax duties and the sense of citizenship, and improving government administration 
and revenue spending over the long run. This study contributes to both academic and 
practitioners by serving as the first comprehensive tax compliance database in Thailand.  
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Personal Income Tax Administration Perception Survey 
 
I am a doctoral student at the University of Kansas and conducting my dissertation on the 
perceptions of Thai tax administration. The objective is to propose ways of improving our tax 
administration. As a citizen, we all want to see our country performing better. I would really appreciate 
you taking the time to complete the following survey which will ultimately contribute to both our 
society and academic knowledge. 
The Department of Public Administration at the University of Kansas supports the practice of 
protection for human subjects participating in research. The following information is provided for you to 
decide whether you wish to participate in the present study. You should be aware that even if you agree 
to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time without penalty. This questionnaire is expected to 
take approximately 20 minutes of your time.  
   The content of the questionnaires should cause no more discomfort than you would experience 
in your everyday life. Although participation may not benefit you directly, we believe that the 
information obtained from this study will help us gain a better understanding of problems of Thai tax 
administration and be able to propose ways to improve efficiency and fairness of the income tax system. 
Your participation is solicited, although strictly voluntary.  
Please do not put your name or other identifiable information anywhere in this survey. Your 
response will be anonymous. All responses will be compiled together and analyzed as a group. The 
responses will be used only for academic and public interests and will never be used against the 
respondents in any circumstances.  
If you would like additional information concerning this study before or after it is completed, 
please feel free to contact us by phone or email. Completion of the survey indicates your willingness to 
participate in this project and that you are over the age of eighteen. If you have any additional questions 
about your rights as a research participant, you may call (785) 864-7429 or (785) 864-7385 or write the 
Human Subjects Committee Lawrence Campus (HSCL), University of Kansas, 2385 Irving Hill Road, 
Lawrence, Kansas   66045-7563, email mdenning@ku.edu.  
Thank you very much again for sacrificing your valuable time. 
 
Miss Maneekwan Chandarasorn, Ph.D. Candidate, Principal Investigator  4048 Wescoe Hall, University of Kansas, 
Lawrence, KS 66045 USA. Phone: +1 (785) 393-8636 (USA), 081-443-4222 (Thailand), Email: manee@ku.edu 
 
Professor H. George Frederickson, Edwin O. Stene Distinguished Professor of Public Administration, Ph.D.  
Faculty Supervisor 4060D Wescoe Hall, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045 USA  
Phone: +1 (785) 864-9095 (USA), Email: gfred@ku.edu 
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Personal Income Tax Administration Perception Survey 
1. This questionnaire is from    
   Interview 
   Self-filing  
 
2. How do you feel about the following statements? Please tick  in the box that matches your opinion the best. 
 Way Too 
Low/Little 
Too 
Low/Little  
About 
Right 
Too 
High/Much 
Way Too 
High/Much 
1) You think current personal income tax rates are…      
2) Revenue statistics has shown that the richest 
group of people in Thailand has been paying for half 
of the country’s personal income tax revenues. You 
think they are paying… 
     
 
3. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please tick  in the box that matches 
your opinion the best. 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree  
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1) Not filing taxes or filing taxes lower than actual 
obligation is an acceptable behavior in Thai society 
     
2) It is difficult for the Revenue Department to find out 
who are not filing taxes or filing taxes lower than actual 
obligation 
     
3)  Governmental administration procedures in general 
have treated all people fairly whether rich or poor. 
Everyone is subjected to the same laws and 
enforcement and has an opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner 
     
4) Tax administration procedures in general have      
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree  
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
treated all people fairly whether rich or poor. Everyone 
is subjected to the same tax laws and enforcement and 
has an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner 
5) Currents penalties are too low to make people obey 
tax laws 
     
6) There is not enough enforcement despite the 
existing tax laws 
     
 
4.  Please rate your opinion on the following issues from the lowest to the highest. Please tick  in the box that 
matches your opinion the best. 
 Lowest Low Average High Highest 
1) What is the degree to which you believe government 
or politicians are corrupted (e.g. taking personal gains 
against taxpayers’ money)? 
     
2) What is your level of satisfaction with the service 
quality of governmental organizations in general? 
     
3) What is your level of satisfaction with the service 
quality of the Revenue Department? 
     
4) What is the degree to which you believe the severity 
of current penalties for those who are not filing taxes or 
filing taxes less than actual obligation?   
     
5) What is the degree to which you believe the tax laws 
have been enforced on those who are not filing taxes or 
filing taxes less than actual obligation? 
     
6) What is the level of fairness of government 
administration without selective treatment? 
     
7) What is the level of fairness of tax administration      
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 Lowest Low Average High Highest 
collection of the Revenue Department without selective 
treatment? 
8) What is the degree to which you see the news or 
aware of people evade their taxes 
     
9) What is the degree to which you see the news or 
aware of people evade their taxes that have been 
punished 
     
 
5. Do you think how many percentages of people who are obliged to pay personal income taxes actually file their 
taxes? 
   0-20%  None or Almost None 
   20-40%  Less than Half 
   40-60%  About Half 
   60-80%  More than Half 
   80-100%  All or Almost All 
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6. Do you think why some people don’t even file their personal income taxes?   Please tick  in the box that 
matches your opinion the best. 
 Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Neither 
Likely 
nor 
Unlikely 
Likely Very 
Likely 
1) They don’t know that they must pay taxes       
2) They think the Revenue Department will not find out if 
they don’t file taxes  
     
3) They think even if the Revenue Department find out 
that they don’t file taxes, they will not be punished  
     
4) They are not afraid of current penalties because the 
penalties are not strong enough  
     
5) They don’t know how to get the form to pay taxes       
6) They think tax form is too complicated      
7) They think  it takes too much time to file taxes      
8) They don’t want to be recognized in the tax system 
of the Revenue Department and possibly get chasing 
later on 
     
9) They think the rich should pay instead of them      
10) They think it’s not fair to be taxed from their own 
earnings  
     
11) They think the tax rate is too high      
12) They think others evade taxes       
13) They think the government does not spend tax 
revenues appropriately 
     
14) They think there is too much corruption in 
government operations 
     
15) They don’t like the government      
16) Other (Please specify) 
_____________________________ 
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7. Do you think how many percentages of people who file personal income taxes actually file their taxes 
accurately? 
   0-20%  None or Almost None 
   21-40%  Less than Half 
   41-60%  About Half 
   61-80%  More than Half 
   81-100%  All or Almost All 
 
8. Do you think why some people don’t declare their incomes accurately (e.g. overstate deduction or expenses) 
when filing personal income tax? Please tick  in the box that matches your opinion the best. 
 Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Neither 
Likely 
nor 
Unlikely 
Likely Very 
Likely 
1) They think the Revenue Department will not find out if 
they declare their incomes inaccurately 
     
2) They think even if the Revenue Department find out 
that they declare their incomes inaccurately, they will 
not be punished 
     
3) They are not afraid of existing penalties because 
they are too soft 
     
4) They think the rich should pay more      
5) They think they are paying too much compared to 
what they receive in government services 
     
6) They think it’s not fair to be taxed from their own 
earnings  
     
7) They think the tax rate is too high 
 (regardless of the quality of government services or 
whether others pay more or less) 
     
8) They think other people pay less taxes than they 
obliged to (e.g. understate their incomes) 
     
9) They think the government spend their taxes      
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 Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Neither 
Likely 
nor 
Unlikely 
Likely Very 
Likely 
inappropriately 
10) They think there is too much corruption in 
government operations 
     
11) They don’t like the government      
12) They don’t know which sources of income they 
must declare (e.g. besides withholding taxes) 
     
13) They attempt to file accurately but make honest 
mistakes in filing as the tax form is so complicated 
     
14) They just make calculation mistakes      
15) Other (Please specify) 
_____________________________ 
     
 
9. How many percentages of people you believe are audited by the Revenue Department? 
   0-20%  None or Almost None 
   21-40%  Less than Half 
   41-60%  About Half 
   61-80%  More than Half 
   81-100%  All or Almost All 
 
10. Do you know about criminal penalties for intentionally not filing taxes? 
   Yes 
   No 
   Not sure 
 
11. What do you think current criminal penalties for intentionally not filing taxes according to the Revenue Code 
2008 are (if you don’t know, please use your best guess)?   
   Maximum fine 2,000 Baht or maximum imprisonment 3 months or both 
   Maximum fine 5,000 Baht or maximum imprisonment 6 months or both 
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   Maximum fine 10,000 Baht or maximum imprisonment 1 year or both 
   Maximum fine 20,000 Baht or maximum imprisonment 2 year or both 
 
12. Do know the surcharge penalty for not paying personal income tax on time? 
   Yes 
   No 
   Not sure 
 
13. What do you think current surcharge penalty for not paying personal income tax on time according to the 
Revenue Code 2008 is (if you don’t know, please use your best guess)  
   0.5 % per month of that tax obligation 
   1.5 % per month of that tax obligation  
   5 % per month of that tax obligation  
   10 % per month of that tax obligation  
 
14. Do you know about the fine penalty if audited by the Revenue Department and found paying inaccurate 
taxes? 
   Yes 
   No 
   Not sure 
 
15. What do you think current fine penalty if audited by the Revenue Department and found not paying accurate 
taxes according to the Revenue Code 2008 is (if you don’t know, please use your best guess)?   
   0.5 to 1 time of that tax obligation 
   1 to 2 times of that tax obligation 
   3 to 4 times of that tax obligation 
   4 to 5 times of that tax obligation 
 
16. Do you know about criminal penalties for intentional tax evasion? 
   Yes 
   No 
   Not sure 
    179 
 
 
17. What do you think the criminal penalties for intentional tax evasion according to the Revenue Code 2008 are? 
(if you don’t know, please use your best guess)?  
   Imprisonment 3 months - 5 years and fine 1,000 – 100,000 Baht 
   Imprisonment 3 months - 7 years and fine 2,000 – 200,000 Baht 
   Imprisonment 6 months - 7 years and fine 5,000 – 200,000 Baht 
   Imprisonment 6 months - 10 years and fine 5,000 – 500,000 Baht 
 
18. The following statements are penalties according to the Revenue Code 2008. How do you feel about each 
penalty? Please tick  in the box that matches your opinion the best. 
 Way Too 
Soft 
Too Soft Not Too 
Soft nor 
Too 
Harsh 
Too 
Harsh 
Way Too 
Harsh 
1) The criminal penalties for intentionally not filing 
taxes are to pay maximum fine 5,000 Baht or maximum 
imprisonment 6 months or both. How do you feel about 
that? 
     
2) The surcharge penalty for not filing taxes on time is 
to pay 1.5 percent per month of that tax amount. That is 
if your tax obligation is 10,000 Baht, you must pay at 
least 150 Baht each month. How do you feel about 
that? 
     
3) If audited by the Revenue Department and found 
not paying accurate taxes, there will be fine of one or 
two times of that tax obligation in addition to the 1.5% 
surcharge. That is if your tax obligation is 10,000 Baht, 
you will have to pay extra 20,000 or 30,000 Baht plus 
150 Baht per month.  How do you feel about that? 
     
4) The criminal penalties for intentional tax evasion are 
to imprison from three months to seven years and pay 
fines from 2,000 to 200,000 Baht. How do you feel 
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about that? 
 
19. How likely is that people who intentionally not filing taxes will start filing taxes if the criminal penalties are 
doubled? That is from maximum fine 5,000 Baht or maximum imprisonment 6 months or both to maximum fine 
10,000 Baht or maximum imprisonment 1 year or both  
   Very Unlikely 
   Unlikely 
   Neither Likely nor Unlikely 
   Likely 
   Very Likely 
 
20. How likely is that you or people in general will attempt to report income more accurately (e.g. report more 
accurately incomes, deduction, and expenses) in the following situations? Please tick  in the box that matches 
your opinion the best. 
 Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Neither 
Likely 
nor 
Unlikely 
Likely Very 
Likely 
1) If the chance of being audited by the Revenue 
Department is higher 
     
2) If the Revenue Department informs you in advance 
(before filing tax returns) that your tax returns’ file will 
be audited 
     
3) If the Revenue Department formally announces to 
the people the exact portion of people that will be 
audited each year 
     
4) If minimum surcharge of 1.5 percent per month is 
doubled to 3 percent 
     
5) If fine penalty of 1-2 times of tax obligation is 
doubled to  3-4 times  
     
6) If criminal penalties for intentional tax cheating are to 
imprison from 3 months to 7 years and pay fines from 
     
    181 
 
 Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Neither 
Likely 
nor 
Unlikely 
Likely Very 
Likely 
2,000 to 200,000 Baht are doubled to imprison from 6 
months to 14 years and pay fines from 4,000 to 400,000 
Baht  
7) If there is more enforcement on tax laws      
8) If lottery prices are offered as rewards to compliant 
taxpayers who file taxes accurately 
     
9) If honorary citizen certificates are offered as rewards 
to compliant taxpayers who file taxes accurately 
     
10) If cash back is offered as rewards to compliant 
taxpayers who file taxes accurately 
     
11) If future audit reduction is offered as rewards to 
compliant taxpayers who file taxes accurately 
     
12) If one time opportunity is offered to noncompliant 
taxpayers to voluntarily pay back taxes without criminal 
investigation and penalties  
     
13) If the Revenue Department announces that 
penalties for tax evasion will be stronger after that one 
time opportunity to pay back taxes has been offered 
     
14) If the service quality of government organizations in 
general is improved 
     
15) If the service quality of the Revenue Department is 
improved 
     
16) If government administration procedure is fairer 
without selective treatment 
     
17) If tax collection administration procedure of the 
Revenue Department is fairer without selective 
treatment 
     
18) If there is less corruption in government      
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 Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Neither 
Likely 
nor 
Unlikely 
Likely Very 
Likely 
19) If you see more news or more aware that people 
who evade their taxes have been punished 
     
 
21. How likely is that you or people in general will attempt to report income LESS accurately (e.g. understate 
some incomes) in the following situations? Please tick  in the box that matches your opinion the best. 
 Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Neither 
Likely 
nor 
Unlikely 
Likely Very 
Likely 
1) If the Revenue Department informs you in advance 
(before filing tax returns) that your tax returns’ file will 
NOT be audited  
     
2) If you see more news or more aware that people 
evade their taxes or filing taxes less than actual 
obligation 
     
 
For the following questions, if you are not comfortable to answer any question or the question is not 
applicable to you, you can skip that question. However, your response will be anonymous. All 
responses will be compiled together and analyzed as a group. 
 
22. Within the past two years or so, did you file personal income tax? 
   Yes 
   No – Why? (Please specify) ______________________ 
   Prefer not to answer 
 
If you did not file personal income tax within the past two year or so, please skip to Question 27. 
    183 
 
 
23. Do you know which income tax rate brackets you have been paying?  
   I have been legally exempted from paying personal income tax  
   10 % 
   20 % 
   30 % 
   37 % 
   I don’t know 
   Prefer not to answer 
  
24. Comparing to the public services you receive, personal income tax you are paying are... 
   Way Too Low  
   Too Low 
   About Right 
   Too High 
   Way Too High 
   Prefer not to answer 
  
25. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the followings? Please tick  in the box that matches your 
opinion the best. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Prefer 
Not to 
Answer 
1) Within the past two years or so, you were 
willing to pay all personal income taxes you 
were legally obliged to pay? (Regardless of 
whether you really filed tax)  
      
2) Within the past two years or so, you intended 
to declare all information as accurately as 
possible when filing personal income tax? 
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26. Please tick  in the box that matches your opinion the best. 
 Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Neither 
Likely 
nor 
Unlikely 
Likely Very 
Likely 
Prefer 
Not to 
Answer 
1) Within the past two years or so, how likely is it 
that you might have left some reportable 
income off when filing your personal income 
tax?  
      
2) Within the past two years or so, how likely is it 
that you might have overstated any deduction 
or expenses when filing your personal income 
tax? 
      
 
27. Will you file personal income tax next year? 
   Yes 
   No – Why? (Please Specify) ______________________ 
   Prefer not to answer 
 
28. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the followings? Please tick  in the box that matches your 
opinion the best. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Prefer 
Not to 
Answer 
1) For next year, you are willing to pay all 
personal income tax you legally obliged to pay 
      
2) For next year, you intend to declare all 
information as accurately as possible when 
filing your personal income tax 
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29. Please tick  in the box that matches your opinion the best. 
 Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Neither 
Likely 
nor 
Unlikely 
Likely Very 
Likely 
Prefer 
Not to 
Answer 
1) For next year, how likely is it that you might 
leave some reportable income off when filing 
your personal income tax? 
      
2) For next year, how likely is it that you might 
overstate any deduction or expenses when 
filing your personal income tax? 
      
 
 
30. Please provide us with any further comments and suggestions you may have regarding personal income tax 
administration in Thailand.  This can include why you believe people evade taxes, what you think could help make 
people be more willing to pay taxes, other rewards or penalties that should be introduced, what government 
should do more for the citizens, etc.  
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________ 
 
More questions on the next page… 
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Please provide us with a little bit of your information 
 
Sex  
   Male 
  Female 
Age  _________ years 
Highest level of education:  
   Primary school or lower 
   Secondary school 
   Two-year College’s degree 
   Bachelor 
   Master 
   Ph.D./Doctorate or higher 
Occupation: (Choose all that apply) 
   Government official 
   Other governmental employee  
   Private organization’s employee 
   Businessman, Entrepreneur  
   Elected official, Politician 
   Freelance 
   Other (Please specify) _____________ 
 
 
 
This is the end of the survey. Thank you 
very much again for your valuable time in 
completing this survey. Please feel free to 
contact me at manee@ku.edu with any 
further questions or comments.  
Marital Status:  
   Single 
   Married 
If married, how do you file tax?  
   Jointly with spouse 
   Separately 
Your annual total income or you and your 
spouse total annual income based on how you 
file tax  
   Below 150,000 Baht (approximately 
12,500 Baht/month) 
   150,001-500,000 Baht (approximately 
12,500 – 42,000 Baht/month) 
   500,000-1,000,000 Baht 
(approximately 42,000 – 83,000 Baht/month) 
   1,000,001-4,000,000 Baht 
(approximately 83,000 – 330,000 
Baht/month) 
   4,000,001 Baht and over 
(approximately 333,000 Baht/month) 
Number of Children     _________  (If none = 0) 
People who are Financially Dependent on You 
   Number of kids under 18        ____   
   Number of seniors over 60             ____  
   Number of handicapped people   ____  
   Number of unemployed people     ____ 
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Appendix B 
Thai Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
แบบสอบถามความคิดเหน็เกี่ยวกับ 
การจัดเกบ็ภาษีเงนิได้บุคคลธรรมดา 
 
กรกฎาคม 2554 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
รหสัแบบส ารวจ  ......................................................... 
รหสัพืน้ท่ี     ......................................................... 
 
    188 
 
แบบสอบถามความคิดเหน็เกี่ยวกับการจัดเก็บภาษีเงนิได้บุคคลธรรมดา 
 
เรียน ทา่นผู้ตอบแบบสอบถาม 
 
 ดิฉนั นางสาวมณีขวญั จนัทรศร ก าลงัศกึษาในระดบัปริญญาเอก คณะรัฐประศาสนศาสตร์ ณ มหาวิทยาลยัแคนซสั 
ประเทศสหรัฐอเมริกา ขณะนีอ้ยูใ่นระหวา่งการรวบรวมข้อมลูเพื่อจดัท าวิทยานิพนธ์ เร่ือง ความคิดเห็นของประชาชนเก่ียวกบั 
การจดัเก็บภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดา โดยมีวตัถปุระสงค์เพื่อเสนอแนะปรับปรุงการบริหารจดัเก็บภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดา 
ของประเทศไทย ในฐานะประชาชนไทย พวกเราทกุคนตา่งมุง่หวงัที่จะเห็นประเทศชาติของเราพฒันายิ่งขึน้ ดิฉนั
ขอขอบพระคณุทกุทา่นท่ีกรุณาสละเวลาตอบแบบสอบถามนีเ้พื่อประโยชน์ทางวิชาการและสงัคมไทยตอ่ไป 
 
 คณะรัฐประศาสนศาสตร์ มหาวทิยาลยัแคนซสั สนบัสนนุการรักษาสทิธิของผู้มีสว่นร่วมในงานวิจยั จึงขอน าเสนอ 
ข้อมลูตอ่ไปนี ้เพื่อประกอบการตดัสนิใจของทา่นในการตอบแบบสอบถามครัง้นี ้ถึงแม้วา่ทา่นตกลงที่จะตอบแบบสอบถาม 
ทา่นสามารถหยดุตอบได้ทกุเมื่อ โดยจะไมม่ีผลกระทบตอ่ทา่น แบบสอบถามนีค้าดวา่จะใช้เวลาของทา่นประมาณ  20 นาที 
และจะไมก่่อให้เกิดความล าบากใจแก่ทา่นมากเกินไปกวา่ที่ทา่นจะพบเจอในชีวติประจ าวนั ถงึแม้วา่การเข้าร่วมในการตอบ 
แบบสอบถามนีจ้ะไมไ่ด้ให้ประโยชน์แก่ทา่นโดยตรง ผู้วจิยัเช่ือวา่ข้อมลูที่ได้รับจะช่วยให้ผู้วิจยัเข้าใจปัญหาของการจดัเก็บ 
ภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดาของประเทศไทยมากยิง่ขึน้ และสามารถน าเสนอแนวทางในการปรับปรุงประสทิธิภาพ 
และความเป็นธรรมของระบบภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดาผู้วจิยัจงึขอความอนเุคราะห์จากทา่นผู้มีเงินได้และเข้าขา่ยใน 
การต้องยื่นช าระภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดาในการตอบแบบสอบถามครัง้นี ้อยา่งไรก็ตาม การเข้าร่วมขึน้อยูก่บั 
ความสมคัรใจของทา่น 
 
 กรุณาอย่ากรอกชื่อหรือข้อมูลส่วนบุคคลของท่านลงในแบบสอบถามนี ้ค าตอบของทา่นจะไมส่ามารถระบถุึง
ตวัตนของทา่นได้ในอนาคต และการรายงานจะแสดงผลเป็นคา่สถิติในเชิงของกลุม่บคุคล โดยจะไมม่ีการน าค าตอบของทา่น
มาใช้ในทางทีก่่อให้เกิดความเสยีหายแก่ทา่น ค าตอบของทา่นจะใช้เพื่อประโยชน์ทาง 
วิชาการและประโยชน์ตอ่สาธารณะเทา่นัน้ ถ้าทา่นต้องการข้อมลูเพิ่มเติม มีข้อสงสยั หรือข้อเสนอแนะประการใดเก่ียวกบั 
งานวจิยัชิน้นี ้ไมว่า่จะก่อนหรือหลงัการวจิยันีเ้สร็จสิน้ โปรดติดตอ่ผู้วิจยัทางโทรศพัท์หรือทางอีเมลตามที่อยูด้่านลา่งนี ้การตอบ
แบบสอบถามนีจ้นเสร็จแสดงวา่ทา่นเตม็ใจมีสว่นร่วมในงานวิจยัครัง้นีแ้ละทา่นมีอายมุากกวา่ 18 ปี หากทา่นมีข้อสงสยั
เก่ียวกบัสทิธิของทา่นในฐานะผู้มสีว่นร่วมในงานวิจยั โปรดติดตอ่ Human Subject Committee Lawrence Campus 
(HSCC), University of Kansas ทางโทรศพัท์ (ประเทศสหรัฐอเมริกา) +1 (785) 864-7429 หรือ +1 (785) 864-7385 หรือ
ทางจดหมายที ่2385 Irving Hill Road, Lawrence, Kansas   66045-7563 หรืออีเมล mdenning@ku.edu   
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ขอขอบพระคณุอยา่งสงูในการสละเวลาอนัมคีา่ของทา่น 
 
นางสาวมณีขวัญ จันทรศร (Miss Maneekwan Chandarasorn, Ph.D. Candidate) นกัศกึษาระดบัปริญญาเอก คณะรัฐประศาสนศาสตร์ 
มหาวิทยาลยัแคนซสั ผู้วิจยั 4048 Wescoe Hall, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045 USA 
โทรศพัท์ +1 (785) 393-8636 (สหรัฐอเมริกา), โทรศพัท์ 081-443-4222 (ประเทศไทย), อีเมล manee@ku.edu 
 
ศาสตราภิชาน ดร. เอช จอร์จ เฟรเดอริกสัน (H. George Frederickson, Edwin O. Stene Distinguished Professor of Public 
Administration, Ph.D.) อาจารย์ที่ปรึกษา 4060D Wescoe Hall, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045 USA  
โทรศพัท์ +1 (785) 864-9095 (สหรัฐอเมริกา), อีเมล gfred@ku.edu 
  
    190 
 
แบบสอบถามความคิดเหน็เกี่ยวกับการจัดเก็บภาษีเงนิได้บุคคลธรรมดา 
 
1. แบบสอบถามนีไ้ด้มาจาก    
   การสมัภาษณ์ 
   การกรอกด้วยตนเองโดยผู้ตอบแบบสอบถาม 
 
2. ทา่นรู้สกึอยา่งไรกบัประโยคเหลา่นี ้กรุณาท าเคร่ืองหมาย  ในช่องที่ตรงกบัความเห็นของทา่นมากที่สดุ 
 ต ่าเกินไป 
มาก 
ต ่า ก าลงั 
เหมาะสม 
สงู สงูเกินไป
มาก 
1) ทา่นคิดวา่อตัราภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดาในปัจจบุนันัน้      
2) จากข้อมลูรายรับของประเทศไทยแสดงวา่ ประชากรที่จ่ายภาษี
เงินได้ในอตัราสงูสดุ จ่ายภาษีเป็นจ านวนถึงคร่ึงหนึง่ของรายรับ
ภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดาทัง้หมด ทา่นคิดวา่บคุคลกลุม่ดงักลา่วจา่ย
ภาษี…  
     
 
3. ทา่นเห็นด้วยหรือไมเ่ห็นด้วยมากน้อยเพียงใดกบัค ากลา่วตอ่ไปนี ้กรุณาท าเคร่ืองหมาย  ในชอ่งที่ตรงกบัความเห็นของ
ทา่นมากที่สดุ 
 ไมเ่ห็น 
ด้วยอยา่ง
ยิ่ง 
ไม ่
เห็น 
ด้วย 
เห็นด้วยและ ไม่
เห็นด้วยพอๆ 
กนั 
เห็น
ด้วย 
เห็นด้วย
อยา่งยิ่ง 
1)การหลกีเลีย่งไมช่ าระภาษีหรือช าระภาษีต า่กวา่ความเป็นจริง
เป็นสิง่ที่ยอมรับได้ในสงัคมไทย 
     
2)การท่ีกรมสรรพากรจะตรวจสอบพบวา่ใครหลกีเลีย่งไมช่ าระ
ภาษีหรือช าระภาษีต ่ากวา่ความเป็นจริงเป็นเร่ืองยาก 
     
3)การบริหารจดัการภาครัฐให้ความเป็นธรรมแก่ทกุคนไมว่า่จะ 
รวยหรือจนประชาชนทกุคนอยูภ่ายใต้ข้อบงัคบัของกฎหมาย 
เดียวกนัโดยไมม่ีการเลอืกปฏิบตัิ  
     
4)การบริหารการจดัเก็บภาษีให้ความเป็นธรรมแก่ทกุคนไมว่า่จะ
รวยหรือจนประชาชนทกุคนอยูภ่ายใต้ข้อบงัคบัของกฎหมาย
ภาษีเดียวกนัโดยไมม่กีารเลอืกปฏิบตัิ  
     
5)บทลงโทษในปัจจบุนัต ่าเกินกวา่ที่จะท าให้ประชาชนปฏิบตัิ
ตามกฎหมายภาษี 
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6)กฎหมายภาษียงัไมม่ีการบงัคบัใช้จริงเพียงพอถงึแม้จะมี 
บทลงโทษตามกฏหมาย  
     
4.  ขอให้ทา่นชว่ยให้คะแนนในเร่ืองตา่งๆ ตอ่ไปนี ้ตามความเห็นของทา่น จากคะแนนต ่าที่สดุ จนถงึสงูที่สดุ กรุณาท า
เคร่ืองหมาย  ในช่องที่ตรงกบัความเห็นของทา่นมากที่สดุ 
 ต ่า
ที่สดุ 
ต ่า ปาน 
กลาง 
สงู สงู
ที่สดุ 
1) ทา่นคิดวา่ระดบัการคอรัปชัน่ของรัฐบาลหรือนกัการเมือง เช่น การน าเงินภาษีของ
ประชาชนไปใช้เอือ้ผลประโยชน์สว่นตวั อยูใ่นระดบัใด 
     
2)ระดบัความพงึพอใจของทา่นตอ่คณุภาพการให้บริการของหนว่ยงานภาครัฐอยู่ ในระดบั
ใด 
     
3)ระดบัความพงึพอใจของทา่นตอ่คณุภาพการให้บริการของกรมสรรพากรอยูใ่นระดบัใด      
4)ทา่นคิดวา่ระดบัความรุนแรงของบทลงโทษส าหรับการหลกีเลีย่งไมย่ื่นแบบช าระภาษีและ
ช าระภาษีต า่กวา่ความเป็นจริงอยูใ่นระดบัใด 
     
5)ทา่นคิดวา่ระดบัการบงัคบัใช้จริงของกฎหมายภาษีตอ่ผู้ที่หลกีเลีย่งไมย่ื่นแบบช าระภาษี 
และช าระภาษีต า่กวา่ความเป็นจริงอยูใ่นระดบัใด 
     
6)ทา่นคิดวา่ระดบัความเป็นธรรมของการให้บริการประชาชนของรัฐโดยการไมเ่ลอืกปฏิบตัิ
อยูใ่นระดบัใด  
     
7)ทา่นคิดวา่ระดบัความเป็นธรรมของการจดัเก็บภาษีของกรมสรรพากรโดยการไมเ่ลอืก 
ปฏิบตัิอยูใ่นระดบัใด 
     
8) ทา่นเห็นขา่วหรือรับรู้วา่มีคนหลกีเลีย่งภาษี อยูใ่นระดบัใด      
9) ทา่นเห็นขา่วหรือรับรู้วา่คนที่หลกีเลีย่งภาษีได้รับการลงโทษ  
อยูใ่นระดบัใด 
     
 
5. ทา่นคิดวา่ประชากรจ านวนร้อยละเทา่ไร ยื่นแบบช าระภาษีจากจ านวนของผู้มีหน้าทีต้่องเสยีภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดา
ทัง้หมด 
   0-20%  ไมม่ีหรือเกือบไมม่ี 
   20-40%  น้อยกวา่คร่ึง 
   40-60%  ประมาณคร่ึงหนึง่ 
   60-80%  มากกวา่คร่ึง 
   80-100%  เกือบทัง้หมดหรือทัง้หมด 
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6. ทา่นคิดวา่เหตผุลตอ่ไปนี ้เป็นเหตผุลที่คนบางสว่น ไม่ยื่นแบบช าระภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดามากน้อยเพียงใด กรุณาท า
เคร่ืองหมาย  ในช่องที่ตรงกบัความเห็นของทา่นมากที่สดุ 
 เป็นไปไม ่
ได้อยา่ง 
มาก 
เป็น 
ไป
ไมไ่ด้ 
เป็นไปได้และ 
เป็นไปไมไ่ด้ 
พอๆ กนั 
เป็น
ไป 
ได้ 
เป็นไปได้
อยา่ง 
มาก 
1) พวกเขาไมท่ราบวา่ตวัเองต้องเสยีภาษี      
2) พวกเขาคิดวา่กรมสรรพากรคงไมส่ามารถตรวจเจอ หากไม่
ยืนแบบช าระภาษี 
     
3) พวกเขาคิดวา่ถึงแม้วา่กรมสรรพากรจะตรวจเจอ พวกเขาก็จะ
ไมถ่กูลงโทษจากการไมย่ื่นแบบช าระภาษี 
     
4) พวกเขาไมเ่กรงกลวัตอ่บทลงโทษที่มีอยู ่เนื่องจากบทลงโทษ
ไมรุ่นแรงพอ 
     
5) พวกเขาไมท่ราบวา่จะไปรับแบบฟอร์มการช าระภาษีได้ที่ใด      
6)พวกเขาคดิวา่แบบฟอร์มการช าระภาษีซบัซ้อนและเข้าใจ ยาก
เกินไป 
     
7)พวกเขาคดิวา่การกรอกแบบฟอร์มการช าระภาษีเสยีเวลามาก
เกินไป 
     
8)พวกเขาไมต้่องการถกูบนัทกึในระบบรายช่ือผู้ เสยีภาษีของ
กรมสรรพากรและเสีย่งตอ่การถกูบงัคบัให้จ่ายภาษีตอ่ไปใน 
อนาคต 
     
9) พวกเขาคิดวา่คนรวยควรเทา่นัน้ท่ีควรจะเป็นผู้ เสยีภาษี      
10)พวกเขาคิดวา่การท่ีจะต้องเสยีภาษีจากเงินท่ีหามาจาก 
น า้พกัน า้แรงของตวัเองแก่รัฐเป็นเร่ืองไมเ่ป็นธรรม 
     
11) พวกเขาคิดวา่ภาษีที่ต้องช าระสงูเกินไป      
12) พวกเขาคิดวา่คนอื่นๆ ก็หลกีเลีย่งไมช่ าระภาษี      
13) พวกเขาคิดวา่รัฐใช้เงินภาษีของประชาชนอยา่งไมเ่หมาะสม      
14) พวกเขาคิดวา่ภาครัฐมีการคอรัปชัน่มากเกินไป      
15) พวกเขาไมช่อบรัฐบาล      
16) อื่นๆ โปรดระบ ุ______________________________      
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7. ทา่นคิดวา่ประชากรจ านวนร้อยละเทา่ไร ยื่นช าระภาษีได้ถกูต้องจากจ านวนของผู้ที่ยื่นแบบช าระภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดา
ทัง้หมด 
   0-20%  ไมม่ีหรือเกือบไมม่ี 
   21-40%  น้อยกวา่คร่ึง 
   41-60%  ประมาณคร่ึงหนึง่ 
   61-80%  มากกวา่คร่ึง 
   81-100%  เกือบทัง้หมดหรือทัง้หมด 
 
8. ทา่นคิดวา่ท าไมคนบางสว่นถงึ ยื่นช าระภาษีไม่ถกูต้อง (เช่น แจ้งรายได้ต า่กวา่ความเป็นจริง แจ้งคา่ลดหยอ่นหรือ
คา่ใช้จา่ยสงูกวา่ความเป็นจริง เป็นต้น) กรุณาท าเคร่ืองหมาย  ในช่องที่ตรงกบัความเห็นของทา่นมากที่สดุ 
 เป็นไปไมไ่ด้
อยา่งมาก 
เป็นไป 
ไมไ่ด้ 
เป็นไปได้และ 
เป็นไปไมไ่ด้
พอๆ กนั 
เป็น 
ไป 
ได้ 
เป็นไปได้ 
อยา่งมาก 
1)พวกเขาคดิวา่กรมสรรพากรคงไมส่ามารถตรวจเจอหาก
ยื่นช าระภาษีไมถ่กูต้อง   
     
2) พวกเขาคิดวา่ถึงแม้วา่กรมสรรพากรจะตรวจเจอ พวกเขา
ก็จะไมถ่กูลงโทษจากการยื่นช าระภาษีไมถ่กูต้อง 
     
3) พวกเขาไมเ่กรงกลวัตอ่บทลงโทษที่มีอยู ่เนื่องจาก
บทลงโทษไมรุ่นแรงพอ 
     
4)พวกเขาคดิวา่คนรวยตา่งหากที่ควรจะเป็นผู้จ่ายภาษี
มากกวา่นี ้
     
5)พวกเขาคดิวา่ตนเองจา่ยภาษีสงูเกินไปเมื่อเทียบกบั 
บริการของรัฐที่ได้รับ 
     
6)พวกเขาคดิวา่การท่ีจะต้องเสยีภาษีจากเงินท่ีหามาจาก
น า้พกัน า้แรงของตวัเองแก่รัฐเป็นเร่ืองไมเ่ป็นธรรม 
     
7) พวกเขาคิดวา่ภาษีทีต้่องช าระสงูเกินไป (โดยไมเ่ก่ียวข้อง
กบัคณุภาพของบริการของรัฐที่ได้รับ และไมเ่ก่ียวข้องกบัวา่
คนอื่นจ่ายมากหรือน้อยกวา่) 
     
8) พวกเขาคิดวา่คนอื่นๆ ก็ช าระภาษีต า่กวา่ความจริง      
9)พวกเขาคดิวา่รัฐใช้เงินภาษีของประชาชนอยา่งไม่
เหมาะสม 
     
10) พวกเขาคิดวา่มีภาครัฐมกีารคอรัปชัน่มากเกินไป      
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 เป็นไปไมไ่ด้
อยา่งมาก 
เป็นไป 
ไมไ่ด้ 
เป็นไปได้และ 
เป็นไปไมไ่ด้
พอๆ กนั 
เป็น 
ไป 
ได้ 
เป็นไปได้ 
อยา่งมาก 
11) พวกเขาไมช่อบรัฐบาล      
12) พวกเขาไมรู้่วา่จะต้องแจ้งรายการเงินได้ประเภทใดบ้าง 
เช่น เงินได้อื่นท่ีนอกเหนือจากสว่นท่ีถกูหกัภาษี ณ ท่ีจ่าย 
     
13) พวกเขาพยายามทีจ่ะยื่นช าระภาษีอยา่งถกูต้องแตว่า่
ท าผิดพลาดโดยไมไ่ด้ตัง้ใจ เนื่องจากแบบฟอร์มภาษี
ซบัซ้อนเกินไป 
     
14) พวกเขาแคค่ านวณผิดพลาด      
15) อื่นๆ โปรดระบ ุ______________________________      
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9. ทา่นคิดวา่โอกาสที่ทา่นจะถกูตรวจสอบภาษีจากกรมสรรพากรเป็นร้อยละเทา่ไร  
   0-20%  ไมม่ีหรือเกือบไมม่ี 
   21-40%  น้อยกวา่คร่ึง 
   41-60%  ประมาณคร่ึงหนึง่ 
   61-80%  มากกวา่คร่ึง 
   81-100%  เกือบทัง้หมดหรือทัง้หมด 
 
10. ทา่นทราบหรือไมว่า่ โทษทางอาญากรณีเจตนาละเลยไม่ยื่นแบบแสดงรายการเพื่อหลีกเลี่ยงการเสียภาษีอากร 
ตามประมวลรัษฎากร 2551 คืออะไร  
   ทราบ 
   ไมท่ราบ 
   ไมแ่นใ่จ 
 
11.ทา่นคิดวา่โทษทางอาญากรณีเจตนาละเลยไม่ยื่นแบบแสดงรายการเพื่อหลกีเลี่ยงการเสียภาษีอากรตามประมวล
รัษฎากร 2551 คืออะไร (ถ้าทา่นไมท่ราบ โปรดเลอืกตอบข้อที่ทา่นคิดวา่เป็นไปได้มากที่สดุ)  
   ปรับไมเ่กิน 2,000 บาท หรือ จ าคกุไมเ่กิน 3 เดือน หรือ ทัง้ปรับทัง้จ า 
   ปรับไมเ่กิน 5,000 บาท หรือ จ าคกุไมเ่กิน 6 เดือน หรือ ทัง้ปรับทัง้จ า 
   ปรับไมเ่กิน 10,000 บาท หรือ จ าคกุไมเ่กิน 1 ปี หรือ ทัง้ปรับทัง้จ า 
   ปรับไมเ่กิน 20,000 บาท หรือ จ าคกุไมเ่กิน 2 ปี หรือ ทัง้ปรับทัง้จ า 
 
12. ทา่นทราบหรือไมว่า่ บทลงโทษตามประมวลรัษฎากร 2551 ส าหรับการจา่ยภาษีเงินได้ไมต่รงเวลา ต้องช าระเงนิเพิ่มเป็น
เทา่ไร  
   ทราบ 
   ไมท่ราบ 
   ไมแ่นใ่จ 
 
13. ทา่นคดิวา่อตัราการเสยีเงนิเพิ่มส าหรับการจา่ยภาษีเงินได้ไมต่รงเวลาตามประมวลรัษฎากร 2551 เป็นเทา่ไร (ถ้าทา่นไม่
ทราบ โปรดเลอืกตอบข้อที่ทา่นคดิวา่เป็นไปได้มากที่สดุ)  
   ร้อยละ 0.5 ตอ่เดือนของจ านวนภาษีที่ต้องช าระ 
   ร้อยละ 1.5 ตอ่เดือนของจ านวนภาษีที่ต้องช าระ 
   ร้อยละ 5 ตอ่เดือนของจ านวนภาษีที่ต้องช าระ 
   ร้อยละ 10 ตอ่เดือนของจ านวนภาษีที่ต้องช าระ 
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14. ทา่นทราบหรือไมว่า่ บทลงโทษตามประมวลรัษฎากร 2551 ในกรณีที่ถกูกรมสรรพากรตรวจสอบแล้วพบวา่ช าระภาษีไม่
ถกูต้อง  
ต้องเสยีเบีย้ปรับเป็นอตัราเทา่ไร  
   ทราบ 
   ไมท่ราบ 
   ไมแ่นใ่จ 
 
15. ทา่นคดิวา่บทลงโทษตามประมวลรัษฎากร 2551 ในกรณีถกูกรมสรรพากรตรวจสอบแล้วพบวา่ช าระภาษีไมถ่กูต้อง  
ต้องเสยีเบีย้ปรับเป็นอตัราเทา่ไร (ถ้าทา่นไมท่ราบ โปรดเลอืกตอบข้อที่ทา่นคิดวา่เป็นไปได้มากทีส่ดุ)  
   0.5 ถึง 1 เทา่ของจ านวนภาษีที่ต้องช าระ 
   1 ถึง 2 เทา่ของจ านวนภาษีที่ต้องช าระ 
   3 ถึง 4 เทา่ของจ านวนภาษีที่ต้องช าระ 
   4 ถึง 5 เทา่ของจ านวนภาษีที่ต้องช าระ 
 
16. ทา่นทราบหรือไมว่า่โทษทางอาญากรณีจงใจ แจ้งข้อความเท็จ หรือแสดงหลกัฐานเท็จหรือฉ้อโกงฯ เพื่อหลกีเลีย่งหรือ
พยายามหลีกเลี่ยงการเสียภาษีอากรตามประมวลรัษฎากร 2551 คืออะไร  
   ทราบ 
   ไมท่ราบ 
   ไมแ่นใ่จ 
 
17. ทา่นคดิวา่โทษทางอาญากรณีจงใจ แจ้งข้อความเท็จ หรือแสดงหลกัฐานเท็จหรือฉ้อโกงฯ เพือ่หลกีเลีย่งหรือพยายาม
หลีกเลี่ยงการเสียภาษีอากรตามประมวลรัษฎากร 2551 คืออะไร (ถ้าทา่นไมท่ราบ โปรดเลอืกตอบข้อที่ทา่นคิดวา่เป็นไป
ได้มากที่สดุ)  
   จ าคกุ 3 เดือน – 5 ปี และปรับ 1,000 – 100,000 บาท 
   จ าคกุ 3 เดือน – 7 ปี และปรับ 2,000 – 200,000 บาท 
   จ าคกุ 6 เดือน – 7 ปี และปรับ 5,000 – 200,000 บาท 
   จ าคกุ 6 เดือน – 10 ปี และปรับ 5,000 – 500,000 บาท 
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18. ข้อความตอ่ไปนี ้เป็นบทลงโทษตามประมวลรัษฎากร 2551 ทา่นรู้สกึอยา่งไรกบับทลงโทษแตล่ะข้อ กรุณาท าเคร่ืองหมาย 
 ในช่องทีต่รงกบัความเห็นของทา่นมากที่สดุ 
 เบา 
เกินไป
มาก 
เบา 
เกิน 
ไป 
ไมเ่บา 
หรือหนกั 
เกินไป 
หนกั
เกิน 
ไป 
หนกั 
เกินไป
มาก 
1)โทษทางอาญากรณีเจตนาละเลยไม่ยื่นแบบแสดงรายการเพื่อ
หลีกเลี่ยงการเสียภาษีอากร คอื ปรับไมเ่กิน 5,000 บาท หรือ จ าคกุไมเ่กิน 
6 เดือน หรือ ทัง้ปรับทัง้จ า ทา่นรู้สกึอยา่งไรกบับทลงโทษดงักลา่ว   
     
2) การจ่ายเงนิเพิ่มส าหรับการจา่ยภาษีเงินได้ไมต่รงเวลา คือร้อยละหนึง่จดุ
ห้าตอ่เดือนของจ านวนภาษีทีต้่องช าระ นัน่คือถ้าจ านวนภาษีที่ทา่นต้องช าระ
คือ 10,000 บาท ทา่นจะต้องจา่ยคา่ปรับอยา่งน้อย 150 บาทตอ่เดือน ทา่น
รู้สกึอยา่งไรกบับทลงโทษดงักลา่ว 
     
3) ในกรณีถกูกรมสรรพากรตรวจสอบพบวา่ช าระภาษีไมถ่กูต้อง จะต้องช าระ
เบีย้ปรับเป็นจ านวนหนึง่หรือสองเทา่ของจ านวนภาษีที่ต้องช าระแล้วแต่
กรณีเพิ่มเติมจากเงินเพิ่มร้อยละหนึง่จดุห้าตอ่เดือน นัน่คือถ้าจ านวนภาษีที่
ทา่นต้องช าระคือ 10,000 บาท ทา่นจะต้องจา่ยเงินเพิม่ 20,000 ถงึ 30,000 
บาท เพิ่มเติมจากคา่ปรับ 150 บาทตอ่เดือน ทา่นรู้สกึอยา่งไรกบับทลงโทษ
ดงักลา่ว 
     
4) โทษทางอาญากรณีจงใจ แจ้งข้อความเทจ็ หรือแสดงหลกัฐานเท็จหรือ
ฉ้อโกงฯเพื่อหลกีเลีย่งหรือพยายามหลีกเลี่ยง การเสียภาษีอากรคือจ าคกุ
ตัง้แตห่กเดือนถึงเจ็ดปีและปรับตัง้แตส่องพนัถงึสองแสนบาท ทา่นรู้สกึ
อยา่งไรกบับทลงโทษดงักลา่ว 
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19. ทา่นคดิวา่เป็นไปได้มากหรือน้อยเพียงใด ที่ผู้ที่เจตนาละเลยไมย่ื่นแบบแสดงรายการเพื่อหลกีเลีย่งการเสยีภาษีอากร 
จะหนัมายื่นแบบช าระภาษีมากขึน้ หากโทษทางอาญาเพิ่มขึน้เป็นสองเท่า เช่น จากปรับไมเ่กิน 5,000 บาท หรือ จ าคกุไม่
เกิน 6 เดือน หรือ ทัง้ปรับทัง้จ า เป็นปรับไมเ่กิน 10,000 บาท หรือ จ าคกุไมเ่กิน 1 ปี หรือ ทัง้ปรับทัง้จ า 
   เป็นไปไมไ่ด้อยา่งมาก 
   เป็นไปไมไ่ด้ 
   เป็นไปได้และเป็นไปไมไ่ด้พอๆ กนั 
   เป็นไปได้ 
   เป็นไปได้อยา่งมาก 
 
20. ทา่นคดิวา่เป็นไปได้มากหรือน้อยเพียงใดที่ทา่นหรือประชาชนโดยทัว่ไปจะพยายามแจ้งช าระภาษีให้ถกูต้องตาม
ความเป็นจริงมากยิ่งขึน้ (เแจ้งรายได้ คา่ลดหยอ่น หรือคา่ใช้จ่ายให้ตรงกบัความเป็นจริงมากยิง่ขึน้) ในกรณีดงัตอ่ไปนี ้
กรุณาท าเคร่ืองหมาย  ในช่องที่ตรงกบัความเห็นของทา่นมากที่สดุ 
 เป็นไปไม ่
ได้อยา่ง 
มาก 
เป็น 
ไป
ไมไ่ด้ 
เป็นไปได้และ 
เป็นไปไมไ่ด้ 
พอๆ กนั 
เป็น
ไป 
ได้ 
เป็นไปได้
อยา่งมาก 
1) ถ้าโอกาสในการถกูตรวจสอบจากกรมสรรพากรสงูขึน้      
2) ถ้ากรมสรรพากรแจ้งทา่นลว่งหน้า (ก่อนที่ทา่นจะยื่นแบบ
ช าระภาษี) วา่ทา่นจะถกูตรวจสอบภาษี 
     
3)ถ้ากรมสรรพากรประกาศให้ประชาชนรับรู้อยา่งเป็นทางการ
ถึงโอกาสในการถกูตรวจสอบภาษีของผู้ยื่นภาษีฯ ในแตล่ะปี  
     
4) ถ้าเพิ่มบทลงโทษเงนิเพิ่มเป็นสองเทา่ เช่น จากร้อยละ 1.5 
เป็นร้อยละ 3 
     
5) ถ้าเพิ่มบทลงโทษเบีย้ปรับเป็นสองเทา่ เช่น จาก 1-2 เทา่ 
เป็น 3-4 เทา่ ของจ านวนภาษีที่ต้องช าระ 
     
6)ถ้าเพิม่บทลงโทษทางอาญากรณีจงใจหลกีเลี่ยงการเสีย
ภาษีอากรเป็นสองเทา่ เช่น จ าคกุ 3 เดือนถงึ 7 ปี และปรับ 
2,000 ถึง 200,000 เป็น จ าคกุ 6 เดือนถึง 14 ปี และปรับ 
4,000 ถึง 400,000 บาท 
     
7) ถ้ามีการบงัคบัใช้กฏหมายภาษีอยา่งจริงจงัมากกวา่นี ้      
8) ถ้ามีการจบัสลากให้รางวลัแกผู่้ที่ช าระภาษีอยา่งถกูต้อง 
 
     
9)ถ้ามกีารให้ประกาศนียบตัรประชาชนตวัอยา่งแก่ผู้ที่ช าระ      
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 เป็นไปไม ่
ได้อยา่ง 
มาก 
เป็น 
ไป
ไมไ่ด้ 
เป็นไปได้และ 
เป็นไปไมไ่ด้ 
พอๆ กนั 
เป็น
ไป 
ได้ 
เป็นไปได้
อยา่งมาก 
ภาษีอยา่งถกูต้อง 
10)ถ้ามีการคืนเงินภาษีบางสว่นให้แก่ผู้ที่ช าระภาษีอยา่งถู กต้
อง 
     
11)ถ้ามีการลดอตัราการตรวจสอบภาษีในอนาคตให้แก่ผู้ที่ 
ช าระภาษีอยา่งถกูต้อง 
     
12)ถ้ามีการให้โอกาสเพียงครัง้เดยีวแก่ผู้ที่เลีย่งภาษีให้ช าระ 
ภาษีย้อนหลงั โดยไมต้่องผา่นกระบวนการสอบสวนและไมต้่อง
รับโทษใดๆ 
     
13)ถ้ากรมสรรพากรประกาศวา่จะเพิ่มบทลงโทษส าหรับผู้ที่ 
เลีย่งภาษีหลงัจากการให้โอกาสครัง้เดยีวในการช าระภาษี 
ย้อนหลงั 
     
14) ถ้าคณุภาพการให้บริการของหนว่ยงานภาครัฐดขีึน้      
15) ถ้าคณุภาพการให้บริการของกรมสรรพากรดีขึน้      
16)ถ้าการให้บริการประชาชนของภาครัฐมีความเป็นธรรมมาก
ยิ่งขึน้โดยไมม่ีการเลอืกปฏิบตัิ 
     
17)ถ้าการจดัเก็บภาษีของกรมสรรพากรมีความเป็นธรรมมาก 
ยิ่งขึน้โดยไมม่ีการเลอืกปฏิบตัิ 
     
18) ถ้าภาครัฐมกีารคอรัปชัน่น้อยลง      
19) ถ้าทา่นเห็นขา่วหรือรับรู้มากขึน้วา่ คนที่หลกีเลีย่งภาษีหรือ
ช าระภาษีต า่กวา่ความเป็นจริงได้รับการลงโทษ 
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21. ท่านคิดวา่เป็นไปไดห้รือไม่ท่ีท่านหรือประชาชนโดยทัว่ไปจะแจ้งช ำระภำษตีรงกบัควำมเป็นจริงลดลง เช่น ยกเวน้การแจง้
รายไดบ้างส่วน ในกรณีดงัต่อไปน้ี กรุณาท าเคร่ืองหมาย  ในช่องท่ีตรงกบัความคิดเห็นของท่านมากท่ีสุด 
 เป็นไปไมไ่ด้ 
อยา่งมาก 
เป็นไป 
ไมไ่ด้ 
เป็นไปได้และ เป็นไป
ไมไ่ด้พอๆ กนั 
เป็น 
ไปได้ 
เป็นไปได้ 
อยา่งมาก 
1) ถ้ากรมสรรพากรแจ้งทา่นลว่งหน้า (ก่อนที่
ทา่นจะยื่นช าระภาษี) วา่ทา่นจะไมถ่กู
ตรวจสอบภาษี  
     
2) ถ้าทา่นเห็นขา่วหรือรับรู้มากขึน้ วา่มีคน
หลกีเลีย่งไมช่ าระภาษีหรือช าระภาษีต า่กวา่
ความเป็นจริง 
     
 
ส าหรับค าถามตอ่จากนี ้ทา่นสามารถข้ามค าถามท่ีทา่นไม่สบายใจท่ีจะตอบหรือไมเ่ก่ียวข้องกบัทา่นได้ อยา่งไร
ก็ตาม ค าตอบของทา่นจะไม่สามารถระบุถงึตัวท่านได้ในอนาคต และการรายงานจะแสดงผลเป็นคา่สถิตใิน
เชิงของกลุม่บคุคลเทา่นัน้  
 
22. ในปีหรือสองปีที่ผา่นมา ทา่นได้ยื่นแบบช าระภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดาหรือไม ่ 
   ยื่น 
   ไมไ่ด้ยื่น เพราะ (โปรดระบ)ุ ______________________ 
   ขอไมต่อบ 
 
ถา้ท่านไม่ไดยื้่นช าระภาษีในปีหรือสองปีทีผ่่านมา กรุณาข้ามไปทีข่้อ 27 
 
23. ทา่นทราบไหมวา่ทา่นจา่ยภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดาในอตัราเทา่ใด?  
   ได้รับการยกเว้นจากการเสยีภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดาตามกฎหมาย 
   10 % 
   20 % 
   30 % 
   37 % 
   ไมท่ราบ 
   ขอไมต่อบ 
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24. ถ้าเปรียบเทยีบภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดาที่ทา่นจา่ยกบับริการของภาครัฐที่ทา่นได้รับ ทา่นคิดวา่ทา่นจ่ายภาษี... 
   ต ่าเกินไปมาก 
   ต ่าเกินไป 
   ก าลงัเหมาะสม 
   สงูเกินไป 
   สงูเกินไปมาก 
   ขอไมต่อบ 
 
25. ทา่นรู้สกึอยา่งไรตอ่ข้อความตอ่ไปนี ้กรุณาท าเคร่ืองหมาย  ในช่องที่ตรงกบัตวัทา่นมากที่สดุ 
 ไมเ่ห็นด้วย
อยา่งยิ่ง 
ไมเ่ห็น
ด้วย 
เฉย
ๆ 
เห็น
ด้วย 
เห็นด้วย 
อยา่งยิ่ง 
ขอไม่
ตอบ 
1) ในปีหรือสองปีที่ผา่นมา ทา่นเต็มใจช าระภาษีเงินได้บคุคล
ธรรมดาทัง้หมดที่ทา่นต้องช าระตามกฎหมาย (ไมเ่ก่ียวกบัวา่
จริงๆ แล้วทา่นได้ช าระภาษีหรือไม่) 
 
      
2) ในปีหรือสองปีที่ผา่นมา ทา่นตัง้ใจที่จะกรอกข้อมลูอยา่ง
ถกูต้องเทา่ทีจ่ะเป็นไปได้ลงในแบบฟอร์มภาษีเงินได้บคุคล
ธรรมดา 
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26. กรุณาท าเคร่ืองหมาย  ในช่องที่ตรงกบัตวัทา่นมากที่สดุ 
 เป็นไป 
ไมไ่ด้ 
อยา่งมาก 
เป็น 
ไป
ไมไ่ด้ 
เป็นไปได้ และ
เป็นไป ไมไ่ด้
พอๆ กนั 
เป็น
ไป 
ได้ 
เป็นไป 
ได้อยา่ง
มาก 
ขอ 
ไม ่
ตอบ 
1) ในปีหรือสองปีที่ผา่นมา ทา่นคิดวา่เป็นไปได้มากหรือน้อย
เพียงใดที่ทา่นอาจจะไมไ่ด้แจ้งรายได้บางสว่นในการกรอก
แบบฟอร์มภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดา  
      
2) ในปีหรือสองปีที่ผา่นมา ทา่นคิดวา่เป็นไปได้มากหรือน้อย
เพียงใดที่ทา่นอาจจะแจ้งคา่ลดหยอ่นหรือคา่ใช้จา่ยตา่งๆ 
สงูเกินกวา่ความเป็นจริง 
      
 
27. ทา่นจะยื่นแบบช าระภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดาในปีหน้านีห้รือไม ่ 
   ยื่น 
   ไมไ่ด้ยื่น เพราะ (โปรดระบ)ุ ______________________ 
   ขอไมต่อบ 
 
28. ทา่นเห็นด้วยมากหรือน้อยเพยีงใดกบัประโยคนี ้กรุณาท าเคร่ืองหมาย  ในช่องที่ตรงกบัตวัทา่นมากที่สดุ 
 ไมเ่ห็นด้วย
อยา่งยิ่ง 
ไมเ่ห็น
ด้วย 
เฉย
ๆ 
เห็น
ด้วย 
เห็นด้วย 
อยา่งยิ่ง 
ขอไม่
ตอบ 
1)ทา่นเต็มใจในการช าระภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดาทัง้หมด ที่
ทา่นต้องช าระตามกฎหมายในปีหน้านี ้
      
2) ในปีหน้า ทา่นตัง้ใจที่จะกรอกข้อมลูอยา่งถกูต้อง 
เทา่ที่จะเป็นไปได้ลงในแบบฟอร์มภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดา 
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29. กรุณาท าเคร่ืองหมาย  ในช่องที่ตรงกบัตวัทา่นมากที่สดุ 
 เป็นไป
ไมไ่ด้
อยา่ง
มาก 
เป็นไป
ไมไ่ด้ 
เป็นไปได้
และ
เป็นไป
ไมไ่ด้
พอๆ กนั 
เป็นไปได้ เป็นไปได้
อยา่ง
มาก 
ขอไม่
ตอบ 
1) ในปีหน้านี ้ทา่นคิดวา่เป็นไปได้มากหรือน้อย
เพียงใดที่ทา่นอาจจะไมไ่ด้แจ้งรายได้บางสว่นในการ
กรอกแบบฟอร์มภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดา  
      
2) ในปีหน้านี ้ทา่นคิดวา่เป็นไปได้มากหรือน้อย
เพียงใดที่ทา่นอาจจะแจ้งคา่ลดหยอ่นหรือคา่ใช้จา่ย
ตา่งๆ สงูเกินกวา่ความเป็นจริง 
      
 
 
30. กรุณาให้ความเห็นของทา่นเพิ่มเติมตอ่ระบบบริหารการจดัเก็บภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดาของประเทศไทย ความเห็นของ
ทา่นสามารถรวมถึงสาเหตทุี่ทา่นคิดวา่ท าไมคนถึงเลีย่งภาษี ท าอยา่งไรถงึจะสามารถท าให้ประชาชนเตม็ใจเสยีภาษีมากยิง่ขึน้ 
รางวลัหรือบทลงโทษใดที่ทา่นคิดวา่ควรจะน ามาใช้ รัฐควรจะท าอะไรให้ประชาชนมากขึน้ เป็นต้น 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________  
 
มีค ำถำมต่อหน้ำถดัไป 
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โปรดกรอกข้อมูลส่วนตัวของท่าน 
 
เพศ  
   ชาย 
   หญิง 
อาย ุ  _________ ปี 
ระดบัการศกึษาสงูสดุ:  
   ประถมศกึษาหรือต ่ากวา่ 
   มธัยมศกึษาหรือเทยีบเทา่ 
   อนปุริญญา 
   ปริญญาตรี 
   ปริญญาโท 
   ปริญญาเอกหรือสงูกวา่ 
อาชีพ: (เลอืกทัง้หมดที่เก่ียวข้อง) 
   ข้าราชการ 
   พนกังานอื่นๆ ของรัฐ  
   พนกังานบริษัท 
   นกัธุรกิจ เจ้าของกิจการ ค้าขาย 
   ข้าราชการการเมือง นกัการเมือง 
   อาชีพอิสระ 
   อื่นๆ โปรดระบ ุ-
_________________________________ 
สถานภาพในการสมรสปัจจบุนั:  
   โสด 
   แตง่งาน 
ถ้าแตง่งาน ทา่นยื่นช าระภาษีอยา่งไร 
   ร่วมกบัคูส่มรส 
   แยกยื่นภาษี 
รายได้ทัง้หมดของทา่นหรือของทา่นกบัคูส่มรส ตาม
วิธีที่ทา่นยื่นช าระภาษี  
   ต ่ากวา่ 150,000 บาท ตอ่ปี หรือประมาณ 
12,500 บาท ตอ่เดือน 
   150,001-500,000 บาท ตอ่ปี หรือ
ประมาณ 12,500 – 42,000 บาท ตอ่เดือน 
   500,000-1,000,000 บาท ตอ่ปี หรือ
ประมาณ 42,000 – 83,000 บาท ตอ่เดือน 
   1,000,001-4,000,000 บาท ตอ่ปี หรือ
ประมาณ 83,000 – 330,000 บาท ตอ่เดือน 
   มากกวา่ 4,000,001 บาท ตอ่ปี หรือ
ประมาณ 333,000 บาท ตอ่เดือน 
จ านวนบตุร     _________ คน (ถ้าไมม่ตีอบ 0) 
ผู้ที่พึง่พาทา่นด้านการเงิน 
   เด็กอายตุ า่กวา่ 18 ปี  จ านวน____  คน 
   ผู้สงูอาย ุเกิน 60 ปี  จ านวน ____  คน 
   ผู้พิการ  จ านวน ____  คน 
   ผู้วา่งงาน จ านวน ____  คน 
 
จบแบบสอบถามเพียงเทา่นี ้ขอขอบพระคณุอีกครัง้ที่
ทา่นกรุณาเสยีสละเวลา 
ตอบแบบสอบถามนี ้หากทา่นมคี าถามหรือ
ข้อเสนอแนะใดๆ สามารถติดตอ่ผู้วิจยั 
นางสาวมณีขวญั จนัทรศร ได้ที่ manee@ku.edu 
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Appendix C 
Data Analysis Techniques 
 
All data analysis techniques are presented here. First, processing involving how to deal 
with ‘Prefer Not to Answer’ and missing data will be discussed. Next, factor analysis (both 
exploratory and confirmatory), which is used to separate tax compliance reasons into subgroups 
based on their similarity, and the cross-validation strategy to confirm those subgroups will be 
explained.  Finally, I will explain latent transition analysis (LTA), which is used to classify 
participants into different groups based on their tax compliance behaviors, and describe how I 
use independent variables (i.e. tax compliance reasons’ subgroups  and other demographic 
characteristics) to predict their behaviors. I used R (R Development Core Team, 2011) for pre-
analysis data processing and Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2011) for all other statistics. 
 
1. Pre-Analysis Data Processing Techniques 
All responses in ‘Prefer Not to Answer’ were all treated as missing data. Note that the 
frequencies of these responses on each dependent variable question were 9 to 29 percent.  
 All missing data will be handled by a maximum likelihood method, which is one of the 
best methods handling missing data (Graham, 2009; Schafer & Graham, 2002). The likelihood 
function will be tailored to fit in each response and skip all missing values. However, the whole 
data of a participant may be excluded from the analysis dataset if all variables in the analysis 
were missing (e.g. in LTA). In Mplus, latent transition analysis cannot account for auxiliary 
variables. Therefore, unfortunately, about 6% of participants were deleted from the analysis 
(listwise deletion). Multiple imputations could be done but the method to pool the results from 
LTA is still unclear. Thus, I leave this as a limitation of this study. 
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 For the income variable, I used averages of bounded income in each category to represent 
a value of each category. The last category (4,000,001 Baht per year or more) was assumed that 
the upper bound was 7,000,000 Baht per year, which the gap was equal to the second highest 
category. For the purpose of clarity, I used million Baht unit for income. Thus, the value of 
income of each category was 0.075 Million, 0.325 Million, 0.750 Million, 2.5 Million, and 5.5 
Million Baht per year. This variable is treated as if it is in the ratio scale. Based on the 
transformed scale, the average income was 0.335 Million Baht (SD = 0.628).  
 
2. Factor Analysis Techniques 
Because all items in Question 6 and 8 were measured in five-ordered categories (from 1 
very unlikely to 5 very likely), factor analysis on ordinal items and robust weighted least square 
estimation method were used. Robust weighted least square is an appropriate estimation method 
for non-normal distribution as maximum likelihood method could not be used for ordinal items 
because of multivariate normal distribution violation.  I used robust weighted least squared 
estimator, specifically WLSMV estimator in Mplus. See Flora and Curran (2004) for further 
details about the estimation method. 
 Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was used to suggest groups (factors) of tax compliance 
determinants in calibration sample. In EFA, researchers usually run multiple analyses by 
different number of factors or different ways of rotation in order to find the most fit/meaningful 
factors.  
To select the number of factors, model fit indices, the contribution of additional factors, 
and the interpretation of factor results were used. The selected number of factor should provide 
adequate fit that adding another factor will not be meaningful.  
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- Selecting Number of Factors  
There are many fit indices used for model fit evaluation. In this study, I used root mean 
squared error of approximation (RMSEA), comparative fit index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis index 
(TLI), and standardized root mean squared error (SRMR, which is available for CFA only).  For 
adequate fit, RMSEA should be less than .10, CFI should be greater than .90, TLI should be 
greater than .90, and SRMR should be less than .08. 
 Next, I checked whether an additional factor was meaningful via factor loadings. Factor 
loading is the measure of how large each factor contributes to each indicator. If factor loading of 
a factor on an indicator is close to 0, the factor does not explain any variation in the indicator. If 
factor loading is close to 1 or -1, the factor dominantly explains the indicator. If the additional 
factor does not have high factor loadings with any indicators, this additional factor should be 
dropped.  
Finally, all result factors should be meaningful for interpretation. The meaning of a factor 
is interpreted from the items that have high factor loading from the particular factor. Usually, 
researchers read the content of the items with high loadings, find their common things that these 
items measured, and use these common things as the meaning of a factor. Sometimes, the 
resulting factor loadings are not meaningful for interpretation, which means that the number of 
factors may not be correct.  
 
- Selecting Types of Rotation 
Factor loadings results also depend on different types of rotation. In EFA, different sets 
of factor loadings can provide exactly the same model fit. Researchers can pick one of the 
solutions that is easy to interpret. This situation is similar to choosing a different starting point in 
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explaining map direction. The target is still the same but picking the appropriate starting point 
can provide easier interpretation. EFA provides the different criteria for selecting an optimal 
factor loadings result by different rotation methods, such as Varimax, Quartimin, or Geomin. I 
used Quartimin in all analyses. The reasons I chose Quartimin rotation is that: 1) it is an oblique 
rotation, which allows factors to be correlated among one another and 2) this rotation 
theoretically provides only one high factor loading in each item. I also ran the results with other 
rotation methods, such as Geomin and Promax, but the results are similar to what I found by 
Quartimin. Thus, only the factor results from Quartimin will be reported in the results. See 
Browne (2001) for further details about rotation methods. 
After EFA, Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to validate the factor results 
from EFA on the validation sample. In validation sample, the high factor loadings from EFA 
solution were freely estimated in CFA. However, all small cross-loadings from EFA results were 
constrained to be 0 in CFA. Then, the model fit was evaluated by the same criteria described in 
EFA (except SRMR). The CFA results should provide good fits to support cross validation of 
factor results. After cross-validation processes, all samples (both calibration and validation 
samples) were analyzed by CFA. Then, the scores of each factor (i.e. factor scores) were 
estimated from all participants using refined regression method. As a result, tax compliance 
factors were derived from this analysis.  
 
3. Latent Transition Analysis Techniques 
LTA is used to classified participants into subgroups based on their characteristics in 
multiple timepoints (Kaplan, 2008; Nylund, 2007; Nylund, Asparouhov, & Muthén, 2007). Here, 
their responses regarding tax compliance behaviors (Questions 22, 25.2, 26.1, 26.2, 27, 28.2, 
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29.1 and 29.2) were used in the analysis. In each time point (past behavior and future intention), 
there were three questions: 1) whether the participants file tax (2 category), 2) whether they 
understate their income (5 ordered categories), and 3) whether they overstate deduction/expenses 
(5 ordered categories).  The purposes of LTA for this study are to obtain tax compliance classes 
and then gauge determinants of tax compliance by incorporating independent variables from 
factor analysis results to predict tax compliance classes. 
 
- Selecting Number of Classes 
Similar to EFA, LTA is usually exploratory.  The first step is to find the number of latent 
classes (groups) of participants. The criterion for selecting number of classes in LTA is similar to 
those of EFA. Researchers need the number of classes that provides a good model fit in which all 
classes are interpretable. If adding another class to the optimum number of classes, that 
additional class will not be meaningful.  
The model fit was evaluated by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) and Sample Size adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion (SSBIC). 
The AIC, BIC, and SSBIC were used to compare the solutions based on different numbers of 
classes. The solution with the least values of these indices provides the best model fit. If there are 
different suggested solutions among fit indices, the researchers should choose the one with the 
best interpretation.  
To interpret each class, the proportions of endorsing each response from each class are 
used in the interpretation of the meanings of all classes (similar to factor loading in factor 
analysis). For example, a class may be interpreted as not filing tax group if the proportion of file 
tax by this class is low (close to 0).  
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In this study, LTA was used to investigate how people change class membership between 
past behaviors and future intention via a multinomial logistic regression with dummy variables, 
where the intercept of the reference class was set to 0. See Nylund (2007) for further details 
about LTA equations. Here, the class interpreted as “not filing tax” is used as the reference class.  
 
- Finding tax compliance determinants  
Next, independent variables (tax compliance factors and demographic variables) were 
introduced to the model to find determinants of tax compliance. These independent variables 
have two roles: 1) predicting tax compliance classes in past behavior and 2) predicting tax 
compliance classes in their future intention (controlling for tax compliance classes in their past 
behavior). This study will not analyze the interaction between an independent variable and past 
tax compliance classes because of nonconvergence. 
AIC is used to test the significance of the independent variables by comparing two 
models (free and fixed). The first model (free) estimates regression coefficients of an 
independent variable in all log odds equations. The second model (fixed) constrains the 
regression coefficients to be 0 in all log odds equations. If the first (free) model has a lower AIC, 
the effect of the independent variable onto class membership exists i.e. significant. If the second 
model (fixed) has a lower AIC, the effect of the independent variable onto class membership 
does not exist i.e. not significant. As a result, tax compliance determinants were determined.  
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Appendix D 
Interview Protocol and Interview Questions 
 
Oral Consent Procedures 
 
As a student in the University of Kansas's Department of Public Administration, I am 
conducting my dissertation on the perceptions of Thai tax administration. The objective is to 
propose ways of improving our tax administration. I would like to interview you to obtain your 
views on current tax administration and ways you think could improve Thai tax administration. 
You have no obligation to participate and you may discontinue your involvement at any time. 
 
Participation in this interview indicates your willingness to take part in this study. The 
interview will take approximately 20 minutes of your time. Please indicate your willingness 
to include your name in the research findings. If you do not agree to disclose your name, your 
name will not be associated in any publication or presentation with the information collected 
about you or with the research findings from this study.  
 
Should you have any questions about this project or your participation in it you may ask 
me Maneekwan Chandarasorn, Ph.D. candidate, Public Administration Department, the 
University of Kansas at manee@ku.edu or call 081-443-4222. You may also contact my faculty 
supervisor, Professor H. George Frederickson at the Department of Public Administration at the 
University of Kansas at gfred@ku.edu or call +1(785) 864-9095. If you have any questions about 
your rights as a research participant, you may call the Human Subjects Protection Office at 
+1(785) 864-7429 or email mdenning@ku.edu. 
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Thai Tax Administration Perception Interview Questions 
ประเดน็กำรสัมภำษณ์เร่ืองกำรรับรู้เกีย่วกบัภำษเีงนิได้บุคคลธรรมดำในประเทศไทย 
1. What is your opinion on tax evasion situation in Thailand?  
ท่านมีความคิดเห็นอย่างไรเก่ียวกบัการหลบเลี่ยงภาษีในเมืองไทย 
- Do you think why some people don’t file their personal income taxes? 
ท่านคิดวา่ท าไมคนบางกลุม่ถงึไมย่ื่นช าระภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดา 
- Do you think why some people don’t declare their incomes accurately when filing 
personal income taxes? 
ท่านคิดวา่ท าไมคนบางกลุม่ถงึย่ืนช าระภาษีเงินได้บคุคลธรรมดาไมต่รงกบัความเป็นจริง 
- Do you think Thai people perceive tax evasion as acceptable behavior? Is the 
situation getting better or worse comparing to the past? 
ในความเห็นของท่าน ท่านคิดวา่การหลบเลี่ยงภาษีเป็นพฤติกรรมท่ียอมรับได้ในสงัคมไทยหรือไม ่
อย่างไร สถานการณ์ในปัจจบุนัดีขึน้หรือแย่ลงกวา่ในอดีต 
2. What are the weaknesses and strengths of current Thai tax administration system?  
ท่านคิดวา่อะไรคือจดุออ่นและจดุแข็งของการบริหารการจดัเก็บภาษีของประเทศไทยในปัจจบุนั  
3. What are the factors that affect tax complaint behavior of Thai people? 
ท่านคิดวา่ปัจจยัใดบ้างท่ีสง่ผลกระทบตอ่การยินยอมจ่ายภาษีของคนไทย 
- Enforcement perception (e.g. audit rate, penalties) 
การรับรู้เก่ียวกบัการบงัคบัใช้กฎหมาย เช่น อตัราการตรวจสอบภาษี บทลงโทษ 
- Incentive perception (e.g. rewards, tax amnesty) 
การรับรู้เก่ียวกบัการให้รางวลัและสิ่งจงูใจตา่งๆ  
- Tax/governmental administration perception (e.g. procedural fairness, 
responsiveness) 
การรับรู้เก่ียวกบัการบริหารจดัการของภาครัฐและหน่วยงานจดัเก็บภาษี เช่น ความมีประสิทธิภาพ ความ
เป็นธรรม ความโปร่งใส  
4. What are the strategies you suggest could help make taxpayers become more compliant? 
ท่านคิดวา่มีกลยทุธ์ใดท่ีจะสามารถช่วยให้ผู้มีหน้าท่ีช าระภาษีย่ืนช าระภาษีอย่างถกูต้องมากขึน้  
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Appendix E 
 
Interview Participants 
 
 
Tax expert no.1: High-ranking public official/tax administrator from Ministry of Finance, 
Thailand. 30 years of experience in income and consumption tax administration. 
 
Tax expert no.2: Medium-ranking public official/tax policy expert from Ministry of Finance, 
Thailand. Senior Economist. 8 years of experience in income and consumption tax policy.  
 
Tax expert no.3: High-ranking public official/tax policy expert from Ministry of Finance, 
Thailand. Head of Property Tax Policy Division. 30 years of experience in tax policy. 
 
Tax expert no.4: High-ranking public official/tax policy expert from Ministry of Finance, 
Thailand. Head of Income and Consumption Tax Policy Division. 10+ years of experience in 
economic policy. 
 
Tax expert no.5: University professor from Thammasat University, Thailand. Associate 
Professor in Economics. Major contributions in Local Public Finance and Decentralization. 
Work regularly as a consultant to the Thai government. Ph.D. from the United States.  
 
Tax expert no.6: Executive-level public official/tax policy expert from Ministry of Finance 
Thailand. Director of Bureau of Policy on Financial Benefit Protection System. 20+ years of 
experience in tax policy.  
 
Tax expert no.7: Medium-ranking public official/tax policy expert from Ministry of Finance, 
Thailand. Senior Economist. 5+ years of experience in income and consumption tax policy.   
 
Tax expert no.8: Medium-ranking public official/tax policy expert from Ministry of Finance, 
Thailand. Senior Economist. 5+ years of experience in fiscal policy and income and consumption 
tax policy. Ph.D. from the United States. 
 
Tax expert no.9: Executive-level public official/tax policy expert from Ministry of Finance. 
Director of Saving and Investment Policy Bureau. 30 years of experience in general tax policy 
and income and consumption tax policy.  
 
Tax expert no.10: University professor/President from Durakij Pundit University, Thailand. 
Former Minister of Education of Thailand. Associate professor of Economics. Well-known 
columnist. Experiences in business sector. Ph.D. from the United States. 
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Tax expert no.11: High-ranking public official/tax policy expert from Ministry of Finance, 
Thailand. Head of Tax Incentive Policy Division. 30 years of experience in tax policy. 
 
Tax expert no.12: Medium-ranking public official/tax administrator from Ministry of Finance, 
Thailand. 3 years of experience in income and consumption tax administration.  
 
Tax expert no.13: University professor from Thai University Research Association, Thailand. 
Professor of Public Administration. Major contributions in Bureaucratic Reform. Former 
Director-General of the Office of the Educational Council of Thailand. Ph.D. from the United 
States. 
 
Tax expert no.14: Executive public official/Deputy Director-General from Bureau of the Budget, 
Thailand. 30 years of experience in budgeting. M.P.A. from the United States. 
 
 Tax expert no.15: High-ranking public official/tax policy expert from Ministry of Finance, 
Thailand. Head of Export Promotion Sub-Division. 10+ years of experience in tax policy 
particularly in tax incentives. 
 
 
 
